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Abstract
The purpose of this project is to outline a Kantian form of cosmopolitan theory in relation 
to the normative requirements necessary for a constitutional global order and to provide a 
comprehensive defense of cosmopolitan ethics against realist, pluralist and 
communitarian critiques. The project consists in a theoretical exploration of Kantian 
cosmopolitanism and the normative requirements consistent with, and necessary to, a 
Kantian based cosmopolitan constitution. The project addresses such topics as Kantian 
cosmopolitanism, the principle of cosmopolitan law, cosmopolitan right, the laws of 
hospitality, the normative principles behind the idea of a federation of states, a 
cosmopolitan epistemology of culture and a possible normative basis for a Kantian form 
of global distributive justice. Contrary to many historical conceptions of 
cosmopolitanism, the project interprets Kantian cosmopolitan thought as a form of 
international constitutional jurisprudence that requires minimal ethical / legal demands 
versus the more rigorous demand of establishing a world state or a utopian moral order. 
By viewing Kantian cosmopolitan theory as a form of international jurisprudence, it has 
better promise to satisfy communitarian, realist and pluralist concerns without 
surrendering cosmopolitan principles of human worth and global ethical order. In contrast 
to an extreme form of cosmopolitanism, this project provides an alternative Kantian 
version of cosmopolitanism that allows for various ethical perspectives on a culturally 
local and state level, while providing a minimal global ethical umbrella for international 
cooperation and cosmopolitan principles. However, this thesis does not represent a strict 
interpretation of Kant or of his political theory. What this project provides is a Kantian 
based form of cosmopolitanism, which not only pulls from Kant, but also from 
contemporary cosmopolitan arguments found throughout political philosophy. In this 
regard, it provides a more comprehensive understanding of Kantian cosmopolitanism and 
what normative implications this vision has for contemporary international political 
theory.
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Song of the Universal
Come said the Muse,
Sing me the song no poet has yet chanted,
Sing me the universal.
All, all for immortality,
Love like the light silently wrapping all,
Nature’s amelioration blessing all,
The blossoms, fruits of ages, orchards divine and certain, 
Forms, objects, growths, humanities, to spiritual images ripening.
Is it a dream?
Nay, but the lack of it the dream,
And failing it life’s lore and wealth a dream,
And all the world a dream.
— Walt Whitman
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Introduction
“We cannot live for ourselves alone. Our lives are connected by a thousand invisible threads, and along 
these sympathetic fibers our actions run as causes and return to us as results.” -- Herman Melville
Despite the fact , that the above quote was written over a hundred years after the 
death of Immanuel Kant, it shares a common cosmopolitan spirit. The spirit is implicit in 
that it relates the nature of human interdependency and the consequences of our behavior 
towards one another. Although Melville is not usually associated with cosmopolitan 
theory and is generally portrayed as a representative of rich Victorian adventurists, 
Melville was much more than a fiction writer, spending significant time writing critical 
essays on the global philosophy of Kant and Hugo Grotius. The quote by Melville 
reflects a cosmopolitan belief of universal human coexistence, for it mirrors a Kantian 
cosmopolitan concern, that we are all inextricably connected, that “a violation of rights in 
one part of the world is felt everywhere-”1 Moreover, Melville’s quote is loaded with a 
Kantian cosmopolitan universal principle, that human’s cannot live independently of one 
another and therefore should act towards others as if those actions were to dictate the 
substance of returned consequences. This could be extended to a form of Kant’s 
categorical imperative, where individuals should “act only according to the maxim 
whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” It would 
seem that Melville is in agreement with Kant’s cosmopolitanism, that we should monitor 
our actions as if we would want our actions to be the universal actions of everyone, 
which ultimately “run as causes and return to us as results.” Since “we cannot live for 
ourselves alone,” Melville, like Kant, suggests that we need to remember that our lives 
are unavoidably connected and that our moral actions must reflect the fact of human 
interdependence and unavoidable coexistence.
It might seem odd to introduce a thesis on Kantian cosmopolitanism by making a 
comparison with Melville. Nevertheless, the passage is a striking continuation of a long 
cosmopolitan legacy and highlights the major premises inherent in both Kantian and
‘Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in Hans Reiss (ed.), Kant’s Political Writings. (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1970), pg. 107. The italics are Kant’s.
2 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. J. Ellington (trans.), (Cambridge, Hackett 
Publishing Company, Inc., 1981), pg. 30.
current cosmopolitan thought and debate. Cosmopolitan theory, it seems to me, has 
attracted new criticism as well as newfound interest due to the increase in the 
phenomenon usually described as globalization. There is considerable debate about what 
globalization is, what it entails, what effects it has, how to define it, or if it is a new 
phenomenon or if it is as old as history itself. Regardless of how we define globalization, 
it is widely accepted that the world is becoming increasingly interconnected at an 
exponential rate and that this process has been, and will continue to be, a real fact for 
human relations on earth. For my purpose, I regard globalization as a natural 
phenomenon in our lives and I define it as broadly as possible, in that it encompasses 
growing connection between various people, nations, cultures, corporations,, 
governments, environments, economies and movements which are ultimately bound by 
the spherical shape of the earth.
The increase of cosmopolitan debate in conjunction with new approaches for 
understanding the effects of globalization illustrates that political theorists, among others, 
have increasingly realized the necessity to philosophically and politically address new 
global considerations of human interconnectedness. Most cosmopolitan theories, if not 
all, are premised on the fact that the world is an interconnected and interdependent 
community, which is bound by the spherical shape of the earth, where our moral 
responsibility toward all humanity should be understood as being a universal and 
globalized concern. For the cosmopolitan, the interconnectedness of humanity translates 
to a cosmopolitan ethical concern “whose primary allegiance is to the community of 
human beings in the entire world.”3 For Kant and Melville, as well as with most 
cosmopolitan theorists, the limited sphere of the earth creates a common human 
community and provides the philosophical motivation behind cosmopolitan enthusiasm.4
Therefore, the use of the quote by Melville provides a simple way to relate the 
assumptions and premises found within the tradition of cosmopolitan theory in general, 
but also found within this thesis in particular. The first premise of this thesis, highlighted 
wonderfully by Melville, is the suggestion which underlines most globalization theories
3Martha Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism.” The Boston Review. 19, (5), 1994, pg. 3.
4 1 borrow the phrase cosmopolitan enthusiasm from Georg Cavallar as found in Kant and the Theory and 
Practice of International Right (Cardiff, University o f South Wales Press, 1999).
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and those cosmopolitans associated with political theory. The main premise is that the 
world is becoming increasingly interconnected and that this increased interconnectedness 
has created a need to consider political issues from a broader and more universally human 
standpoint. Like most cosmopolitan theories, this thesis is based on the assumption that 
globalization creates an increasingly interconnected global community and has therefore 
also created a need for new theories to adjudicate the problems associated with this 
growing interdependence. Although there exist several arguments for and against the 
positive effects of globalization and the formulation of any global social order, these 
arguments seem to support, and not discredit, the standpoint that corresponding forms of 
normative theorizing are needed to grapple with the new benefits and burdens associated 
with globalization. Intuitively speaking, as the world becomes increasingly more 
interdependent and socially interactive, cosmopolitan concerns for peaceful coexistence 
and cohabitation seem to be concerns that need to be philosophically addressed. As the 
international environment has evolved, so must political theory and the concerns they are 
designed to reconcile. As Melville suggests, we no longer live in a world of community 
isolation. The international arena has evolved into an extremely interdependent, culturally 
transient and globalized environment.5 If this environment of global interdependence is to 
peacefully evolve, it is important to find recognizable ethical principles that not only 
facilitate greater cooperation, but that also protect the valuable pluralist and autonomous 
concerns of various communities impacted by globalization.
The second cosmopolitan belief highlighted by Melville stems directly from the 
acceptance that globalization is both a real and dialectic phenomenon.6 Since the world 
is, so to speak, getting smaller, and the sharing of our world with others is more
5I am assuming that the effects of globalization are in fact forcing communities to relate with one another in 
both positive and negative ways that have not been historically prevalent. For a detailed discussion of 
globalization and its implications see, D. Held, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt, & J. Perraton, Global 
Transformations (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999).
^ h e  use of the term dialectic is meant in its Habermasian form, namely that globalization has two sides, 
one promoting more interconnectedness, resulting in greater economic markets, democracies and peace 
between democratic states; while also promoting greater economic inequality, ideological ethic conflict and 
a failure to secure human development. The result is that globalization makes an environment for 
cosmopolitanism feasible, but only if  we are successful in implementing the normative principles necessary 
to make globalization a peaceful and positive evolutionary process versus a process which creates increased 
networks of possible conflict. For a greater discussion of globalization and the resulting philosophical 
implications, see Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity. (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 
1990).
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inevitable, we should continue to theorize about the possibility of global interaction in 
relation to a minimal set of normative principles.7 Without common normative principles 
to guide the increased benefits and burdens of global dependency, there is a greater 
possibility that our human interactions will become increasingly confrontational. As Kant 
himself developed it in The Metaphysics o f Morals, cosmopolitanism should be 
understood as a set of genuinely agreed constraints governing what people can reasonably
Q
expect in the course of living alongside one another. It is from a normative conception 
for basic rules of cosmopolitan law that it is possible to establish a foundation for a 
minimal ethical cosmopolitan order. An international order that not only satisfies 
cosmopolitan concerns of human worth, but that is also not guilty of being imperialistic, 
idealistically utopian, or grossly universal beyond the minimal normative principles that 
make the peaceful existence of individuals, associations, cultures, and states, in a 
pluralistic global society possible.
I. An Abridged History of Cosmopolitan Thought 
and the Connections to Kantian Cosmopolitanism
The cosmopolitan idea that human beings are globally connected and share 
responsibilities to each other on the basis of a common humanity is not new.9 Around the 
year 300 BC, the Cynic philosopher Diogenes of Sinope claimed that humans were all 
kosmopolites (universal citizens) and that we should shrug off the coil of xenophobic
7My major assumption with globalization is that it has both created the need for cooperation and a 
corresponding need for a mechanism to regulate new problems associated with this interdependence. 
Although I understand that there exist several arguments against the positive effects o f globalization and 
social order, I largely accept and posit a view that globalization is in fact occurring and that this 
phenomenon creates a corresponding need for some form of regulating normative order. For a more 
detailed discussion of globalization and the corresponding need for the international regulation of these 
problems, see David Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995), specifically, 
chps. 4, 5 & 6. Also see D. Held and M. Koenig-Archibugi (eds.), Taming Globalization: Frontiers of 
Governance. (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2003).
8Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals. M. Gregor (ed.), (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1996), pg. 90-110.
9 The ebb and tide of cosmopolitan thinking seems as old as humanity itself. Although we do not know 
when cosmopolitan thinking began, we can categorize western cosmopolitan thought into roughly six 
historical periods, Old Stoa (500-206 BC), Middle Stoa (206-51BC), Late Stoa (51BC -180AD), 
Renaissance Neostocicism, Enlightenment (1500-1800 AD), and what I would argue is a renewed stage 
arising from the end of World War II. For a comprehensive history o f cosmopolitan thought, see Derek 
Heater, World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History o f Western Political 
Thought (New York, St. Martins Press, 1996).
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particularism in order to behave towards one another as common citizens o f the world. 
Refusing to define himself by place of birth, Diogenes responded to questions regarding 
his communal affiliation by proclaiming “I am a citizen of the world.” From what we 
know of Diogenes and the other Cynics, their philosophy advocated a universal 
conception of morality and argued against the dominance of a morality based on national 
origin alone. These ideas were further developed by the philosophy of Crates of Thebes, 
and most importantly, through the Old Stoa schools of Zeno of Citium and Chrysippus.
Continuing for half a millennium, the cosmopolitan legacy was developed from 
Cynic and Old Stoa writings by the philosophical works of Cicero, Seneca and Marcus 
Aurelius. Unlike the Cynic philosophy of Diogenes, the Roman Stoics’ produced a more 
sophisticated exposition of cosmopolitan theory. Where Diogenes has been given credit 
for coining the phase kosmopolites, it is through middle and late Stoic philosophy that 
cosmopolitanism received a more comprehensive and elaborate foundation. Nevertheless, 
the traditions behind the development of these foundations are complicated. It would take 
an extensive piece of writing to detail the various theoretical nuances and transitions 
found throughout the chronology of Stoic cosmopolitanism. For the sake of brevity, it is 
sufficient to summarize Stoic cosmopolitanism as containing roughly four common 
themes.
The first of these themes is the idea that every human being is a member of the 
same species and therefore is part of a unified community. Borrowing from earlier Cynic 
philosophers, the Stoics’ maintained that humans are members of two communities, the 
community of our birth and the community of humankind. As Seneca wrote, we should 
“measure the boundaries of our nation by the sun;”10 although we are bom into particular 
communities, humankind remains a single species without boundaries but those of the 
immortal realm. As with other Stoics, Seneca believed it is because of our common 
humanity that we have a universal moral purpose and a duty to respect this moral concern 
as mutual citizens of the world regardless of our place of birth.
The second theme shared by most Stoic philosophers is that the human species 
has a common capacity for human reason and communication. For the Stoic, the shared 
capacity for reason is the basis for a community of human beings. It is from this human
10 Seneca, De Otio. A. Long & D. Sedley eds., (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), pg. 431.
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ability to reason and communicate that we can derive a universal respect for human
worth. As Cicero wrote, the “bond of connection is reason and speech, which... associate
men together and unite them in a sort of natural fraternity.”11 The capacity for reason has
played a critical role in Stoic philosophy. As with later enlightenment theories, the
Stoics’ placed considerable moral significance in a shared capacity for reason and derived
all political principles in relation to the universal quality of human reason. Aurelius best
exemplifies the Stoic connection between reason, communication, law and political
obligation when he wrote:
“If the intellectual capacity is common to us all, common too is the reason, 
which makes us rational creatures. If so, that reason is common which tells 
us to do or not to do. If so, law is common. If so, we are citizens. If so, we 
are fellow members of an organized community. If so, the universe is as it 
were a state -  of what other single polity can the whole race of mankind 
be said to be fellow members? And from it, this common state, we get the 
intellectual, the rational, and the legal instinct, or whence do we get 
them?”12
A third theme linking Stoic philosophy is the concept of universal law and 
teleology. Despite the fact that each philosopher employed a different teleology, almost 
every Stoic philosopher suggested that there was a divine source for a universal law of 
nature. Stoic teleology was generally used to illustrate the universality between humans 
in relation to natural law and heavenly purpose. This tradition continued far into modem 
political thought and can be seen to have influenced the natural law theories of John 
Locke and Hugo Grotius. It was not until the work of Kant and more contemporary 
cosmopolitans that heavenly arguments for universal law were abandoned, or at least 
replaced, by other non-theistic metaphysical foundations.
The fourth theme found within the Stoic tradition is the idea that human reason 
should be in harmony with nature and universal law. The Stoics firmly believed that the 
human species had a unifying common purpose and that this purpose served as a 
universal natural law with which all human law should comply. As Cicero states, “true 
law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging
11 Cicero, De Officiis. M.T. Griffin &E.M. Atkins eds., (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
Book I, (50), pg. 21.
12 Marcus Aurelius, The Meditations. (New York, Hackett, 1983), Sect. 14.
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and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its 
prohibitions... We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and we need 
not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it.”13 The influence of this 
statement in the formation of Kant’s cosmopolitanism is enormous. From this statement 
we can see the foundation for three important Kantian cosmopolitan principles. First, 
morality and law should be derived and built upon one another and that they are 
discoverable through our innate capacity for reasoning. Second, this innate capacity for 
reason and reflection allows us to be moral beings and therefore also bestows upon all 
humans a universal worth. Third, the universality of human worth cannot be over-ruled 
by local commands or decrees, but must be understood as creating universal obligations 
and harmonious purpose between all human beings. In this regard, both Kant and the 
Stoics believed that we are obligated to respect the natural worth of all human beings, 
regardless of where people come from and irrespective of local decree.
Although cosmopolitan philosophy suffered an extended period of silence after 
the death of Marcus Aurelius, there was a renewed interest in it between the period of 
1500 and 1800 AD. Philosophers such as Francis Bacon, John Locke, Denis Diderot, 
Hugo Grotius, Thomas Paine, F.M.A. Voltaire and most notably for this project Kant, 
outlined strong commitments to various forms of cosmopolitanism within their political 
theory. However, there is a significant difference between the majority of natural law 
theorists and the cosmopolitanism of Kant. Building on the foundations laid by Thomas 
Hobbes, natural law theory promoted the contractual creation of a sovereign state as the 
ultimate source for ethical law and human emancipation. Inherent in this type of 
contractrian argument is the idea that self-interested individuals contract with one another 
to create political institutions of mutual preservation and right. Nevertheless, contracts 
between individuals immediately create boundaries between contracted citizens and other 
non-citizens who are not considered to be obligated members of the political community. 
Although many natural law theorists sought limitations on state power in order to 
promote the universal natural rights of individual cooperators, they nevertheless did not 
always argue for strong principles of universal natural law that created imperative moral 
obligations between bounded political communities.
13 Cicero, Ibid.
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It was from Kant’s development of cosmopolitan theory that stronger 
commitments to Stoic universal principles were developed away from, and as a 
supplement to, the natural law tradition. Unlike the natural law tradition of jus gentium, 
Kant suggested that a higher cosmopolitan law was necessary to limit the law o f nations 
and international conflicts often legitimated by political claims to absolute sovereignty. In 
line with Stoic universalism, Kant believed that a theory of cosmopolitan law was 
preferable in fostering universal human advancement and security. Although Kant held 
the state to be an extremely important component in the formation of moral law and a 
cosmopolitan constitution, he believed that “no one has more original right to possession 
of the earth than anyone else, and therefore all contracts short of a final cosmopolitan 
form of association are provisional.”14 In this regard, Kant makes a dramatic move away 
from the traditional law o f nations by advocating an additional principle of cosmopolitan 
law in order to advance an ethical community based on the inherent moral worth of all 
human beings.15 The Kantian distinction between international law, the role of states and 
cosmopolitan law will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three. For the purpose of 
providing the philosophical and overall historical background for the type of Kantian 
cosmopolitanism that will be defended throughout this project, it is with Cicero, Seneca 
and Aurelius that more extrapolation is helpful here. As Martha Nussbaum has 
successfully demonstrated, Kant’s cosmopolitanism drew greatly on the universalism 
found within Roman Stoic philosophy.16
The connection between Stoic cosmopolitanism and Kant is considerable. 
Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to assume that Kant’s cosmopolitanism is simply 
regurgitating Stoic principles. Kant significantly abandons and transforms various Stoic 
foundations to fit his own cosmopolitan vision. Where Kant seems to mirror Stoic 
philosophy is in his moral assertions for a kingdom of free rational beings that are equal
14 Sharon Anderson-Gold, Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights. (Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 
2001), pg. 13.
15 More detail and explanation regarding the Kantian move away from ju s gentium to cosmopolitan law is 
provided in Chapter Three of this project. For another discussion on this topic see Daniele Archibugi, 
“Immanuel Kant, Cosmopolitan Law and Peace,” European Journal of International Relations. Vol. 1 (4), 
1995.
16 Martha Nussbaum, “Kant and Cosmopolitanism,” in Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan 
Ideal. J. Bohman & M. Lutz-Bachmann (eds.), (Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1997).
15
17in humanity and treated always as an end, no matter where the person is from. Other
connections are located in Kant’s preferred usage of Stoic terminology, in his insistence
on universal justice and law, the communal possession of the earth in common and in
1 8discussions for world citizenship.
However, Kant distanced his political philosophy from the Stoics in four critical 
ways. First, Kant did not make exceptions to the cosmopolitan idea of a universal and 
unified human community and thus did not accept slavery.19 Unlike some Stoics, Kant 
maintains that human beings are a single species of moral worth and that the Aristotelian 
concept of natural slave was a xenophobic invention with immoral implications. 
Second, Kant did not endorse the Stoic acceptance of colonialism and expansionism. 
According to Kant, colonialism and any military enlargement of an empire or state was 
immoral and contradictory to cosmopolitan morality. Third, Kant’s cosmopolitanism 
sought to separate theology from moral purpose. Whereas the Stoics espoused a divine 
source of universal morality, Kant promoted a universal purpose derived from practical 
reason and his metaphysics of morals. Although many have argued that Kant is 
unsuccessful in completely removing divine purpose from his overall cosmopolitan 
project, Kant himself claimed to have done so. Whether or not we believe he was 
mistaken in this claim, he himself wished to draw a distinction from Stoic teleology and it 
is for this reason that we can suggest a perceived difference. Fourth, Kant did not share 
the Stoic belief that human passions were completely malleable and could therefore be 
permanently changed away from feelings of violence and hatred. An underlying Stoic 
understanding of human nature is that human passions could be reeducated away from 
immoral action and influenced towards a communal love as citizens o f the world. Kant 
did not assume that humans could always know perfect rationality, or could always be 
relied upon to understand cosmopolitan morality and obligation. In addition, Kant
17 Ibid.. pg. 36.
18 Klaus Reich, “Kant and Greek Ethics,” Mind. 48, (1939), pg. 338-354.
19 Some feminists have challenged whether Kant included women in his cosmopolitan equation. These 
arguments are based on some of Kant’s side comments on the irrationality o f women. However, I don’t 
believe Kant’s personal bias, if the feminist critique is correct, has any effect on how we have to understand 
Kant’s overall philosophy. Although Kant may have held views of women that reflected the chauvinism of 
his day, these beliefs do not represent inherent problems with his cosmopolitanism in general and we can 
simply include women as rational agent’s worthy of equal respect.
20 Christine M. Korsgaard, “Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value” in Ethics. 96, (April, 1986), pg. 
486-505.
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maintained that human passions were not completely malleable, but could only be 
partially influenced by institutional conditioning and education. According to Kant, 
human nature had certain basic passions that no amount of social engineering could 
eradicate. In this regard, there was a need for a formalized and institutionalized 
cosmopolitan law to appropriately reflect a universal respect for humanity. Unlike most 
Stoic philosophy, Kant sought stronger institutional guarantees and frameworks for his 
cosmopolitan law. What is important in our understanding of Kantian cosmopolitanism, 
is that we recognize the fact that Kant (and various forms of Kantianism) have altered 
both the Stoic and natural law tradition, advocating a much stronger and more positive 
conception of cosmopolitan law. It is in relation to the normative elements involved in a 
Kantian understanding of a cosmopolitan constitution and cosmopolitan law that the 
remaining chapters of this project will further examine.
II. Contemporary Cosmopolitan Themes 
and the Distinctiveness of a Kantian Approach to Cosmopolitanism
As was mentioned earlier, there is considerable interest within contemporary 
scholastic debate regarding the effects of globalization, interdependency and 
cosmopolitanism. Contemporary cosmopolitan arguments are generally based on an 
empirical understanding of global cohabitation and a corresponding ethical perspective 
grounded on “the acknowledgment of some notion of common humanity that translates 
ethically into an idea of shared or common moral duties toward others by virtue of this
• 91humanity.” Nevertheless, despite the fact that cosmopolitanism is currently 
experiencing somewhat of a renaissance, there is still considerable confusion regarding 
what a cosmopolitan stance entails. Although cosmopolitanism is often discussed 
between academics, it is not always clear what cosmopolitanism is supposed to mean.
99Cosmopolitanism, like any discipline, contains many facets and variations. As 
was discussed in the last section, the legacy of cosmopolitanism finds its roots dating as
21Catherine Lu, “The One and Many Faces of Cosmopolitanism,” Journal o f Political Philosophy. Vol. 8, 
(2), June 2000, pg. 245.
22 For a fairly comprehensive bibliography o f cosmopolitan movements see, D. Archibugi and M. Koening- 
Archibugi, “Globalization, Democracy and Cosmopolis: A Bibliographical Essay,” in D. Archibugi (ed.), 
Debating Cosmopolitics. (London, Verso, 2003), pg. 273-291.
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far back as 500 BC and has undergone many transformations. Since Diogenes first 
claimed that he was a citizen o f the world, cosmopolitanism as a political theory has 
evolved to include, and has grown to influence, a wide distribution of subjects and 
disciplines. Subjects as disperse as Development Studies, International Relations, Gender 
Studies, Human Rights, International Law, Economics, Political Theory, Social 
Anthropology and Philosophy to name a few, have embraced aspects of cosmopolitan 
thinking within their respective sub-fields. Where an interdisciplinary commonality 
seems to exist between them is in regards to the normative foundations behind their 
various cosmopolitan approaches and applications. As Thomas Pogge has suggested, 
most contemporary cosmopolitan theories share three general themes. First, 
cosmopolitanism maintains that the unit of ultimate moral concern are individual human 
beings. Second, cosmopolitan theories share the element that this moral concern should 
be equally applied, meaning that “the status of ultimate concern attaches to every living 
human equally.”23 Third, cosmopolitanism requires generality in its application, 
proclaiming that humans are the ultimate moral concern for everyone, regardless of race, 
nationality, social status and religious belief. As Pogge has pointed out, most 
cosmopolitan approaches advocate in various degrees three normative elements, 
individualism, egalitarianism and universalism.
A further distinction within cosmopolitan thought can be made between what 
Charles Beitz has called moral cosmopolitanism and institutional cosmopolitanism. Beitz 
makes a distinction between an institutional cosmopolitanism and the normative moral 
foundations that underline any institutional framework designed to facilitate them. For 
Beitz, moral cosmopolitanism demands “that every human being has a global stature as 
the ultimate unit of moral concern.”24 As Brian Barry has pointed out, “moral 
cosmopolitanism leaves open the final questions of the ideal constitution of international 
society.”25 The distinction is related to, but separate from institutional cosmopolitanism, 
which is more focused on how to implement the normative considerations of it’s moral
23 Thomas Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” Ethics. 103 (1992), pg. 49-50.
24 Ibid.. pg. 49. Quoted by Charles Beitz in “International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey o f  
Recent Thought” World Politics. (511. pg. 287.
25 Brian Barry, “International Society From a Cosmopolitan Perspective,” in D. Maple & T. Nardin (eds.), 
International Society. (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1998), pg. 143.
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counterpart. Beitz has suggested that institutional cosmopolitanism, “holds that the 
world’s political structure should be reshaped so that states and other political units are
• 96brought under the authority of supranational agencies of some kind.” Although both are 
closely related and it is difficult to imagine institutional strategies without some 
normative grounding, it is an important distinction to be made, for it is critical to 
understand that “there is no automatic move from ethical premises to any particular
97conclusion about the ideal world constitution.” In other words, moral cosmopolitanism 
is concerned with what should be done ethically, while an institutional component is 
concerned with how the moral principles are to be structured in practice or how current 
institutions are failing the ethical concerns of moral cosmopolitanism. There is an overlap 
between them, but the moral theory is prior to implementation and is meant to act as both 
an ethical grounding for future institutional schemes and as a moral basis for institutional 
evaluation.
Although the model Beitz provides makes a useful distinction for categorizing 
normative cosmopolitan projects (moral) from more empirically based cosmopolitan 
projects (institutional), the division does not provide us with clarification as to the 
universal scope involved in various cosmopolitan theories. We are still left with questions 
concerning the level of unifying and universalized community that various cosmopolitan 
theories advocate. It has been suggested that a further distinction is required if we are to 
better understand the various formulations and subdivisions involved in cosmopolitan 
theory between weak cosmopolitanism and strong cosmopolitanism. This further 
distinction is meant to illustrate the degree between various cosmopolitan perspectives 
and the thickness of universal morality. As the terms might suggest, a weak form of 
cosmopolitanism “holds only that morality is cosmopolitan in part: there are some valid 
principles of equal consideration with a universal scope, even though there may also be
90
independent, nonderivative principles with a more restricted scope.” Conversely, strong 
cosmopolitanism advocates that “all moral principles must be justified by showing that 
they give equal weight to the claims of everyone, which means that they must either be
26 Charles Beitz, “Cosmopolitan Liberalism and the State System,” in Chris Brown (ed.), Political 
Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives. (London, Routledge, 1994), pg. 124.
27 Barry, Ibid.. pg. 145.
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directly universal in their scope, or if they apply only to a select group of people they
9Qmust be secondary principles whose ultimate foundation is universal.” The distinction 
between weak and strong cosmopolitanism is meant to connote an allowance for 
localized morality and obligation versus a strict adherence to a hegemonic universal 
morality irrespective of local sentiments. Although most contemporary cosmopolitan 
theories are located somewhere in the middle of the bell distribution between weak and 
strong, a limited number of cosmopolitan theories can be understood as located towards 
the ends.30
With a basic understanding of the distinction between a moral and institutional 
approach, cosmopolitan theory can be broken down into roughly four general 
conceptions. Although the four conceptions share elements of significant overlap, most 
cosmopolitan theories tend to focus on at least one of these primary forms. Gerald 
Delanty has defined these four conceptions as legal cosmopolitanism, political 
cosmopolitanism, cultural cosmopolitanism and civic cosmopolitanism.31 In order to 
understand the Kantian cosmopolitan approach developed throughout this thesis, it is 
helpful to outline the four conceptions and where a Kantian position is comparatively 
located.
1) Legal cosmopolitanism generally focuses on the concept of a system of states 
that are constrained by various forms of cosmopolitan or international law. Legal 
cosmopolitanism can have both a moral and or institutional aspect with various degrees 
of weak or strong cosmopolitan commitments. However, what is distinctive about a legal 
approach is the focus that is given to the creation of global law and legal obligation above 
state sovereignty. Another significant aspect of a legal approach is recognition of the 
moral worth of states. Unlike world state cosmopolitanism (see below), legal
28 David Miller, “The Limits of Cosmopolitan Justice,” in D. Mapel & T. Nardin (eds.), International 
Society., op. cit.. pg. 166.
29 Ibid.
30 As with any discipline as broad as cosmopolitanism, it is often difficult to know exactly where any
variation is located in relation to one another. However, a good example o f a contemporary weak form of
cosmopolitanism can be seen in the arguments of someone like. Chandran Kukathas who suggests an
extremely minimal universalism between groups. A strong contemporary conception of cosmopolitanism 
can be located in works such as Charles F. Taylor, who advocates a single world state with a strong 
overarching unifying liberal morality. See respectively, Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A 
Theory of Diversity and Freedom. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) and Charles T. Taylor, Toward 
World Sovereignty. (Maryland, University Press of America, 2002).
34 Gerard Delanty, Citizenship in a Global Age. (Buckingham, Open University Press, 2000).
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cosmopolitans believe that properly constituted states that uphold basic cosmopolitan 
principles can serve as important mechanisms for the wellbeing of humans.32
2) Political cosmopolitanism usually has a corresponding legal component, but 
maintains emphasis on creating greater forms of global governance or with reforming 
international political institutions in line with cosmopolitan ideals. The political approach 
is generally concerned with the creation of supra-national political organizations that can 
generate large-scale international consensus and democratic accountability. Although 
political cosmopolitanism tends to focus on global institutions and global governance, the
' I ' l
focus is often underpinned by a commitment to moral cosmopolitan principles.
3) Cultural cosmopolitanism is perhaps the oldest form of cosmopolitanism dating 
as far back as the philosophy of Diogenes. A cultural cosmopolitan approach generally 
asserts that individuals are interconnected and culturally transient beings that identify 
with a multiplicity of cultural identities and obligations. From a basic understanding of 
manifold identities and the cosmopolitan belief in a common humanity, cultural 
cosmopolitans generally argue for moral duties and obligations that supercede and 
transgress localized ethnicity, culture and nationality. As with early Stoic philosophy, 
cultural cosmopolitans suggest a unifying moral duty and support this position by 
locating universal principles that encourage our common human culture.34
4) Civic Cosmopolitanism is closely related to the cultural and political approach, 
but places more emphasis on the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship. The degree to which 
universal citizenship is advocated varies greatly within civic cosmopolitanism. Some 
versions like one offered by Luis Cabrera advocate a strong world civil state with
32 Contemporary theorists such as Allan Buchanan and Fernando Teson are excellent examples o f legal 
cosmopolitan arguments. See Allan Buchanan, Justice. Legitimacy, and self-determination: Moral 
Foundations for International Law. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), and Fernando Teson, A 
Philosophy of International Law (Boulder Colorado, Westview, 1998).
33 Theorists such as David Held, Richard Falk and Daniele Archibugi are active contemporary examples of  
a political cosmopolitan approach. See David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modem 
State to Cosmopolitan Democracy. (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995), Richard Falk. On Humane 
Governance: Towards a New Global Politics. (University Park, PA, 1995), Daniele Archibugi, & D. Held, 
(eds.). Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order. (Cambridge, Polity, 1995).
34 Contemporary cultural cosmopolitanism is best expressed in the political theories of Timothy Brennan, 
Jeremy Waldron and Martha Nussbaum. See Timothy Brennan, At Home in the World: Cosmopolitanism 
Now. (Cambridge, 1997), Jeremy Waldron, “What is Cosmopolitan?” Journal o f Political Philosophy. (Vol. 
8, no. 2, 2000) and Martha Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity. (Cambridge, 1998).
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corresponding rights of citizenship.35 Other versions of civil cosmopolitanism, like the 
theories advocated by Jurgen Habermas, seek to create a non-national sense of global 
community and do not necessarily promote the idea of a world state.36 Civil 
cosmopolitans of the weaker persuasion often use human rights theory to create a sense 
of unifying citizenship and global community without obligating themselves to a strong 
institutional conception of world government.
Before discussing where a Kantian position is located within current debate, it is 
important to clarify that all of the aforementioned categories are fluid and interrelated. 
Most contemporary cosmopolitans work on adjoined aspects of moral and institutional 
cosmopolitanism, and on the various cosmopolitan principles of global justice, 
egalitarianism, individualism and universalism. Many theorists share similar moral 
positions, but differ in what institutional approach to take in realizing them. Conversely, 
other cosmopolitans share institutional beliefs, but debate whether those institutions 
should be based on universal human rights or on other positive moral duties. In this 
respect, the four classifications are useful in relating the wide scope of cosmopolitan 
thought, but limited for understanding the complexities between them. As with any 
subject as rich as cosmopolitanism, the range of debate is broad and each cosmopolitan 
theory has its own unique intricacies.
Nevertheless for the purpose of this project, it is important to understand that the 
Kantian cosmopolitanism argued within this thesis contains both a moral and institutional 
component. First, it is a weak form of moral cosmopolitanism, in that it advocates a 
minimal universal moral law while allowing for various moral principles to be derived 
locally by individual participants. The moral concern relates to how the world should be 
normatively understood as a coexisting whole and is meant to act as a moral compass in 
questions regarding global cohabitation and justice. Second, since Kant argued for
35 Luis Cabrera, Political Theory of Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Case for the World State. (New York, 
Routledge, 2004).
36 Jurgen Habermas, The Post-National Constellation. (Cambridge, MIT Press, 2001).
37 Contemporary examples of civic cosmopolitanism in the weak form can be seen within the works of 
Thomas Pogge, Jack Donnelly, Derek Heater and Charles Jones. See Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and 
Human Rights. (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2002), Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights. (Boulder, Co, 
1998), Derek Heater, World Citizenship, op. cit., Charles Jones, Global Justice: Defending 
Cosmopolitanism. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999). It is also important to point out that many 
cosmopolitans who advocate universal human rights are also legal cosmopolitans in the sense that human 
rights should form a legal minimum for any system of cosmopolitan civil order.
22
formalized constitutional structures of cosmopolitan law, any form of Kantian 
cosmopolitanism certainly has an institutional component. In this regard, Kant’s 
cosmopolitan law is a form of strong cosmopolitanism, in that cosmopolitan law is meant 
to trump local norms in favor of a universal cosmopolitan ethic. In other words, the moral 
cosmopolitan component argues for a minimal and weak form of universal morality that 
respects the worth of human beings regardless of geographical location. Nevertheless, 
Kantian cosmopolitanism also advocates a strong institutional component that demands 
that these minimal moral standards be recognized through the codification of 
cosmopolitan law, which in return demands universal application and obligation.
Because of Kant’s commitment to cosmopolitan law within a federation of states, 
many scholars have preferred to label Kantian cosmopolitanism as belonging to the sub­
field of legal cosmopolitanism. Although this classification is appropriate, the 
classification is often misunderstood within legal theory, creating somewhat of a 
misnomer. Many legal theorists of the positivist persuasion argue that law and morality 
are not connected. Positivists believe that our obligation to any form of international law
< io
is based on enforcement and convention versus being based on strong moral sentiment.
In addition, legal realists suggest that international law is predicated on the protection of 
sovereign states and that the nature of the state system rules out a unified global morality. 
Despite the fact that Kant certainly believed that law had a positive component and that 
universal law would be difficult in a world driven by state interest, Kantian cosmopolitan 
law is derived from moral and normative foundations. In this regard, Kantian 
cosmopolitan law is meant to be positive in its constitutional authority to provide order 
within a realist system, but this authority is justified by a naturalist consideration located 
within the internal aspects and moral foundations of cosmopolitan law. Therefore, 
although Kantian cosmopolitanism might be well classified as a form of legal 
cosmopolitanism, it should not be considered as falling into any strict category of legal 
positivism (what the law does), legal naturalism (the morality behind the law), or legal 
realism (international law as a tool for the protection of sovereignty). As Jeremy Waldron 
has argued, Kantian jurisprudence might best be described as a form of normative
38 Legal Nihilists take legal positivism a step further by denying the existence of international law since 
there are no enforcement mechanisms with compulsory jurisdiction.
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positivism,39 In this sense, a Kantian position believes that there must be systematic moral 
reasoning underpinning international justice and law, but also that law itself when 
constitutionally objectified, can have a commanding force in creating individual 
obligations regardless of the normative force on which it is presupposed.
III. Some Concerns and Critiques of Kantian Cosmopolitanism
An argument advocating cosmopolitan normative principles is not one without 
considerable challenges and debate. Since the early Stoic conception of a universal 
citizen, cosmopolitanism as a political theory has historically received staunch criticism. 
Critics of cosmopolitanism have faulted cosmopolitan ideas largely on the fact that those 
ideas are morally utopian, idealistic, and overly universal in a world of various ethical 
conceptions. Of these critics, communitarian, cultural pluralists and moral relativists have 
been the most prominent challengers to the cosmopolitan perspective. Moral relativists 
regard cosmopolitan claims as utopian in their positivist assumptions of the perfectibility 
of human reason and universal ethical understanding. For the cultural pluralist, 
cosmopolitanism replaces a plurality of values in the world with a universalism that both 
diminishes human diversity, but also “fosters aspirations for a universal state... 
attempting world conquest.”40 Similarly, communitarians describe cosmopolitan ideals as 
a threatening force to the moral goods of community and communal obligation. 
Communitarians fear that cosmopolitanism, with its focus on the global citizen, cannot 
adequately accommodate the human need to belong to immediate communities of 
meaning and purpose. In the communitarian argument lies an existential fear of a rootless 
cosmopolitan, where a person “is really no one, a man without allegiances... he is not, in 
positive terms, a friend to all, but merely not a stranger."41
Although we should acknowledge that some historical conceptions of 
cosmopolitanism are more susceptible to the communitarian and pluralist claims of
39 Jeremy Waldron, “Kant’s Legal Positivism,” Harvard Law Review. Vol. 109: pg., 1535. A more detailed 
discussion of Kantian cosmopolitan law is provided in chapter 1, 2 and 3.
^Martin Wight, An Anatomy o f  International Thought, Review of International Studies. 13 (1987), 221 -7, 
pg. 226. As paraphrased by Catherine Lu, op. cit., pg. 251.
41 John Bryant, Nowhere a Stranger: Melville and Cosmopolitanism, Nineteenth Century Fiction. 39, (#3) 
(1984), pg. 278.
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authoritarian utopianism than others, this does not corrupt and make incoherent all 
aspects of cosmopolitan theory.42 Furthermore, it is important to refute and satisfy 
pluralist, relativist and communitarian concerns of cosmopolitanism before cosmopolitan 
law can have any legitimate ethical claim on a global order. It is essential to consider the 
concerns of cosmopolitan critics and satisfy their most profound apprehensions. 
Nevertheless, where I believe cosmopolitanism is correct, is in the idea that a normative 
international order cannot be developed and maintained independently of a general 
acceptance of common ethical principles. In contrast to some theorists such as Hedley 
Bull, who suggest that international order cannot be maintained directly by ethical 
principles,43 a Kantian position demands that stronger normative principles are needed to 
anchor human relations and the unavoidable coexistence of all human beings regardless 
of nationality, ethnicity, or place of birth.
In addition, the relativist, communitarian and pluralist stance is predicated on 
what the international world has historically delivered and not on how a world order 
might organize itself; or better yet, on how the world should organize itself based on 
global cohabitation and corresponding human concerns. In order to satisfy the critics of 
cosmopolitanism, this thesis will outline and defend what I believe is the most coherent 
and promising form of cosmopolitanism. As we will discover, a Kantian based form of 
cosmopolitanism best captures the complexities of a pluralistic global environment while 
confirming a moral concern for humanity and the normative obligations that we should 
have towards one another if we are to coexist. In addition, the Kantian argument is not a 
harebrained or unrealistic argument as some have suggested, for it is based on the 
principle that we must in fact necessarily tolerate one another within the spherical 
confines of the earth. Since spherical cohabitation is an empirical fact, “the idea of 
cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastic or over strained; it is a necessary
42See Derek Heater, World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western 
Political Thought (New York, St. Martins Press, 1996), for a comprehensive historical account of 
cosmopolitan thought.
43Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (London, Macmillan, 1977). Bull suggests that the world cannot be 
constituted anything beyond a modus vivendi. Generally understood, a modus vivendi is an order based on 
the power relationships of self-interested associations and subject to alteration on those grounds. In 
contrast, a normative society is a cooperative order that recognizes the trumping priority of certain common 
ethical principles. In a normative order, individuals pursue their self-interest in relation to those mutually 
agreed principles versus motivation on the exclusive considerations of self-interest and power balance.
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complement to the unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into 
a universal right of humanity.”44
As we will see, Kant outlines his argument for a cosmopolitan order in two ways. 
On the one hand, Kant makes his appeal on an empirical level, outlining the practical 
need for unified cosmopolitan purpose through historical examination and through the 
examination of international tensions that threaten our common humanity. On the other 
hand, Kant sets up normative a priori principles of jurisprudence, where practical reason 
dictates an innate cosmopolitan right to external freedom. In a fusion of empirical 
experience with normative principles, Kant maintains that humans cannot avoid physical 
contact with one another and therefore must inter into a civil order that secures mutual 
rights and spheres of external freedom. Nevertheless, Kant does not tell us exactly how 
this international order will ultimately look, or provide details as to how global 
institutions and economic structures will function to protect mutual cosmopolitan law. 
What Kant provides are the metaphysical and normative foundations within the 
considerations for a cosmopolitan future. It is with an attempt to flush these principles out 
into a coherent and defensible cosmopolitan theory that this thesis is ultimately 
concerned.
The purpose of this project is to outline a Kantian form of cosmopolitan theory in 
relation to the normative requirements necessary for a constitutional global order and 
provide a comprehensive defense of cosmopolitan ethics from realist, relativist, pluralist 
and communitarian critiques. The project entails a theoretical exploration of Kantian 
cosmopolitanism and the normative requirements consistent with, and necessary to, a 
Kantian based cosmopolitan constitution. However, as will be discussed below, this 
project is not meant as a strict interpretation of Kant or of his political theory. What this 
project attempts, is to provide a Kantian based form of cosmopolitanism, which not only 
pulls from Kant, but also from contemporary cosmopolitan arguments found throughout 
political philosophy. The goal is to provide a comprehensive outline and defense for 
Kantian cosmopolitanism in order to provide a coherent theory for those concerned with 
global relations in an increasingly globalized environment.
44 Kant, “Perpetual Peace” in Reiss, op. cit., pg. 108.
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IV. Kant the Cosmopolitan versus a Kantian form of Cosmopolitanism
There are two methodological models that can be utilized when exploring Kantian 
cosmopolitanism. Both models can be used as separate scholastic activities or can be used 
together in various degrees in order to clarify Kant’s philosophy. The first method is to 
employ strict exegesis in an attempt to understand Kant’s cosmopolitanism directly by 
analyzing his use of words, logical structure and the relationship between various aspects 
of his philosophy. Undoubtedly, this exercise can be extremely useful in resolving logical 
incoherence (or as in most cases highlighting it) and with providing a synoptic reading of 
the works of Kant.
The other method is to reconstruct aspects of Kant’s cosmopolitanism in order to 
establish a coherent and defensible argument for Kantian cosmopolitanism. This method 
entails significant dedication to exegesis, but allows flexibility in reconstructing and 
altering Kant’s philosophy in order to advance a more consistent and defensible position. 
The distinction between these two methodologies is important, because the first method 
demands strict adherence to what Kant said, while the second allows for movement 
between agreement and disagreement based on a certain interpretation of what a Kantian 
cosmopolitan position could possibly maintain.45
As was mentioned above, this project maintains that there is a useful difference 
between examining Kant’s cosmopolitanism, in the strict contextual and textual sense, 
and with examining a variation of Kantian cosmopolitanism that is based on aspects of 
his overall philosophy. Although I believe it is useful to make a distinction between 
Kantian exegesis on one hand and the heuristic value of reconstruction on the other hand, 
it is often the source of some contention within Kantian scholarship. Strict scholars of 
Kant’s philosophy often protest the way contemporary political theorists use the works of 
Kant as a basis for their political theory. Critics are concerned with a perceived use of 
generous interpretation and are critical of using these lax readings of Kant in order to suit 
contemporary debates. However, this is a problematic position to hold as an absolute 
restriction on reconstructing the theories of Kant, especially if one takes Kant’s theory of
451 barrow aspects of this methodological distinction from Fernando Teson, “Kantian International 
Liberalism,” in D. Mapel & T. Nardin, International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives. (New Jersey, 
Princeton University Press, 1998).
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human progress seriously. As Kant himself suggests, human enlightenment is not the act 
of discovery by one person alone, but is a process o f development through countless 
generations of human involvement and reexamination.46 If we were to solely approach 
the study of Kant as narrow exegesis, to outline what Kant said, the historical context of 
his work, and the logical coherency of his internal philosophy, it would significantly limit 
his contribution to human knowledge. Although radical interpretations are often made 
and this might lead a contemporary theorist away from what Kant may have “actually” 
had in mind, it does not necessary suggest that the exercise to construct a more robust 
form of Kantian cosmopolitanism should be abandoned. For as Kant suggests in The 
Contest o f Faculties, no theory can assume to be complete and it is only through a 
continued reexamination by future generations that any work can hope to find some level 
of reasonable satisfaction.
The distinction between strict textual exegesis and reconstructed Kantianism is 
important because this project is not meant as a strict interpretation of Kant’s 
cosmopolitan theory. Rather it is based on Kant’s theory in order to provide what I 
believe is the most coherent basis and defense of cosmopolitanism. The project should be 
seen as an attempt to broaden the understanding of cosmopolitanism from a Kantian 
perspective versus providing a strict account of Kant. At times, this project will attempt 
to follow Kant’s cosmopolitan theory without expansion or deviation. Nevertheless, when 
Kant’s cosmopolitanism is vague, incoherent or insufficient, other cosmopolitan 
arguments or philosophical inteijections will be utilized. An example of this methodology 
is probably best seen in Chapter Five, where there is an attempt to develop a Kantian 
conception of global distributive justice. Since Kant does not fully develop a theory of 
distributive justice, let alone global distributive justice, the chapter constructs a scheme of 
global distributive justice in light of Kant’s overall discussions of social welfare and 
justice. By examining the underlining normative concerns involved in Kantian justice, the 
chapter extrapolates and constructs further normative principles of distributive justice on 
a cosmopolitan level. Although the distributive scheme moves away from strict textual 
exegesis, it is nevertheless extrapolated from a Kantian conception of justice and is based
46 Kant, “The Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” & “What is Enlightenment,” in 
H. Reiss, op. rit.
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on Kant’s overall cosmopolitan concerns. The goal of using this methodology is to 
present a coherent and comprehensive defense of a Kantian form of cosmopolitanism for 
contemporary international relations theory. Although this thesis will in no way provide a 
complete and exhaustive analysis of any conception of Kantian cosmopolitanism, it will 
hopefully, form the heuristic groundwork for future thoughts and understandings of 
Kantian theory and it’s consanguinity to international relations.
Nevertheless, before moving forward, it is necessary to clarify one last issue 
related to the aforementioned topic. The issue is related to the complexity involved in 
linking Kant’s critical philosophy to his political theory. It should be mentioned that there 
is an inherent difficulty with focusing on an examination and extrapolation of Kantian 
cosmopolitan theory, which arises from the fact that Kant’s political theory evolves from 
his more complex philosophical principles. In order to understand Kant’s political theory, 
it becomes increasingly important to place it within the context of his critical philosophy 
and vice versa. This is due to the fact that Kant wrote his political works after The 
Critique o f Pure Reason and saw his political theory as a logical extension of his overall 
philosophy. Therefore, in order to construct a convincing form of Kantian 
cosmopolitanism, it is often necessary to have a sense of the interrelation between his 
critical philosophy and his interspersed political works. However, there is no simple way 
to summarize or encapsulate Kant’s critical philosophy and the transition to his political 
theory.47 The critical works are both massive in substance as they are in technical 
subtlety. When focusing on Kant’s political theory, it becomes difficult not to get bogged 
down in Kant’s more technical philosophical principles. Nevertheless, since the focus of 
this thesis is with advancing a form of Kantian cosmopolitanism, concentrating on a form 
of Kant’s legal cosmopolitanism in particular, I must limit my analysis to the realm of 
Kantian political theory. Therefore, any discussion of Kant’s critical philosophy will be 
brought out where it is relevant to the cosmopolitan theory I outline. Although this will 
often do a great injustice to the nuances of Kant’s argument, I have done my best to relate 
the major critical themes while maintaining a focus on Kantian cosmopolitanism.
47Hans Reiss has described the task of summarizing Kant’s critical philosophy as “virtually impossible.” 
Ibid.. Introduction, pg. 16. Steven Komer also states a problem with summarizing Kant’s philosophy, but 
gave what I consider to be the most successful attempt in his book entitled, Kant. (Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex, Penguin Books Ltd., 1955).
29
To my knowledge, there is no thorough analysis or extrapolation of a Kantian 
form of cosmopolitanism. Although various scholars have discussed detailed aspects of 
Kantian cosmopolitanism, from Kant’s use of metaphysics and duty, to Kantian 
principles for perpetual peace, there does not seem to be any exhaustive attempt to tie the 
various complexities of Kant’s cosmopolitan vision into a comprehensive picture. For 
anyone interested in Kantian cosmopolitanism, we are decidedly stuck with the 
puzzlement of what a Kantian form of cosmopolitanism advocates. This problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that Kant provided little explanation of his cosmopolitan vision. 
What Kant provided was the metaphysical and normative foundations for a future 
philosophical movement toward a cosmopolitan order. The task of this project is to 
provide a more comprehensive understanding of Kantian cosmopolitanism and the 
normative implications of a Kantian vision within contemporary international political 
theory.
V. Thesis Structure
In order to establish the grounding for Kantian cosmopolitanism, this project is 
divided into two parts. Part One comprises two chapters, Chapter One outlining a Kantian 
form of cosmopolitanism, while Chapter Two examines the normative foundations 
involved in a cosmopolitan constitution and cosmopolitan law. From this outline, Part 
Two attempts to provide a comprehensive defense and more detailed examination of the 
major themes and obstacles involved in Kantian cosmopolitanism. In this part, themes 
concerning Kantian federation and cosmopolitan law (Chapter Three), the role of 
diversity and culture within cosmopolitan law (Chapter Four), and a Kantian form of 
global distributive justice (Chapter Five) are discussed in relation to the Kantian 
cosmopolitanism outlined in Part One. The thesis will conclude with a final chapter 
relating the various normative concepts discussed throughout the thesis to practical 
concerns regarding the problems of application theory.
In Chapter One, the basic elements that underwrite a Kantian form of 
cosmopolitanism are outlined. In doing so, the chapter looks at the ethical principles 
behind Kantian cosmopolitanism, the problem of Kant’s cosmopolitan teleology and
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develops a brief overview of Kant’s more coherent principles of cosmopolitan law. The 
chapter is divided into four sections. In Section One, a connection is made between 
Kant’s critical philosophy and the moral foundations of Kantian cosmopolitanism. 
Section Two then outlines Kant’s cosmopolitan theory of history and suggests that it is 
based on a problematic teleology. It is in this section that a more plausible treatment of 
Kant’s cosmopolitan history is provided. Section Three discusses the concept of 
cosmopolitan law and couches it in Kant’s overall theory of universal justice. The aim of 
the fourth section is to tie the various aspects of Kantian cosmopolitanism into a single 
coherent narrative that will provide a basis for future redevelopment in subsequent 
chapters.
The purpose of Chapter Two is to outline a Kantian form of cosmopolitan law and 
the ethical system involved in a cosmopolitan constitution. In doing so, this chapter 
explores and discusses Kantian cosmopolitan law, the idea of cosmopolitan right, the 
laws of hospitality and a revised Kantian approach to constitutional cosmopolitanism. 
The chapter argues beyond Kant’s discussion of constitutionalism, suggesting that a 
written constitution not only articulates many of Kant’s cosmopolitan concerns, but also 
provides a reasonable ethical foundation for an international society. The chapter focuses 
on the possibility of an ethical cosmopolitan order based on jurisprudence, the necessity 
of a minimal consensus bound by constitutional provisions, and the corresponding legal 
obligations maintained by cosmopolitan law.
As was mentioned above, the aim of Part One of the thesis is to outline the 
normative principles involved in a Kantian form of cosmopolitanism and to discuss the 
various components behind Kant’s cosmopolitan enthusiasm and his concept of 
cosmopolitan law. Based on the foundations laid out in Part One, Part Two of this thesis 
will further examine the various themes and critiques involved in Kantian 
cosmopolitanism. This is done in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding 
of what is involved in the Kantian form of cosmopolitanism and to provide a 
cosmopolitan defense from various anti-cosmopolitan or anti-Kantian arguments.
Chapter Three examines the role of states in a Kantian cosmopolitan federation 
and attempts to clarify the relationship between the rights of states and the concept of 
cosmopolitan law. In order to present a coherent and tenable account of a Kantian
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federation, this chapter is divided into four sections. In Section One, the Kantian move 
away from the traditional natural law concept of jus gentium to the idea of cosmopolitan 
federation and cosmopolitan law is outlined. In doing so, the chapter discusses the 
historical context of Kant’s cosmopolitanism and the paradigm shift produced by Kant’s 
contribution to international relations theory. From this background, Section Two 
examines the three definitive articles of Perpetual Peace and their primary significance in 
creating a cosmopolitan order. From this, an argument is furthered that the internal justice 
of a state confers political legitimacy and the acceptability for state membership within a 
cosmopolitan federation. The Kantian distinction between international right and 
cosmopolitan right is further developed, arguing that Kantian cosmopolitanism advocates 
a new level of cosmopolitan law which holds supremacy over the idea of absolute state 
sovereignty. Section Three seeks to resolve the debate between realists and Kantian 
scholars as to whether Kant’s cosmopolitanism must be understood as advocating a 
federation of free states or a world republic. Through this discussion, it is argued that 
Kantian cosmopolitanism is best understood as a federation of free states with the caveat 
that Kant maintained optimism for a continued movement toward broader multilateral 
institutions. The Fourth Section concludes by comparing Kantian cosmopolitanism to 
contemporary theories offered by both realists and Rawls’ Law o f Peoples. In doing so, I 
maintain that Kantian cosmopolitanism does not advocate the immediate destabilizing 
destruction of states and self-determination as realists claim, but is meant as a mechanism 
for the lawful coexistence of various political communities constituting a judicial 
community of the world.
The primary concern of Chapter Four is with the role of cultural diversity in 
Kantian cosmopolitan thought. In this chapter, a Kantian epistemology of culture is 
defended against cultural relativists, cultural pluralists and claims from culture that denies 
the possibility of cosmopolitan law. This chapter argues that cosmopolitan law does not 
command normative shifts beyond human recognition and further suggests that cultures 
are not static entities that should be protected from a concept of cosmopolitan law. The 
ultimate position is that a Kantian vision of cosmopolitan law does not reduce a plurality 
of cultures, but seeks to establish minimal cosmopolitan principles in order to allow 
various cultures to coexist.
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Chapter Five examines some normative principles inherent in a Kantian scheme 
of distributive justice. This chapter looks at Kant’s conception of external freedom and 
social welfare, relating them to a cosmopolitan concern for global justice. The chapter 
argues that Kant’s freedom of autonomy (co-legislation) demands a more robust theory of 
distributive justice in order to provide a political environment that supports the effective 
autonomy of individuals. The chapter further explores a possible relationship with Martha 
Nussbaum’s capability theory, suggesting that Kant’s distributive principles are best 
expressed through a capability approach. Lastly, the chapter draws connections between 
contemporary cosmopolitan arguments for global justice and Kantian cosmopolitanism.
Chapter Six articulates the major points from the previous chapters and relates 
them to the overall Kantian project. However, a large portion of the chapter will provide 
a discussion of Kantian cosmopolitan theory and its relationship to current cosmopolitan 
debates. In doing so, the chapter will explore the implications of Kantian 
cosmopolitanism in relation to contemporary issues of globalization, global justice, 
humanitarian assistance and universal human rights. The point of this exercise is to 
illustrate how a Kantian cosmopolitan position could respond to these issues and how it 
might in theory and practice further a cosmopolitan condition. In providing some link 
between theory and practice, the argument is made that Kantian cosmopolitan right is 
closely synonymous with a concept of universal human rights and is best articulated in 
the form of universal human rights protection. Furthermore, the argument is made that 
given the current global order, human rights are the best philosophical invention to date 
that can respect an individuals autonomous freedom, while providing protection of those 
rights exclusively on the basis of being human. From this discussion of how Kantian 
cosmopolitanism might respond to contemporary global issues, a further argument is 
made that a minimal ethical order might be developed from already existing and 
overlapping international concerns. I will conclude by making a claim that we should 
change unjust global systems toward the metaphysical ideal of a cosmopolitan 
constitution and will discuss the possible positive ripple effect of cosmopolitan 
enthusiasm.
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Chapter One 
Kantian Cosmopolitanism
“It makes no difference whether a person lives here or there, provided that, where he 
lives, he lives as a citizen of the world.” -  Marcus Aurelius
Introduction
In Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, Immanuel Kant 
defines cosmopolitanism as being “the matrix within which all the original capacities of 
the human race may develop.”1 In the broadest sense, Kantian cosmopolitanism can be 
understood as being concerned with the cultivation of a global environment within which 
everyone can fully develop his or her human capacities. Kant expands on what 
establishing this matrix entails when he proclaims that, “the greatest problem for the 
human species, the solution of which nature compels him to seek, is that of attaining a 
civil society, which can administer justice universally.” There are two important 
distinctions that should immediately be made from these passages when understanding 
Kantian cosmopolitanism. One distinction involves understanding the components 
embroiled in creating a matrix of cosmopolitan law. This includes formulating what is to 
be meant by universal justice, a global civil society and the moral value assigned to 
human capacities. The other involves synthesizing these principles with Kant’s assertion 
that nature compels us to administer justice universally and that all human beings have 
original capacities that nature obliges us to fully develop. In this regard, there exist two 
strands in Kantian cosmopolitanism. One is concerned with a naturalistic teleology and 
the other is concerned with the formal principles involved in creating universal justice 
and cosmopolitan law. The distinctions are important, for whereas Kant’s cosmopolitan 
theory of history sought to discover naturalistic motivations behind the formation of a 
cosmopolitan order, cosmopolitan law was specifically dedicated to inaugurating 
principles of jurisprudence necessary for a condition of universal justice to exist. 
Although both concepts are linked, they sustain two distinctive functions within Kantian
1 Immanuel Kant, “Idea of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” in H. Reiss fed). Kant’s 
Political Writings. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970), pg. 51.
2 Ibid.. pg. 45.
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cosmopolitanism and should not be lumped tightly together as has been traditionally 
done.
What the two quotes also help to highlight is that there are three interrelated 
elements involved in both aspects of Kantian cosmopolitanism. First, individuals 
represent the unit of ultimate moral concern equally and that our human capacities can 
only be fully developed within a condition of universal justice. Second, the attainment of 
universal justice requires the broader cultivation of a cosmopolitan civil society, one 
based solely on our humanity alone, without reference to nationality, localized political 
affiliation or place of birth. Third, the sole concern of cosmopolitan law is with 
establishing this matrix of universal justice and with formulating the necessary 
fundamental normative principles that underwrite a cosmopolitan constitution. It is in this 
sense that there is a connection between Kant and the quote used at the beginning of this 
chapter by Marcus Aurelius. The connection stems from a shared cosmopolitan belief 
that it makes no difference where a person lives, as long as that person is also understood 
as embedded within the larger human community. The foundations of that larger 
community should be based on a conception of universal justice and the establishment of 
a global condition where the development of everyone’s capacities are to be considered 
as if they were equal citizens of the world.
Although many cosmopolitan scholars have invoked Kantian moral philosophy 
and aspects of his cosmopolitan theory as the foundational basis for their own arguments, 
they have often disagreed on the exact nature of a Kantian form of cosmopolitanism. This 
is because there is considerable ambiguity and complication involved in the development 
of a Kantian cosmopolitan matrix. The purpose of this chapter is to help clarify some of 
these ambiguities by outlining the basic elements that underwrite a Kantian form of 
cosmopolitanism. In doing so, this chapter will look at the ethical principles behind 
Kantian cosmopolitanism, the problem of Kant’s cosmopolitan teleology and develop a 
brief overview of Kant’s more coherent principles of cosmopolitan law. Although the 
focus of this thesis will remain on Kantian cosmopolitan law as the basis for any coherent 
reconstruction of Kantian cosmopolitanism, this chapter will provide a link with Kant’s 
critical philosophy while also rendering a possible alternative to his problematic 
teleology. To do this, the chapter is divided into four sections. In Section One, a
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connection is made between Kant’s critical philosophy and the moral foundations of 
Kantian cosmopolitanism. The second section will then outline Kant’s cosmopolitan 
theory of history and suggest that it is based on a problematic teleology. It is in this 
section that a more plausible treatment of Kant’s cosmopolitan history is provided. The 
third section discusses the concept of cosmopolitan law and couches it in Kant’s overall 
theory of universal justice. The aim of the fourth section is to tie the various aspects of 
Kantian cosmopolitanism into a single coherent narrative that will provide a basis for 
further redevelopment in subsequent chapters.
I. Moral Foundations of Kantian Cosmopolitanism
The easiest way to capture the essence of Kant’s moral philosophy is to state his 
philosophical intention. It is generally accepted that Kant’s goal was to give meaning to 
human experience without relying on pure rationalism or empiricism. Although this is 
stated very broadly, it does capture Kant’s basic intent, which was to provide 
philosophical meaning to both the realm of scientific and empirical experience, but also 
to metaphysical concepts such as the idea o f morality. In opposition to David Hume’s 
empiricism, Kant believed that the forces of nature were not to be discovered by 
experience alone, but also through a priori constructions which gave significant human 
meaning to these experiences. This does not mean that Kant looked unfavorably on 
empiricism, for Kant was extremely influenced by Newtonian science and was 
considered to be a knowledgeable source on the scientific method. What Kant stressed in 
his critical philosophy was the necessary element of independent principles of human 
reason, which were prior to experience and which gave order to what he called “the 
experience of nature.” In other words, the critical philosophy of Kant was an attempt to 
establish a system of a priori principles for the purpose of understanding the external 
world. This understanding could only be one from the human mind, which gives meaning 
not only to our empirical experiences, but also provides meaningful order to the world 
around us.
It is in Kant’s discussions of morality that his epistemological considerations 
transfer into political foundations. The question for Kant was how to understand the idea 
o f morality beyond the realm of empirical experience, where the idea o f morality has the
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ability to provide guiding principles that can be confirmed by practical reason. For Kant, 
the idea o f morality starts with the transcendental deduction and the inherent assumption 
that individuals are free to make moral decisions. If humans are not free to determine the 
imperative force behind moral values, then morality no longer represents a self-imposed 
duty, but rather a meaningless coerced action. In order for the idea o f morality to have 
subjective imperative, individuals must be understood as having the capacity for self- 
prescribed duty. The idea o f morality, in order to remain internally consistent, must 
contain this corresponding imperative action. These moral decisions are not made in the 
context of determined causes alone, but find imperative weight principally through 
choices of our free will. In order to justify the idea of having a moral choice, human 
beings must be considered not only as phenomenal beings, but also as noumenal beings 
that are free. The idea o f morality demands the freedom o f will to make reasoned 
judgments, which in turn enable humans to make meaningful moral judgments that act in 
accordance with self-imposed duties. According to Kant, the capacity to self-legislate is 
the power to be autonomous moral agents and represents the ultimate source of human 
dignity. Thus, “by acting in accordance with moral principles prescribed by his own 
reason, man asserts his independence from the natural world and establishes what is 
distinctively human in his nature.”3
Nevertheless, morality is different from other cognitive decisions because the 
latter command action in relation to self-imposed belief or agreed upon social rules. Kant 
understands that choices as profoundly important as moral decisions must be conceived 
in relation to whether the moral duty can also be conceived as universally valid. It is in 
regards to determining what are correct rules of moral action that the idea o f morality 
metaphysically necessitates practical synthetic a priori judgments of the categorical 
imperative which states, “act only according to the maxim whereby you can at the same 
time will that it should become a universal law.”4 It is from variations of the categorical 
imperative that Kant derives two important principles of cosmopolitan universality. One 
derivative affirms that we should, “act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in
3 Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory o f International Relations. 2nd Edition, (Macmillan, 
Basinstoke, 1990), pg. 98-99.
4 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. J. Ellington (trans.), (Hackett Publishing 
Company, Cambridge, 1981) pg. 30.
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your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end, and never 
as a means.”5 Another derivative maintains that legislative maxims are only valid if they 
“can at the same time have for their object themselves as universal laws of nature.”6 In 
other words, since everyone has the capacity to be moral lawgivers, it is therefore rational 
to treat all humans with respect and a sense of universal human dignity. Kant 
consequently defines our human capacity for freedom as an innate right when he states, 
“freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice) insofar as it can 
coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only 
original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity.” This original right 
translates into the maxim that individuals should thus never be used simply as means, but 
should be understood as having ends in themselves. We determine the validity of this 
maxim by understanding that we could never justify the violation of this right, for one 
could never rationally demand the violation of this maxim as a universal law of nature.
As Linklater has pointed out, Kantian ethics has two significant implications in 
regards to its transition to the realm of political theory. The first relates to the 
transcendental deduction and a moral claim that “human beings do not submit to a
o
morality which has its source outside them.” The second implication relates to the 
categorical imperative and the principle that because individuals are moral beings, they 
must also have an “awareness of participating with others in a law-making community.”9 
Kant himself describes this principle as a universal principle of hypothetical community 
when he suggests that humans should act “as if one were through his maxims always a 
law-making member in the universal kingdom of ends.”10 The implications derived from 
these principles are complex but simply summarized. Human beings should be allowed to 
exercise their capacity to be moral beings and that by exercising this equal capacity, we 
must come to understand our political and legal structures as vehicles for the 
development of our mutual co-legislation and external freedom.
5 Ibid.. pg. 36.
6 Ibid.. pg. 42.
7 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals. M. Gregor (ed.), (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1996), pg. 30.
8 Linklater, op. cit., pg. 101.
9 Ibid.. pg. 102.
10 Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 39-40.
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It is therefore from a combination of the transcendental deduction and the 
categorical imperative that Kant formulates his principle o f universal justice and public 
right. Kantian justice and the corresponding condition of public right are defined as “the 
sum of conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another 
in accordance with a universal law of freedom.”11 From the short discussion above, we 
can understand Kantian justice as an attempt to facilitate a civil condition where 
autonomous agents can socially coexist in accordance with universal freedom, which is 
for Kant, the capacity of co-legislation and the voluntary subjugation to moral laws 
legislated by themselves. Nevertheless, there is an important distinction that should be 
made between the categorical imperative as used in Kantian ethics and his principle of 
universal justice. Whereas the first formulation of the categorical imperative describes 
how universal laws of morality can be determined, the principle of universal justice is 
concerned with what legitimate restrictions to individual freedom should exist in order to 
create a condition of universal public right. In this regard, justice necessitates that a legal
condition of public right should exist so that “the freedom of the individual is limited in
1 0such a way as to secure the equal freedom of all.” The justification for this restriction of
freedom is derived through the categorical imperative and a universal respect for the
dignity of human beings as ends in themselves. The fact that we should see humans as
moral decision makers and therefore also as having ends in themselves is derived from
the transcendental deduction and the idea o f morality.
The broader cosmopolitan implications of Kant’s critical and moral philosophy
are nicely encapsulated in an appendix to the Critique o f Pure Reason. The following
quote not only represents Kant’s first transition point from his critical writings to his
political writings, but also provides an outline of his entire cosmopolitan project. In
addition, the quote illustrates the transition of the categorical imperative into a scheme of
constitutional public right. Kant’s guiding principle of the categorical imperative is
outlined as a shared idea of equal and universal justice when Kant suggests:
“A constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in 
accordance with laws which ensure that the freedom o f  each can coexist 
with the freedom o f all the others (not one designed to provide the greatest
11 Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit.. pg. 24.
12 Charles Covell, Kant and the Law of Peace: A Study in the Philosophy o f International Law and 
International Relations. (New York, Palgrave, 1998), pg. 49.
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possible happiness, as this will in any case follow automatically), is at all 
events a necessary idea which must be made the basis not only of the first 
outline of a political constitution but of all laws as well. It requires that we 
should abstract at the outset from present hindrances, which perhaps do 
not arise inevitable out of human nature, but are rather occasioned by 
neglect of genuine ideas in the process of legislation... Even if the later 
should never come about, the idea which sets up this maxim as an 
archetype, in order to bring the legal constitution of mankind nearer and 
nearer to its greatest possible perfection, still remains correct. For no one 
can or ought to decide what the highest degree may be at which mankind 
may have to stop progressing, and hence how wide a gap may still of 
necessity remain between the idea and its execution. For this will depend 
on freedom, which can transcend any limit we care to impose.”13
There are five important elements that should be taken from Kant’s ethical theory 
to the realm of Kantian cosmopolitan theory. First, the source of ultimate moral concern 
is located within individuals as having ends in themselves and with their equal capacity to 
be free and autonomous lawgivers within a universal kingdom o f ends.14 Second, the 
normative purpose of all civil law is to provide a constitution that can universalize a 
condition of equal freedom where “the freedom of each can coexist with the freedom of 
all the other.”15 In this sense, the concept of public right is an egalitarian principle of 
formal jurisprudence, since it affirms the equal restriction of everyone’s external freedom 
in order to promote a mutually consistent level of equal freedom between individuals.16 
Third, the concept of cosmopolitan justice is universal, since it demands the universal 
restriction of freedom in order to maximize the equal freedom of everyone, in all places 
and at all times. Fourth, Kant’s theory of justice is an a priori ideal and is meant to 
provide the normative grounding to which all external laws are to be legislated. Kant 
believes that an ideal constitution can be discovered through the use of metaphysical 
philosophy and should be seen as providing a moral compass toward which the 
establishment of universal justice is possible. In this regard, Kantian justice is also meant
13Immanuel Kant, Appendix, ‘Transcendental Logic II, Dialectic I, Ideas in General, in J.M.D. Meiklejohn 
trans., The Critique of Pure Reason. (New York, The Colonial Press, 1900).
14 The kingdom o f ends is a metaphysical ideal of justice understood as “a systematic union o f different 
rational beings through common laws” which is determined by “universal validity.” A participant in the 
kingdom o f  ends is someone who “legislates in it universal laws while also being themselves subject to such 
laws.” For these quotes, see Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 39-45.1 also 
discuss inherent principles of distributive justice that can be derived from this ideal in Chapter Five.
15 Ibid.
16 Thomas Pogge, “Kant’s Theory of Justice,” Kant-Studien. 79, (1988).
41
to provide an ideal standard from which all existing civil legislation is to be judged. 
Finally, despite the fact that present hindrances demonstrate a difficulty with manifesting 
a cosmopolitan ideal, this does not mean that it is not what humankind should strive for 
or that it is necessarily an impossible undertaking.
All of these principles essentially express the same conviction in Kantian thought, 
namely that global justice necessitates “a condition in which each individual’s external 
freedom is restricted so as to make it consistent with the freedom of all others in the
17framework of a common law or system of laws.” For it is only within a condition of 
public right and justice that humans can enjoy an environment of secured external 
freedom. As Kant argues, “such is the requirement of pure reason, which legislates a
1 Rpriori, regardless of all empirical ends.” It is from the philosophical backdrop provided 
in this section that a further extrapolation of a cosmopolitan framework of law will be 
made in section three. However, before discussing cosmopolitan law, it is necessary to 
understand how Kant saw the ultimate formulation of a cosmopolitan matrix as a result of 
human history. It is in the next section that an outline of Kant’s theory of history is 
provided and what implications this has for his cosmopolitanism.
II. Cosmopolitanism, Globalization and Kant’s Problematic Theory of History
The most useful way to understand Kant’s cosmopolitan theory of history is by 
examining the teleological implications of Idea for a Universal History with a 
Cosmopolitan Purpose and Perpetual Peace. Critics of Kant have accused the 
ambitiously titled essays as proof that Kant maintained a spurious conception of human 
perfectibility with a correspondingly idealistic and impalpable teleology.19 Although 
critics are right to point out the inherent difficulties involved in Kant’s vision of history, a
l7Allen Rosen, Kant’s Theory o f Justice. (Cornell University Press, New York, 1993), pg. 9
18 Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying, This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in 
Practice,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 73.
19 Kant’s teleology is not always considered problematic. For example, Ewan Harrison has suggested that 
Kant’s cosmopolitan history should be recognized as providing a defensible “systematic approach” as this 
term has been traditionally understood within the study of international relations. See Harrison, “Waltz,
Kant and Systematic Approaches to International Relations,” Review of International Studies. 28, (2002): 
143-162. However, this treatment is in my opinion inherently flawed. The inherent problems associated 
with this argument are wonderfully articulated by Martin Weber, “Keeping it Real? Kant and Systematic 
Approaches to IR -  A Reply to Harrison,” Review of International Studies. 29, (2003): 145-150.
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reconstructionist rejection of these aspects can be provided that can salvage Kant’s 
cosmopolitan enthusiasm without being obliged to the notion that nature mechanically 
compels humans toward a universal purpose. For we can interpret an alternative view of 
Kantian history that is more modest than Kant himself may have delineated. It is through 
an examination of Kant’s theory of history that we can begin to understand the role of 
nature in Kant’s cosmopolitan theory and determine what a reconstructist position must 
reject in order to make it more tenable.
As was pointed out in the introduction, Kant maintained that “the greatest 
problem for the human species, the solution of which nature compels him to seek, is that
•jr\
of attaining a civil society, which can administer justice universally.” Kant further
grounds the development of universal justice and the corresponding condition of
perpetual peace in what seems to be a naturalistic teleology:
“Perpetual peace is guaranteed by no less than the great artist Nature 
herself (natura daedala rerum). The mechanical process of nature visibly 
exhibits the purposive plan of producing concord among men, even 
against their will and indeed by means of their very discord.” 1
This passage generates a difficult conundrum for any consistent account of 
Kantian cosmopolitanism. This is because the passage seems to directly contradict Kant’s 
critical philosophy and the necessary element of independent a priori principles of human 
reason. The most problematic element within this quote is the seemingly determined and 
mechanical “intention of nature” and the corresponding guiding force of what Kant later
99describes as “providence.” If humans are in fact determined by a natural purpose and 
therefore “guaranteed” to action by the mechanical forces of providence, then this has 
dangerous implications for Kantian ideas of free will and moral autonomy. As Karl-Otto 
Apel has pointed put, if Kant’s theory of history is teleological in the sense that it is 
determined, then it puts “nearly every presupposition of the Kantian sketch into
91question.” In relation to some implications involved in Kant’s cosmopolitan vision, the 
problem arises that nature’s providence not only seems to provide the motivation to adopt
20 Kant, “Idea o f a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 45.
21 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 108.
22 Ibid.
23 Karl-Otto Apel, “Kant’s Toward Perpetual Peace as Historical Prognosis from the Point of View of 
Moral Duty,” in J. Bohman and M. Lutz-Bachmann, Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan 
Ideal. (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1997), pg. 81.
43
a cosmopolitan constitution, but also guarantees all the means for its inevitable 
construction.
To this end, Kant makes four teleological comments about human evolution and 
the way in which history can be understood as having a cosmopolitan purpose. First, Kant 
believes that nature has enabled humans to “live in all the areas they have settled” and 
has fashioned humans so that they can adapt to the most inhospitable conditions.24 
Second, Kant explains that nature has driven humans “in all directions by means of war,”
•j c
so that they willingly inhabit even the most inhospitable regions of the earth. Third, 
nature has compelled all humans to develop legal relationships in order to avoid war and 
thus to live in communities of law. Fourth, “nature has chosen war as a means of 
attaining this [civil] end” and the forces of war will continue until legal relationships are
Of tbroadened and a cosmopolitan matrix is ultimately procured. As Kant clearly states, 
“the distress produced by the constant wars in which the states try to subjugate or engulf 
each other must finally lend them, even against their will, to enter into a cosmopolitan 
constitution.”27
However, Kant did not believe that war is the only mechanism that nature 
employs to create an inevitable “concord among men.” Although Kant never used the 
term globalization specifically, he did believe that the world was becoming increasingly 
interconnected and that the forces of nature were organized in such a way that it would 
eventually produce a cosmopolitan condition. As Kant suggests, “trade between 
nations... [creates] peaceful relations with one another, and thus achieves mutual 
understanding, community of interests and peaceful relations, even with the most distant 
of their fellows.”28 However, Kant notes that the growth of commerce is also dialectical 
in the sense that it can have inadvertent consequences. In the case of Kant’s 
understanding of globalization, although commerce can establish communities of mutual
24 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 109-110.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Kant, “On the Common Saying: This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice,” in H. 
Reiss, op. cit., pg. 90.
28 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 111.
291 use the term dialectic in the Habermasian form. Namely that global interconnectedness both promotes 
more interconnectedness (thesis) while also creating new and unforeseen forces of opposition (antithesis) 
that ultimately are to be resolved through a synthesis of resolution. In Kant’s case, synthesis of human 
history will be the result of a naturalistic teleology culminating in a cosmopolitan condition.
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interest, it can also “provide the occasion for troubles in one place on our globe to be felt 
all over it.”30 In relation to nature’s use of war, Kant maintained that “the spirit of 
commerce sooner or later takes hold of every people, and it cannot exist side by side with 
war.”31 Therefore, providence employs a carrot and stick method to motivate humanity 
toward a cosmopolitan condition. Humans are forced to socially relate with one another 
through forces of global commerce and mutual interest while also being continuously 
threatened by the global effects and ramifications of destructive war. Kant stresses the 
“unsocial sociability” involved in human nature and how this natural antagonism is 
actually the “intention of nature” when he claims that it is a “purposive plan of producing 
concord among men, even against their will and indeed by means of their very discord.”32 
What is dubious about Kant’s understanding of globalization is that he seems to 
believe that nature has created the dialectics involved with interconnectedness as a way to 
force humans to seek peace and a universal condition of justice. In this regard, “it is the 
unintended consequences of global interconnectedness that propel human beings toward 
peace, so long as they can solve the problems that this form of order poses.”33 
Nonetheless, a problem ensues from the fact that Kant’s globalization does not simply 
supply the empirical circumstances of human experience that are to inform a possible 
cosmopolitan solution. As we have seen, Kant’s concept of globalization appears to entail 
much more. For according to Kant, global interconnectedness is not simply an empirical 
fact of experience, it is the “intention of nature” and compels us to resolve problems 
associated with globalization in order for humanity to fully develop a cosmopolitan 
matrix and the predetermined natural capacities of the human species.
Despite the fact that textual evidence often supports the notion that Kant is 
grounding his cosmopolitanism in a naturalistic teleology, there is another way to 
interpret Kant’s intended use of historical prognosis. This is because we can interpret a 
Kantian vision of history that is divorced from what Karl Popper called teleological 
“futurism.”34 To do so, Kantian history must be understood as hermeneutic in the sense
30 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 121.
31 Ibid.. pg. 114.
32 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” op. rit., pg. 108.
33 James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal. 
Introduction, (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1997), pg. 8.
34 Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism. (London, Routledge, 1957).
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that human experiences have inadvertently brought us to where we are and that these 
experiences highlight the various empirical considerations from which a metaphysics of 
morals must take into account. In this regard, history is comprised of the empirical 
considerations that Kantian metaphysics must attempt to understand as if it is possible to 
derive a moral purpose behind human existence. As Apel has similarly suggested, “a 
morally grounded ought demands that we think hypothetically and fallibly about progress 
in history—that is, in terms of a possible historical process to which morally informed
-1 C
practice can be tied.” This does not mean however that the purpose of history is actually 
determined or guaranteed, but only that a metaphysics of morals can provide a 
hypothetically possible vision of historical progress from which conflicts in history might 
be understood as resolvable through the establishment of a cosmopolitan matrix. It is 
from the fact that we cannot fully understand the forces of history that we can suggest the 
possibility that human beings could be reflective moral participants towards this 
cosmopolitan ideal. Apel has understood this interpretation of Kant as a form of reflective 
judgement, where history provides practical considerations from which it is our moral 
concern to attempt to resolve.
This interpretation suggests that a tenable conception of Kantian cosmopolitanism 
must reject the inherent complications involved in a teleological reading of Kant. 
Whether or not Kant’s theory of history was actually meant as a scheme of reflective 
judgement as Apel claims, or as a “perverted” form of dialectical science as charged by 
Popper, any practical reconstruction of Kantian cosmopolitanism must distance itself 
from the possible teleological ramifications of Kant’s notion of human progress. 
Nevertheless, as Apel has noted, adopting this interpretation of Kant’s vision of history 
might be in contrast to what Kant may have actually believed. Furthermore, utilization of 
this interpretation requires a thorough reinterpretation of the teleological evidence. The 
reinterpretation of Kant’s historical dimension in relation to the possibility of moral 
progress is a colossal undertaking and this subject has been given a more thorough 
treatment elsewhere.36 However, there are two areas connected to Kant’s vision of history
35 Apel, op. cit., pg. 83.
36 Karl-Otto Apel, Understanding and Explanation: A Transcendental-Pragmatic Perspective. (Cambridge, 
MIT Press, 1984). Also see Allen Wood, “Kant’s Campatibilism” in Wood (ed.), Self and Nature in the 
Philosophy of Kant. (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1984), pgs. 73-101.
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where application of this reinterpretation could be helpful in understanding a retooled 
version of Kantian cosmopolitanism.
The first area where determined empirical considerations inform Kantian 
cosmopolitanism is in relation to the development of human capacities. As was suggested 
in the last section, natural human capacities relate to the transcendental deduction and to 
the metaphysical idea o f morality. The base for Kant’s discussion of moral agency stems 
from the empirical fact that humans generally live in moral communities and that when 
we speak of moral actions we usually speak in terms of people being either morally right 
or morally wrong. The language of morality implies freedom o f will and the ability of 
individuals to make autonomous moral choices. This is because when someone has acted 
wrongly from a moral point of view the implication is that the person could have and 
therefore should also have acted differently. For Kant, humans have the power to be 
moral agents and this capacity for moral reasoning is a universal attribute of the human 
species.
Nevertheless, Kant also affirmed that morality is not an action of pure reason 
outside of social context. This is because Kant understood that human capacities can be 
only fully developed within society and that human reason cannot mature without social 
interaction and instruction. In addition, the capacity for moral agency is only valid when 
determined in relation to social context and when it can be conceived as consistent with a 
possible universal natural law. Otherwise, moral actions cannot be conceived as a 
subjective power inherent to the human condition, but as anomalistic impulses outside of 
cognitive influence or beyond the spectrum of practical and social considerations. It is 
for this reason that Kant claims that human capabilities can only be fully developed 
within a social condition of civil public right and justice. For it is only within a just social 
arrangement that individual capacities will be held as having an end in themselves, so 
that “the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a
in
universal law of freedom.”
Despite the fact that humans have the capacity for moral agency, this does not 
mean that all humans believe in the same moral norms or that they will always act upon 
their own moral judgements. This is due to the empirical fact that a plurality of ethical
37 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 24.
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perspectives exist in the world and that not every individual has developed the equal
T O
capacity to relate morally towards others. Consequently, it is a fact of human existence 
that antagonisms exist between various societies and that there are degrees to which 
individuals formulate moral imperatives. Antagonism in itself is not the problem, for 
Kant firmly believes that it is through antagonistic relationships that the exchange of 
ideas and the evolution of the human species is possible. None the less, if this condition 
of natural antagonism is to be understood as having a historical purpose for humanity, it 
must also be thought as having a universal purpose for humanity. As Kant explains, “this 
purpose can be fulfilled only in a society which has not only the greatest freedom, and 
therefore a continual antagonism among its members, but also the most precise 
specification and preservation of the limits of this freedom in order that it can coexist 
with the freedom of others.”39 It is in this regard that the practical concern for 
cosmopolitanism is with creating a global environment where various individuals can 
mutually develop their capacities without the consequences of conflict that have been 
witnessed throughout history. Therefore, the cosmopolitan ideal of history is meant to 
illustrate that if antagonism and human agency are to be both understood as having a 
universal human end, we should also reflectively conclude that they must accord with 
universal principles of right which can guarantee the development of these purposeful 
ends.
This leads to the second area where determined empirical considerations inform 
Kantian metaphysics and the cosmopolitan prescription for a political boundary limited 
only by the spherical shape of the earth. The significance of the symbolism of earth’s 
sphere is paramount to Kantian cosmopolitanism, because it provides the only natural 
political boundary for Kant’s use of practical reason. In fact, the idea of confined global 
space in conjunction with a diverse global population provides for Kant’s insistence that 
humans should enter into a cosmopolitan order. In this regard, the spherical confine of the 
globe provides the empirical conditions that inform his metaphysics of morals while also 
providing the motivation behind why we should establish cosmopolitan law. Since the 
world is not an infinite plane, but a sphere where individuals must necessarily occupy a
38 A more thorough discussion o f culture, pluralism and their relationship with Kantian cosmopolitanism is 
provided in Chapter Four.
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finite space next to one another, reason dictates the establishment of a system of public 
right. As Kant proclaimed, “the peoples of the earth have thus entered in various degrees 
into a universal community and it has developed to the point where the violation of rights 
in one part of the world is felt everywhere.”40 However, this does not mean that humans 
are in fact actual members of a universal community, but that empirical conditions are 
such that we can metaphysically infer that humans are embroiled in something like an 
actual community of mutual interest. From this empirical consideration, reason dictates 
that we should theorize about mutual interests and universal public right from a global 
perspective. As Katrin Flikschuh has suggested of a Kantian position, it “includes all 
those who because they cannot avoid occupying a place on earth, claim such a right to 
such a place.”41 In this regard, the bounded sphere of the earth acts as “an unavoidable 
constraint of nature within the limits of which finite rational beings must resolve conflicts 
of external freedom and justice.”42
The elimination of Kant’s teleology does not require the rejection of his 
cosmopolitan enthusiasm or weaken the force of logic that underpins its relevance. This 
is because we can understand history as providing empirical considerations from which 
our normative reflection must seek to resolve. In the case of globalization and human 
evolution, humans have found themselves inextricably interconnected where history has 
proven a need to peacefully adjudicate disagreement between cohabitants of a spherically 
bounded world. In a fusion of empirical experience with normative principles, Kant 
maintains that humans cannot avoid physical contact with one another and therefore 
should enter into a civil order that secures mutual right and the conditions for human 
capabilities to develop. In this regard, Kantian cosmopolitanism is an attempt to come to 
terms with the plurality of various societies in some sort of minimally recognized 
framework of cosmopolitan law. It is in the next section that a brief description of 
cosmopolitan law and universal justice is furnished.
40 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” op. cit., pg. 107.
41 Katrin Flikschuh, Kant and Modem Political Philosophy. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2000), pg. 179.
42 Ibid.
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III. Cosmopolitan Jurisprudence and the Foundation for a Cosmopolitan Matrix
The formalization of Kant’s cosmopolitan matrix rests on two related ideas of 
jurisprudence. The first involves Kant’s concept of a universal condition of public right, 
or as it is referenced in context of global relations, cosmopolitan right,43 As was 
mentioned before, the condition of public right is linked directly to Kant’s theory of 
justice, namely, “the sum of the conditions under which the choice of one can be united 
with the choice of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom.”44 Mary 
Gregor defines the jurisprudence behind the concept of public right as simply, “the sum 
of laws that need to be publicized in order to produce a rightful condition, one in which 
individuals, nations and states can enjoy their rights.”45 In this regard, Kantian 
jurisprudence is both concerned with the creation of a legal framework of mutually 
negative restraints on external freedom (justice), while also concerned with positive laws 
of publicity which are necessary in order to promote a condition of cosmopolitan right46 
In the global context, cosmopolitan right refers to an equal right of all individuals to 
inhabit the earth, the subsequently legal condition of mutual public right and the 
formulation of consistent legal obligations that are based solely on our humanity alone.
The second area of Kantian jurisprudence involved in the formalization of a 
cosmopolitan matrix relates to cosmopolitan law and universal justice. As Kant argued, a 
condition of public right cannot exist unless the very idea of rightful co-existence is 
grounded and propagated within a greater framework of cosmopolitan law and universal 
justice. In this case, cosmopolitan law refers to the framework of global law that must 
exist in order for any mutually consistent condition of right to be possible. As Kant 
maintained in Perpetual Peace, a cosmopolitan legal condition must not only be 
concerned with the rightful relations between individuals within states, but also with the 
rightful relations that should exist between state actors and their rightful treatment of all
431 discuss the relationship between cosmopolitan right and universal human rights in Chapter Six.
44 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 24.
45 Mary Gregor, “Kant’s Approach to Constitutionalism,” in A. Rosenbaum ed., Constitutionalism: the 
Philosophical Dimension. (New York, Greenwood Press, 1988), pg. 71.
46 As Kant argues, “all maxims which require publicity if  they are not to fail their purpose can be reconciled 
both with right and with politics.” Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. dt., pg. 130.1 discuss the 
principle of publicity and its possible implications for deriving a scheme of global distributive justice in 
Chapter Five.
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human beings.47 It is through this legal condition that both justice and perpetual peace 
should be maintained, for they are codependent and one cannot exist exclusively of the 
other.48
In order to formalize this cosmopolitan legal condition, Kant advances a tripartite 
system of jurisprudence divided into domestic law, international law and cosmopolitan 
law. As the tripartite suggests, a judicial system of public right is to be maintained 
through the three corresponding forms of rights and law, which in tandem create a 
universal condition where “the freedom of each can coexist with the freedom of all the 
others.”49 However, Kant believed that the tripartite system of jurisprudence could not 
guarantee a condition of right when operated solely as independent cells. As Kant 
suggests, “the problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the 
problem of a law governed external relationship with other states, and cannot be solved 
unless the latter is also solved.”50 This is because a thoroughgoing condition of public 
right cannot exist when certain violations of international right persistently threaten to 
undermine already established micro systems of domestic justice. In other words, since 
the world has become inextricably linked and interconnected, “if the principle of outer 
freedom limited by law is lacking in any one of these three possible forms of rightful 
condition, the framework of all the other is unavoidably undermined and must finally 
collapse.”51 It is from this reality of global interconnectedness that reason dictates the 
establishment of cosmopolitan law and a universal condition of public right.
As mentioned above, the framework of universal justice demands three 
corresponding forms of law and rightful condition: Domestic justice and internal state 
law; international justice and international law; and global justice and cosmopolitan law. 
Within Kant’s legal tripartite framework, domestic law involves the rights and duties that 
should exist between citizens and their governments (citizen to citizen, state to citizen). 
As is outlined in greater detail in Chapter Three, domestic justice is the comer stone of
47 Ibid.. pg. 126.
481 have provided an extensive discussion of Kant’s federation, the role o f states, and the interplay between 
domestic, international and cosmopolitan law in Chapter Three. Therefore, I will not go into any great 
detail here, but will sustain a more general focus in order to provide the foundation behind Kantian 
cosmopolitan jurisprudence as a whole.
49 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 41.
50 Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 47.
51 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 89.
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Kant’s overall cosmopolitan vision. This is because Kant believed that states represent 
the most rational form of social organization from which individual capacities could fully 
be allowed to develop. Nonetheless, Kant also firmly believed that only a republican 
constitution is suitable to secure and maintain justice both internally and externally. This 
is because well-constituted states have the ability to function as both the providers of 
justice and human development, while poorly constituted states have historically been the 
greatest violators of public right and human dignity.
For Kant, the first principle of global justice rests on the secured justice of state 
law and public right. According to Kant, a well-constituted state is based on three a priori 
principles; “the freedom of every member of society as a human being; the equality of 
each with all the others as subject; and the independence of each member of a 
commonwealth as a citizen.” Based on this domestic foundation, international law 
should be primarily concerned with the rightful condition that must exist between various 
state actors as representative entities (state to state). As was stated before, Kant believed 
that domestic justice could not flourish without the state also being secured in its external 
relations through a legal condition of international right. In order to secure international 
right, Kant suggests that a federation of independent states should be established in which 
the members uphold the various interlocking levels of justice in order to form a unified 
system of universal law. These principles of right and justice are to be cemented into 
universal law not by a world government, but by the willing concomitants of various 
communities and states that are dedicated to preserving this condition of universal public 
right.
However, Kantian cosmopolitanism is concerned with more than the strict 
prerogative of international relations. This is because Kant’s political theory is 
preoccupied with the moral worth and rightful condition of all human beings everywhere. 
To this end, cosmopolitan law is ultimately concerned with establishing a universal 
rightful condition that should exist between all humans and all states, regardless of 
national origin or state citizenship (state to all humans, humans to all humans, especially 
non-citizens). Although the subsequent chapters will provide a more detailed explanation
52 Kant, “On the Common Saying: This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice,” in H. 
Reiss, op. cit., pg. 74. Also see The Metaphysics of Morals, pg. 91.
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of cosmopolitan law and Kant’s cosmopolitan constitutionalism, it is nevertheless 
necessary to make clear that Kant’s cosmopolitan law was primarily concerned with the 
hospitable treatment of everyone by everyone, whether as individuals or as political 
entities. By hospitality Kant means “the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility 
when he arrives on someone else’s territory.”53 This hospitable treatment was not merely 
a philanthropic principle, but “a principle having to do with rights.”54 In addition, 
cosmopolitan right applied to visiting foreigners and to the inhabitants of newly 
discovered lands. For cosmopolitan hospitality strictly forbids foreign powers from 
exploiting native inhabitants or from using their territory without the explicit consent of 
the native population.55 As Charles Covell suggests, cosmopolitan law “was the body of 
public international law... constituting the juridical framework for the intercourse of men 
and states, considered in their status as bearers of the attributes of citizenship... that 
extended to embrace all mankind.”56 In this regard, “the idea of a cosmopolitan right... is 
a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international right,
cn
transforming it into a universal right of humanity.”
IV. Cosmopolitan Jurisprudence 
and the Development of a Kantian Cosmopolitan Matrix
The first order of Kantian cosmopolitanism is to provide a legal framework that 
prevents any violation of public right and establishes a universal system of justice. 
Nevertheless, the establishment and propagation of a cosmopolitan matrix goes beyond 
Kant’s legal foundation to include the optimistic cultivation of a broader sense of shared 
community, where everyone is considered as if they were mutual citizens of the world. It 
is in this realm that principles of cosmopolitan law and hospitality are meant to provide 
the grounding for a broadened sense of global community. As Kant suggests, we “stand 
in a community [confined by the global sphere] of possible interaction, that is, in a 
thoroughgoing relation of each to all others of offering to engage in commerce with any
53 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 105.
54 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 121.
55 Ibid.. pg. 122.
56 Covell, op. cit., pg. 141.
57 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, pp. ch., pg. 108.
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other, and each has the right to make this attempt.” Although current circumstances 
may restrict the free movement of commerce and relations, “this possible abuse cannot 
annul the right of citizens of the world to try to establish community with all, and to this 
end, to visit all regions of the earth.”59
In this regard, cosmopolitan law goes beyond mutual security and is also meant as 
the legal foundation for continued interconnection and development that may eventually 
bring human beings closer to understanding each other as mutual citizens. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that they are actually citizens in the sense usually used in 
discussions of political obligation and national citizenship. For Kant himself defines 
cosmopolitan right simply as a means for a future cosmopolitan enthusiasm by suggesting 
that, “hospitality does not extend beyond those conditions which make it possible for 
them to attempt to enter into relations with native inhabitants. In this way, continents 
distant from each other can enter into peaceful mutual relations which may eventually be 
regulated by public laws, thus bringing the human race nearer and nearer to a 
cosmopolitan constitution.”60 What this quote highlights is Kant’s optimism that by 
creating a system of cosmopolitan law which governs actions both within the pacific 
federation and externally with other communities, individuals will gradually engage with 
one another to the point where critical distinctions of tension disintegrate. In this sense, 
cosmopolitan law and its corresponding feature of cosmopolitan right, is meant to 
provide the basic legal mechanism necessary for individuals to peacefully and rightfully 
associate, trade, communicate and exchange ideas without conflict or mistreatment. As a 
result, this basic cosmopolitical order fits nicely with Kant’s overall philosophical project 
in that it “providejs] important guarantees for the security and property of persons, but 
more importantly it create[s] sufficient safety for them to proceed to perfect their moral 
lives.”61
Furthermore, the provision of hospitality illustrates the Kantian notion for the 
equal freedom of individuals to be unfettered in the process of communication and
58 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., 121.
59 Ibid.
60 Kant, “perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 106.
61 Linklater, op. cit., pg. 99.
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political emancipation. For it is only through “the freedom to make public use of one’s 
reason,” that broader social change and global civil advancement can hope to be 
achieved.63 This in turn also reflects Kant’s beliefs regarding enlightenment and a 
possible human evolutionary progression toward a cosmopolitan condition. As Kant 
himself proclaims, “the public use of man’s reason must always be free, and it alone can 
bring about enlightenment among men.”64 We can understand Kant as addressing all of 
humanity when he further claims that a violation of this freedom “would be a crime 
against human nature, who’s future lies precisely in such progress.”65
Cosmopolitan law therefore acts as the protective mechanism for the possibility of 
continued transnational deliberation and dialogue. As James Bohman has suggested, 
Kantian enlightenment and the successful propagation of a cosmopolitan sense of 
community requires an “unrestricted audience” from which transnational dialogue can 
foster.66 It is through cosmopolitan law and its corresponding principle of a cosmopolitan 
right to hospitality from which various individuals can engage with one another to 
communicate, criticize, remonstrate, debate, evince, expostulate and to have their own 
conceptions measured by critical examination. Since I have argued that a coherent form 
of Kantian cosmopolitanism should not rely on Kant’s naturalistic teleology, a 
reconstruction of Kantian cosmopolitanism must rely on mechanisms of public 
deliberation and reasoned dialogue as a means to further cosmopolitan enthusiasm. As 
Sharon Anderson-Gold has suggested, “public reason is then ultimately the basis for the
fndevelopment of a cosmopolitan community.”
Consequently, we can understand cosmopolitan law and the right to hospitality as 
containing two distinctive features of public right and deliberation underwriting Kant’s 
cosmopolitan enthusiasm. The first stipulates that every human being should enjoy the 
right of free movement in order to associate, trade and communicate. Following from
621 will provide a more through discussion of the rights derived from cosmopolitan right and hospitality in 
the next chapter. For my purposes here, I will focus on only two rights, the right to freedom o f travel and 
the right to engage in the public use of reason and communication.
63 Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 55.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., pg- 57.
66 James Bohman, “The Public Spheres of the World Citizen,” in Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann (ed.), 
Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal. (Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1997).
67 Sharon Anderson-Gold, Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights. (Cardiff, University of Wales Press,
2001), pg. 40.
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this, the second principle of public right demands that all individuals should have the 
freedom to reason freely with one another without dogmatic external hindrances or the 
fear of prosecution. Kant stresses that an ability for public reason is paramount to human 
advancement when he writes, “these rights of man must be held sacred... there are no 
half measures here... for all politics must bend the knee before right, [if] politics may
/*Q
hope in return to arrive, however slowly, at a stage of lasting brilliance.”
Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand how we should apply Kant’s 
cosmopolitan enthusiasm in the modem context.69 The difficulty arises from the fact that 
human relationships need to reach a certain stage of maturity in order to adopt and 
implement cosmopolitan law. However, reaching this stage of maturity requires an 
already existing amount of hospitality and mutual relations from which this sense of 
community can flourish. Although this does not create a strict “chicken and egg” 
dilemma, it does call into question how we are to determine exactly where human 
relationships stand as far as the practical application of a Kantian system of cosmopolitan 
law. Some have suggested that Kant’s minimal requirement for global hospitality is 
absolutely necessary if human beings are to engage in a continued process of mutual 
education toward a sense of cosmopolitan community.70 Many contemporary scholars 
have suggested that cosmopolitan right is synonymous with current discussions of 
universal human rights and that the language of human rights has developed to a point 
where Kantian cosmopolitanism is conceivable.71 Finally, some contemporary 
cosmopolitans have argued that humans currently exist at a point in our development and 
maturity where human interdependence has made cosmopolitan law a necessarily viable
79alternative to the existing global order.
68 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 125.
69 I discuss the relationship between theory and practice in modem context in greater detail in Chapter Six.
70 Martha Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity. (Harvard, Harvard University Press, 1998).
71 Variations o f this argument can be found in Sharon Anderson-Gold, Cosmopolitanism and Human 
Rights, op. cit., John Charvet, “The Possibility of a Cosmopolitan Order Based on the Idea of Universal 
Human Rights*” Millennium. (1998), Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. 
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The practical and empirical considerations that give substance to these issues are 
complex and multi-faceted. Nevertheless, we can say with a reasonable amount of 
certainty that we no longer live in a world of community isolation. Humanity has 
evolved, for whatever reasons, into an extremely interdependent, culturally transient and 
globalized environment. If this environment of global interdependence is to have a 
greater chance to peacefully evolve, it is important to find recognizable ethical principles 
that not only facilitate greater cooperation, but that also protect the valuable pluralist and 
autonomous concerns of various communities impacted by global cohabitation. For 
although we can claim that humans have reached a level of interdependence that has 
forced us to “relate” with one another, this very same interdependence does not 
necessarily mean that how we “relate” with one another could be labeled as developing a 
sense of shared humanity. It is in this sense that the normative principles behind Kantian 
cosmopolitan law are both relevant to contemporary global issues, even perhaps 
necessary, if we are going to tackle the problems associated with the benefits and burdens 
of confined global cohabitation. It is form this need to think normatively about global 
cohabitation that the remaining chapters seek to further develop Kantian cosmopolitan 
law.
V. Conclusion
The quote by Marcus Aurelius used at the beginning of this chapter maintains that 
“it makes no difference whether a person lives here or there, provided that, where he 
lives, he lives as a citizen of the world.”73 The ethical concern implicit within the quote 
refers to how human beings ought to treat one another and to what degree we should feel 
a sense of broadened communal membership. For Marcus Aurelius, an adequate 
communal obligation stems from our humanity alone, without reference to state, national 
or ethnic membership. From this, our sense of communal membership and obligation 
must stem from something inherent about our mutual existence in this world as living 
human beings. In alignment with the spirit of Aurelius, the version of Kantian 
cosmopolitanism outlined throughout this chapter is meant to provide the philosophical
73 Marcus Aurelius, The Meditations. (New York, Hackett, 1983), section 3.
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and moral foundations that are to underpin the development of this cosmopolitan 
community.
As has been discussed, Kantian cosmopolitanism is firmly grounded in Kant’s 
ethical philosophy and the recognition of human beings as moral agents deserving of 
universal respect and dignity as co-legislators within a kingdom o f ends. Therefore, 
individual human capacities represent the ultimate unit of moral concern equally and it is 
the prerogative of Kantian cosmopolitanism that these capacities should be allowed to 
fully develop within a condition of universal justice. It was from this ethical platform that 
it is possible to understand Kantian cosmopolitanism as being preoccupied with 
providing the normative principles that are meant to ground the motivation, the formation 
and the maintenance of a cosmopolitan matrix. In addition, the attainment of this 
cosmopolitan matrix requires the cultivation of a cosmopolitan civil society; one based 
solely on our humanity alone, grounded in a system of cosmopolitan law. Although Kant 
is both ambiguous and at times inconsistent as to what forces are behind the formation of 
this cosmopolitan matrix, I have argued that it is still possible to maintain a defendable 
enthusiasm for taking Kant’s cosmopolitanism seriously. It is in this vein that the 
subsequent chapters will provide a more detailed analysis of cosmopolitan law, the 
cosmopolitan federation, the place for cultural diversity within cosmopolitan law, a 
possible form of Kantian global distributive justice and how a connection between 
Kantian theory and real world application might be understood as possible.
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Chapter Two
Kantian Cosmopolitan Law 
and the Idea of a Cosmopolitan Constitution
“Ethics is Hospitality. Ethics is thoroughly coextensive 
with the experience of hospitality.” -  Jacques Derrida
Introduction
The study of ethics is usually understood as being concerned with principles of 
good conduct that are associated with a system of standards which govern given social 
organizations. In some cases, the study of ethics seeks to discover these principles from 
an already existing social order. In other cases, ethics is concerned with formulating 
normative principles of good conduct from which to establish additional juridical or 
social standards for communal living. In relation to the study of global ethics, Jacques 
Derrida has suggested that universal hospitality is a necessary, yet also historically 
“perverted,” concept that must find greater purpose if humanity is to ever hope to realize 
a cosmopolitan condition.1 This, according to Derrida, is because hospitable behavior is 
the foundation behind propagating an experience of good social conduct and therefore 
plays a prominent role in inaugurating any move towards a future cosmopolitan ethic. In 
many regards, Kantian cosmopolitanism makes a similar claim. If the development of a 
cosmopolitan condition is to be actualized in practice, then hospitable conduct between 
states, nations, individuals and associations will be the predominate mechanism from 
which a system of continued ethics can flourish. This explains why Kant often defines 
cosmopolitan right as being analogous with a condition of universal hospitality and a 
condition of peace. For it is only from a baseline of mutual security, hospitable conduct 
and a condition of respected public right that the experience of ethical interchange can 
blossom into a more pronounced and standardized system of cosmopolitan order.
1 Jacques Derrida, “On Cosmopolitanism” in On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. M. Dooley & M. 
Hughes (trans.), (London, Routledge, 2002). By historically perverted, Derrida is simply suggesting that 
history has often witnessed states making claims to principles of hospitality while also systematically 
engaging in imperialistic and globally inhospitable behavior.
2 Hospitality can be loosely defined as the cordial and generous reception of guests that is both receptive 
and open minded to their particular ways of living.
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Nevertheless, many scholars have offered critiques of Kantian cosmopolitan law 
and its corresponding feature of universal hospitality. Philosophers such as Derrida have 
questioned whether the principles of Kantian cosmopolitan law are hospitable enough, 
suggesting that they might be too weak and minimalist to truly create a cosmopolitan 
condition where everyone is treated as a citizen of the world. Conversely, Hegelian and 
international relations theorists such as Martin Wight have argued that Kantianism is 
inordinately demanding of a common morality and therefore so fantastically 
universalistic that it is rendered both untenable and extremely dangerous to a plurality of 
global beliefs. Adding more confusion to how to understand Kantian cosmopolitan law, 
many cosmopolitan scholars such as Onora O’Neill and Charles Jones have debated 
about how to interpret Kantian cosmopolitan right and whether it is better understood as a 
duty-based theory or as a legal theory of right-based entitlements.4
What this confusion illustrates is a need to clarify the jurisprudence involved in 
Kantian cosmopolitanism. As will be illustrated, Kantian cosmopolitan law is more 
robust than Derrida has assumed while also not guilty of establishing the “nightmarish 
hegemony” feared by Wight.5 Furthermore, both O’Neill and Jones have looked at 
Kantian cosmopolitanism too narrowly, for Kant’s theory contains both rational duties to 
establish a global ethic while also advocating rightful legal claims to the performance of 
those duties and obligations. Due to the fact that there is a general confusion surrounding 
the nature of Kantian cosmopolitan law, the purpose of this chapter is to outline a Kantian 
form of cosmopolitan law and the ethical system involved in creating a cosmopolitan 
constitution. In doing so, it will explore and discuss Kantian cosmopolitan law, the idea 
of cosmopolitan right, the laws of hospitality and a revised Kantian approach to 
constitutional cosmopolitanism. By a revised approach to Kantian constitutionalism, this 
chapter will argue beyond Kant’s constitutionalism, suggesting the establishment of an
3 Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions. G. Wight & A. Roberts (eds.), (Leicester, 
Leicester University Press, 1991).
4 Onora O’Neill, ‘Transnational Justice,’ in D. Held (ed.), Political Theory Today. (Oxford, Polity Press,
1995), pgs. 276-304. Charles Jones, Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism. (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1999).
5 Martin Wight, “An Anatomy of International Thought,” Review of International Studies. 13 (1987), pg. 
2 2 6 .1 have dealt more thoroughly with this argument in both chapters 3 and 4.
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actual written constitution that can facilitate an experience of mutual citizenship while 
also providing a minimal ethical foundation for a civil cosmopolitan order.
In order to provide an outline of Kantian cosmopolitan law and the principles 
underpinning a cosmopolitan constitution, this chapter is divided into three sections. The 
first section will examine the Kantian idea of cosmopolitan law and explore its 
relationship in creating a condition of cosmopolitan public right. From this background, 
section two develops and extrapolates the inherent principles of cosmopolitan right found 
within Kant’s laws of hospitality and discusses how these principles act as legal 
obligations under a scheme of cosmopolitan law. Section Three builds upon the first two 
sections by examining the jurisprudence behind the establishment of a cosmopolitan 
constitution and argues that the idea of an actual written constitution is an effective 
component in grounding a cosmopolitan legal condition.
I. Cosmopolitan Law and a Condition of Cosmopolitan Right
In the Metaphysics o f Morals, Kant defines right as “the sum of the conditions 
under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of the other in accordance 
with a universal law of freedom.”6 Under this definition of right, the idea of a universal 
law of freedom is meant to ground two related normative principles of cosmopolitan 
jurisprudence and public right. The first normative principle is that a rightful condition of 
cosmopolitan law must be reflective and protective of an “innate right” to freedom. As 
Kant claims, “freedom (independence form being constrained by another’s choice), 
insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal 
law, is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity.”7 In this 
regard, human beings should have the right to be free to determine their lives as long as 
their actions can conform to a universal system of freedom and mutual right. As will be 
discussed in the next section, Kant links this innate right to universalized freedom to the 
laws of cosmopolitan hospitality which are meant to act as the ethical minimums for 
global coexistence and public right.
6 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals. M. Gregor (ed.), (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1996), pg. 24.
7 Ibid.. pg. 30.
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The second principle of cosmopolitan right dictates that “all human beings are 
originally (prior to any act of choice that establishes a right) in a possession of land that is 
in conformity with right, that is, they have a right to be wherever nature or chance (apart
Q
from their will) has placed them.” What this passage suggests, is that all human beings 
are originally located somewhere on earth and that this is not a matter of choice (a 
decision of moral will), but simply a matter of physical existence and circumstance.9 
However, since individuals will take control of land as a believed entitlement and this can 
affect and or be effected by the claims of others, reason dictates that any right to land can 
only be provisional unless grounded within a mutually recognized system of universal 
law. Therefore, a rightful cosmopolitan condition under law must contain the 
prerequisites of equal freedom and a rightful place of secured existence within a world 
that is held in common. These principles are synthetic a priori truths related to a 
condition of right and do not exist as facts, “but as a concept of reason which alone yields 
a principle making it possible for individuals, families, nations or states to use land 
compatibly with principles of right.”10 What is needed to effectively ground these 
principles into a thoroughgoing system of public right is cosmopolitan law, which must 
be firmly rooted to a priori principles of right and be universally understood as forming 
mutual obligations between all human beings.
Although cosmopolitan right must be grounded systematically on a priori 
principles of freedom and a condition of public right, Kant also requires that these 
principles must be universally recognized as law. In this sense, a rightful condition is 
connected to his theory of justice and an authorized use of civil coercion. As Kant claims, 
“if a certain use of freedom is itself a hindrance to freedom in accordance with universal 
law (i.e. wrong), coercion that is opposed to this (as a hindering of a hindrance to 
freedom) is consistent with freedom in accordance with universal laws, that is, it is 
right.”11 As was discussed in the last chapter, Kantian justice is concerned with what 
legitimate restrictions to individual freedoms should exist in order to create a condition of
8 Ibid.. pg. 50.
9 Ibid.
10 Mary Gregor, “Kant’s Approach to Constitutionalism,” in A. Rosenbaum (ed.), Constitutionalism: The 
Philosophical Dimension. (New York, Greenwood Press, 1988), pg. 82.
11 Kant, The Metaphysics o f Morals, pg. 25.
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universal public right. In this regard, a rightful condition demands the regulation and 
enforcement of laws that are designed specifically to allow the greatest freedom of 
everyone in accordance with maintaining universal law. Coercion is justified if it is 
grounded and enforced in relation to the concept of universal right and freedom. As Mary 
Gregor has suggested, “the conclusion Kant draws is that only in a ‘rightful condition,’ in 
civil society, can anyone’s right be conclusive, secured or guaranteed.”12 In relation to 
cosmopolitan right, “cosmopolitan law imposes legal obligations both on individuals and 
on states, and in so doing becomes an attempt to provide a legal foundation for the rights 
of the individual regardless of the state which he or she belongs -  hence for veritable 
rights of citizens of the world.”13 However, we can ask what obligations and legal 
commands are the members of a Kantian federation accepting as legally binding and 
imperative. It is in the next section that the principles of cosmopolitan right and 
hospitality are extrapolated and discussed.
II. Cosmopolitan Right and the Laws of Hospitality
Scholars have long debated the meaning and juridical purpose behind Kantian 
hospitality and its relationship with formulating a condition of cosmopolitan right. As 
Kant defines it, hospitality is “the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when 
he arrives on someone else’s territory.”14 Sharon Anderson-Gold has argued that 
cosmopolitan hospitality can be easily linked to a modem conception of universal human 
rights as enumerated in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.15 
Others like F.H. Hinsley have taken a more skeptical view, suggesting that cosmopolitan 
hospitality is little more than the basic protections needed for expanding global 
commerce and trade.16 Philosophers such as Jacques Derrida have insinuated that Kantian 
hospitality does not demand enough for the protection of asylum seekers and therefore
12 Gregor, “Kant’s Approach to Constitutionalism,” op. tit., pg. 79.
13 Daniele Archibugi, “Immanuel Kant, Cosmopolitan Law and Peace,” European Journal o f International 
Relations. Vol. 1 (4), (1995), pg. 449.
14 Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” in H. Reiss, Kant’s Political Writings. 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970), pg. 106.
15 Sharon Anderson-Gold, Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights. (Cardiff, University o f Wales Press,
2001).
16 F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1963).
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negates Kant’s own concern for individual freedoms while also placing too many
prerogatives in the hands of state actors.17 Lastly, scholars such as Onora O’Neill have
argued that it is misguided to discuss Kantian cosmopolitanism as embodying the
language of human rights, but that it is more appropriately understood through the
categorical imperative and universal moral duties that can be derived from Kant’s critical 
18philosophy. Nevertheless, despite the depth of opinion, there is a critical problem 
involved with all of these interpretations. The problem is that none of these positions 
have unraveled the meaning behind Kant’s laws of hospitality and taken them seriously. 
In fact, when surveying the literature, there has been no attempt to develop the specific 
freedoms and duties that are lurking implicitly within Kant’s discussion of cosmopolitan 
right. In O’Neill’s particular case, she seems to ignore many of Kant’s political writings, 
focusing mainly on the Metaphysics o f Morals and his critical philosophy. Although she 
has skillfully highlighted the point that cosmopolitan right only makes practical sense 
when placed within a system of universal obligation, she seems to have overlooked the 
fact that Kantian laws of hospitality take her concerns into account by mirroring rights of 
hospitality with corresponding positive duties of legal obligation.19 In other words, not 
only does Kant suggest that we have cosmopolitan duties to fellow human beings based 
on our common humanity, but also that this duty must be inscribed as a legal obligation 
to uphold these rights within a system of cosmopolitan law. It is because of the fact that 
there is a general misconception and lack of scholarship on this aspect of Kantian theory 
that the remainder of this section intends to extract, recapitulate and make coherent 
Kant’s laws of hospitality.
As was outlined in Chapter One, the primary concern of cosmopolitan law is with
the creation of a cosmopolitan “matrix within which all the original capacities of the
00human race may develop.” As was also discussed, cosmopolitan right can be 
understood as a condition of global public right or justice, where there is a “restriction of
17 Derrida, op. cit.
18 Onora O’Neill, Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Poverty. Justice and Development. (London, Allen & 
Unwin, 1986).
19 To be fair, O’Neill is mostly concerned with human development and the satisfaction of basic needs and 
does not specifically discuss cosmopolitan hospitality. However, I believe this oversight to be an error and I 
will now attempt to draw out the laws of hospitality. In relation to O’Neill’s concerns, I have provided my 
own Kantian suggestion regarding the normative foundations for a scheme of distributive justice and 
human development in chapter 5 and-6.
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each individual’s freedom so that it harmonizes with the freedom of everyone else.”21 In 
order to develop and maintain a condition of cosmopolitan right, Kant suggests the 
establishment of universal laws of hospitality. This condition of “public right is the 
distinctive quality of the external laws which make this constant harmony possible.”22 
We can understand Kant as grounding cosmopolitan right and the laws of hospitality as a 
legal right under cosmopolitan law, when he states, “a thoroughgoing community of all 
nations on the earth that can come into relations affecting one another is not a
91philanthropic principle but a principle having to do with rights.” As Charles Covell 
aptly points out, “for Kant, the right to hospitality was an authentic legal right. It was 
moreover, a right that he thought of as belonging to all human beings without 
exception.”24 Kant further elaborates on this legal right and ties it back to an a priori right 
to the earth in common when he suggests that “no-one originally has any greater right 
than anyone else to occupy any particular portion of the earth... [Thus a] right to the 
earth’s surface... the human race shares in common.”
Accordingly in direct relationship to the juridical principles necessary to create a 
condition of cosmopolitan right, Kant attaches coterminous laws of hospitality, defined 
broadly as “the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on 
someone else’s territory.” However, the laws of hospitality are not as simplistic and 
impotent as some thinkers like Derrida have often assumed. For throughout his 
discussion of cosmopolitan right, Kant subtly elaborates on five universal freedoms and 
corresponding duties that can be understood as necessary under cosmopolitan right and 
the law of hospitality. Although he did not systematically outline these freedoms, they 
can be extrapolated from his discussions within the Metaphysics o f Morals and his 
various political writings. He himself suggested that we should make such an attempt to 
extrapolate the meaning of these laws when he wrote, “as for cosmopolitan right, I pass
20 Immanuel Kant, “Idea o f a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” in H. Reiss, op. rit., pg. 51.
21 Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying: This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in 
Practice,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 73.
22 Ibid.
23 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 121.
24 Charles Covell, Kant and the Law of Peace: A Study in the Philosophy o f International Law and 
International Relations. (New York, Palgrave, 1998), pg. 143.
25 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 106.
26 Ibid.
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over it here in silence, for its maxims are easy to formulate and assess on account of its
onanalogy with international right.”
In the spirit of Kant’s invitation to formulate principles of cosmopolitan right, we 
can comprehend that the first law of hospitality demands the freedom o f exit and travel. 
These principles can be derived from Kant’s discussion of cosmopolitan right within both 
the Doctrine o f Right and Perpetual Peace. As Kant states, individuals have “a right of 
citizens of the world to try to establish community with all, and to this end, to visit all 
regions of the earth.”28 Kant further argues that all humans can claim a right to such 
travel, arguing that “[humans] may only claim a right to resort, for all men are entitled to 
present themselves in the society of others by virtue of their right to communal 
possession of the earth’s surface.” Although Kant does not specifically suggest that 
hospitality necessitates a right to freely exit one’s locality, it is reasonable to assume that 
this condition must be a premise to the right of global travel, for one could not travel 
without the assumption that they were able to exit their current location. In addition, it is 
clear within Kantian ethics that any unequal and arbitrary physical restraints on 
individual freedom is tantamount to coercion and is not sanctioned under the Kantian 
concept of public right and freedom. Since an arbitrary restriction from exiting a given 
territory is an immediate restriction to the freedom to travel, we can assume that such 
coercion is a violation of universal justice and the laws of hospitality.
The second law of hospitality specifies a freedom from hostility and from  
negligence resulting in death when engaged in global travel. Kant outlines this basic 
negative freedom when he suggests “[someone] can be turned away, if this can be done 
without causing his death, but he must not be treated with hostility, so long as he behaves
70in a peaceable manner in the place he happens to be in.” Although this statement is 
rather ambiguous in that it could be interpreted as standing in contradiction to the first 
law of hospitality, it must be placed into context in order for it to be understood properly. 
In the context of Perpetual Peace, we can understand Kant to be suggesting that a right to 
residence can be denied and that any unlawful act can result in banishment. Nevertheless,
27 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, pg. cit., pg. 128.
28 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 121.
29 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, pg. cit., pg. 106.
30 Ibid.
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given an individual’s lawful behavior and a continued behavior that is consistent with the 
following duties of hospitality, the right to travel cannot be denied. As was previously 
quoted in relation to a right to travel, all humans have “a right to resort and are entitled to
present themselves in the society of others by virtue of their right to communal
11
possession of the earth’s surface.” Additionally, individuals are to be free from hostile 
behavior and from “inhospitable conduct” that would result in immanent harm to body or 
property. Kant outlines some examples of what constitutes inhospitable harm that should 
be forbidden as enslaving stranded seafarers, the plundering o f property, slavery for 
repayment of debt, starvation or forced famine, treachery, physical violence and actions 
that would immediately cause significant harm to body and property.32
Based on this right to “present [oneself] in the society of others,” the third law of 
hospitality demands an additional freedom o f communication and to engage in public 
reason. As Kant plainly states, all individuals should have “the freedom to make public 
use of one’s reason.”33 This freedom is not only necessary for Kant’s overall 
enlightenment project, but is also a necessary element for a continued global dialogue and 
the possible movement toward understanding each other as mutual citizens of the world. 
The use of public reason has a significant position within Kantian thought because it is a 
necessary mechanism that allows for humanity to rightfully associate, trade, 
communicate and exchange experiments in living without conflict. Covell has reached a 
similar conclusion, suggesting that “the stranger was entitled to attempt to enter into 
relations with native inhabitants... [And] the right of men to hospitality carried with it the 
possibility of the whole human race being able to progress towards eventual union under 
a lawful cosmopolitan constitution.”34 Kant further articulates the importance of a 
freedom to share ideas when he writes, “freedom of the pen is the only safeguard of the 
rights of the people.”35 Although this last quote was written in context of domestic right, 
it clearly illustrates Kant’s concern for free access to information in relation to the 
creation of an overall condition of public right. Based on Kant’s discussions of 
enlightenment, free communication, free access to information, a right to engage in
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.. pg. 106-107. Also see footnotes.
33 Kant, “What is Enlightenment?,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 55.
34 Covell, toe. rit.
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public reason and that these principles are collectively necessary for the promotion of a 
condition of public right, we can justifiably extend these principles into the realm of 
cosmopolitan right.
Since humans have “a right to present themselves in the society of others,” the 
fourth law of hospitality stipulates a freedom to engage in commerce and the use o f the 
world in common. As Kant writes:
“Since possession of the land, on which an inhabitant of the earth can live, 
can be thought only as a possession of a part of a determinate whole, and 
so possession of that to which each of them originally has a right, it 
follows that all nations stand originally in a community of land, though 
not of rightful community of possession and so of use of it, or property in 
it; instead they stand in a community of possible physical interaction, that 
is, in a thoroughgoing relation of each to all the others of offering to 
engage in commerce with any other, and each has the right to make this 
attempt without the other being authorized to behave toward it as an 
enemy because it has made this attempt.”36
What this passage highlights is the Kantian concept of the earth in common and 
an equal right to make use of its property through commerce and physical interaction. 
Kant further suggests that, “since the earth is a globe, [humans] cannot disperse over an 
infinite area, but must necessarily tolerate one another’s company. And no-one originally 
has any greater right than anyone else to occupy any particular portion of the earth.”37 In 
relation to commerce, Kant builds upon this idea by suggesting, “[humans] stand in a 
community of possible interaction, that is, in a thoroughgoing relation of each to all the 
others of offering to engage in commence with any other, and each has the right to make 
this attempt.” In other words, since humans are interlocked within a community of 
possible and actual interchange, the laws of hospitality are not only meant as a right to 
engage in hospitable international commerce, but also meant to establish regulative 
principles of commence and trade to assure continued hospitality. In this regard, although 
individuals, nations and associations have a legal right to engage in commerce, these 
exchanges must also conform to legal principles of public right and justice of a world in
35 Kant, “Theory and Practice,” in H. Reiss, og. cit., pg. 85.
36 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, loc. cit.
37 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, og. ch., pg. 106.
38 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., 121.
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common. These legal conditions are further elaborated in the fifth and final law of 
hospitality.
The fifth law of hospitality is related to the previous right to commerce by 
suggesting that fair and equal commerce demands a freedom from false, misrepresented, 
extorted or fraudulent contracts. According to Kant, the law of hospitality is a necessary 
component for the possible evolution of cosmopolitan order for it is concerned “with 
those conditions which make it possible for [individuals] to attempt to enter into relations 
with native inhabitants. In this way, continents distant from each other can enter into 
peaceful mutual relations which may eventually be regulated by public laws, thus 
bringing the human race nearer and nearer to a cosmopolitan constitution.”39 However, 
this condition necessitates a lack of “inhospitable conduct” when engaging with others. In 
relation to settlement and community relations, the law of hospitality demands that 
“settlement may not take place by force but only by contract, and indeed by a contract 
that does not take advantage of the ignorance of those inhabitants.”40 From this it can be 
garnered that Kant is restricting external relations so that all dealings must conform to the 
fair principles of hospitality and contract so as to allow the potentiality for a future civil 
condition. In this regard, both visitor and inhabitant must conform to a fair and balanced 
relationship of commerce and contract. For it is only from a sense of mutual cooperation 
and benefit that a broad sense of cosmopolitan public right can be secured.
Although cosmopolitan right and the corresponding laws of hospitality place 
considerable negative limits on the extent to which individuals, states and communities 
can treat fellow human beings, it must be understood that cosmopolitan right is also 
strictly confined to the realm of hospitality. This is clearly evidenced by the title of the 
third definitive article of Perpetual Peace where Kant claims that “Cosmopolitan Right 
Shall be Limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality.”41 In this regard, Kant assigns 
two caveats within the law of hospitality, stipulating that any visiting individual must 
obey local laws and that any further claim to domestic citizenship must be secured 
through an additional contract. As Kant states, there is not a “right to make settlement on
39 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, ]oc. cit.
40 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 122.
41 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 105.
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the land of another nation (ius incolatus); for this, a specific contract is required.”42 In 
this regard, Derrida is correct to suggest that Kantian hospitality “excludes the right of 
residence” thus limiting “it to the right of visitation.”43 However, Derrida is incorrect to 
immediately assume that this restriction of migration somehow weakens the protective 
force of cosmopolitan hospitality. This is because Kant does not suggest that residence 
and migration is forbidden, but simply that any permanent claim to residency is subject to 
an additional “friendly agreement” between that individual and local inhabitants. In 
addition, Kant clearly states that individuals cannot be “turned away” if this could not “be 
done without causing his death.”44 In addition, as was stated under the second law of 
hospitality, individuals are to be free from “inhospitable conduct” that would result in 
immanent harm to body and or property. In this case, Derrida’s concern regarding the 
possible rejection of asylum seekers under Kantian hospitality is not as clearly evident as 
he seems to assume, since Kantian hospitality strictly forbids rejection if death and or 
immanent harm to body or property would be the result of such deportation.45 Since in 
many cases asylum seekers face torture and or death if extradited, it could be argued that 
this deportation would be tantamount to “inhospitable conduct” and would therefore be a 
negligent violation of the laws of hospitality.
Furthermore, as Kant suggests in both the Metaphysics o f Morals and Perpetual 
Peace, the claim to cosmopolitan right is to be understood as a legal right and therefore 
establishes corresponding duties and obligations under cosmopolitan law. For example, in 
direct relation to cosmopolitan right, there is a corresponding duty on the part of 
federated members not to fraudulently engage in extorted or misrepresented contracts. 
This obligation is not only in relation to foreign visitors, but is also obligatory in any 
external relations with foreign inhabitants46 This could be seen to have broad 
implications for the regulation of global markets and with resolving many global
42 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 121.
43 Derrida, op. cit., pg. 21.
44 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. crt., pg. 106.
45 This is not to say that Derrida is categorically wrong in questioning Kantian hospitality, for it may be the 
case that the laws o f hospitality do not protect asylum seekers to Derrida’s satisfaction under closer 
scrutiny. My point is that there seems to be room for interpretation and broader application within the laws 
of hospitality than Derrida immediately suggests and that they may indeed satisfy an obligation to protect 
asylum seekers.
46 Ibid., pgs. 106-107.
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inequalities associated with globalization.47 In this regard, individuals, states and 
associations are obligated to deal in good faith with each other and a failure to do so 
results in a violation of cosmopolitan right, nullifying all extraneous contracts. Therefore, 
as well as establishing a simple duty to allow free travel, federated members must also 
attempt to establish relationships of fair trade and interaction without hostility. Finally, 
there exists something like a duty o f reasonable care for all individuals, especially non­
citizens, so that visitation or rejection from a territory does not lead to their death, 
inhospitable treatment or immanent harm to body and property. In this respect, a 
condition of cosmopolitan right and hospitality not only protects individual negative 
freedoms, but also establishes positive duties to all human beings in connection with 
travel, trade, contracts, settlement and asylum. It is in the next section that the laws of 
hospitality and cosmopolitan right are placed into the framework of Kantian 
cosmopolitan law and the construction of a cosmopolitan constitution.
III. Kantian Constitutionalism and the Idea of a Cosmopolitan Constitution
In The Critique o f Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant writes that “a constitution 
allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws which ensure that 
the freedom of each can coexist with the freedom of all the other, is at all events a 
necessary idea which must be made the basis not only of the first outline of a political 
constitution but of all laws as well.”48 By constitution, we can understand that Kant does 
not specifically mean a written political document, but rather is alluding to the underlying 
normative principles that underwrite a juridical condition of mutual public right. In this 
regard, a constitution refers to the totality of laws that should be publicized so as to create 
a rightful condition of mutual freedom between individuals, states and associations. What 
is to be constituted within a Kantian system of laws is the idea that the mutual protection 
of individual freedom is paramount for the creation of a condition of universal justice and 
that all subsequent laws should reflect a commitment to this corresponding universal
47 A boarder discussion of these implications is provided in Chapter Six.
48 Immanuel Kant, Appendix, ‘Transcendental Logic II, Dialectics I, Ideas in General,” in J.M.D. 
Meiklejohn trans., The Critique of Pure Reason. (New York, The Colonial Press, 1900).
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condition of public right. Kant defines the relationship between public right and his 
constitutionalism as:
“The sum of laws which need to be promulgated generally in order to 
bring about a rightful condition is public right. -  Public right is therefore a 
system of laws for a people, that is, a multitude of human beings, of for a 
multitude of peoples, which, because they affect one another, need a 
rightful condition under a will uniting them, a constitution (constitutio), so 
that they may enjoy what is laid down as right.”49
We can understand Kant to mean that these principles should not only be the 
concern of domestic constitutions, but also a requirement of all laws, which should 
ultimately culminate in a cosmopolitan constitution. Since humanity has an “original 
possession of the earth in common” and since we are bounded by spherical cohabitation, 
any domestic and international constitution “will always remain provisional unless this 
contract extends to the entire human race.”50 As Kant elaborates, “so if the principle of 
outer freedom limited by law is lacking in any one of these three possible forms of 
rightful condition [domestic, international and cosmopolitan], the framework of all the 
others is unavoidably undermined and must finally collapse.”51
As was previously mentioned, Kant does not specifically advocate the creation of 
a cosmopolitan constitution. For Kant, constitutionalism seems to refer mainly to a 
condition of right under a mutually recognized collection of laws. This legal condition 
can include both codified law and extra-legal principles of convention thaI  act to 
underpin a universal condition of right. In fact, within his argument for a foedus 
pacijicum Kant makes only one direct reference to a written constitution. From this 
discussion Kant seems to disfavor the possibility of a drafted cosmopolitan constitutional 
document. In qualifying an obligation to the foedus pacificum, Kant maintains that the 
alliance is not to be “a federation (like that of the American states) which is based on a 
constitution and can therefore not be dissolved,” but a federation of voluntary 
association. Despite the fact that Kant is misinformed about the permanent rigidity of
49 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 89.
50 Ibid.. pg. 53.
51 Ibid.. pg. 89.
52 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 120.
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the US Constitution, he also seems to underestimate the contractarian benefits that are 
analogous with an objectified written constitution and its ability to formalize the 
normative principles of voluntary association. In addition, under close inspection, it 
would seem that Kant is not so much against the idea of a written constitution per se, as 
he is skeptical of creating a legal document that cements a structure of federal 
government which cannot be “renounced” or “renewed from time to time.”54 In this 
regard, what Kant seems to dislike is the category of a rigid written constitution that 
would contain no ability for member states to either secede or reconfirm their contractual 
obligations.55 What this highlights is the importance of voluntary contractualism behind 
Kant’s federation and the idea that political obligation is grounded by a moral self­
commitment and concomitance to universal principles of law and membership. This 
contractual element fits well with both Kantian morality and a transcendental belief that 
“human beings do not submit to a morality which has its source outside them.”56 
Furthermore, voluntary association is also consistent with Kant’s argument against a 
world republic and his claim that “such a state is in turn even more dangerous to freedom, 
for it may lead to fearful despotism... distrust must force men to form an order which is 
not a cosmopolitan commonwealth under a single ruler, but a lawful federation under a
c*7
commonly accepted international right.”
What is not clear from the above discussion is whether Kant would reject a 
minimalist constitutional document that enumerated the normative principles of 
international and cosmopolitan right. The reason for suggesting a constitutional document 
as a possibility is the fact that Kant certainly argued that the federation would have some 
form of written treaty and further suggests that this document would be different from
C O
contemporary definitions of what a treaty usually entailed. In fact, the essay Perpetual
53 Although the US constitution does not require renewal, it can be legally dissolved as the supreme law of 
the land with a majority vote of congress and the subsequent ratification by two thirds of all 50 states.
54 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 115.
55 Constitutional rigidity is a rather ambiguous concept with various complexities within legal theory. 
Nevertheless, it is meant here generally in that a rigid constitution is one so designed that “it is hard to 
alter... seldom altered and or cannot be amended or altered as a supreme law.” This includes being unable 
to legally withdraw. K.C. Wheare, Modem Constitutions. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1951), pg. 23.
56 Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations. 2nd Edition, (Macmillan, 
Basinstoke, 1990), pg. 101.
57 Kant, “Theory and Practice,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., 90.
58 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. dt., pg. 104.
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Peace is written in the style of a treaty, borrowing common terminology as well as 
adopting the formal structure of many treaties of his time. Nevertheless, other than the 
treaty’s normative content and a corresponding demand for perpetual peace, Kant does 
not specifically outline how this document would come about or how it would be 
practically different from other treaties. Consequently, Kant does not tell us about how 
the treaty of a foedus pacificum would be drafted, its structure, the legal authority it 
would ultimately procure, or how the treaty would seek renewed obligation and or 
rejection once inaugurated. Although Kant certainly found various written constitutions 
to be “remarkable” documents of voluntary republicanism, he did not link these examples 
to any illuminating relationship with this own political theory. As a result, it is impossible 
to know exactly how Kant would feel about the idea of a written cosmopolitan 
constitution, for he simply did not write enough on the subject for us to reasonably 
speculate.
Regardless of this gap in Kant’s theory, it is still possible for a reconstructionist 
account of Kantian cosmopolitanism to argue that a formalized written cosmopolitan 
constitution could provide additional coherency to his theory and should therefore be 
considered as a critical component in grounding a condition of cosmopolitan right. 
However, in order to remain faithful to Kant’s opposition to a world government and the 
establishment of coercive global institutions, it is necessary to examine any cosmopolitan 
constitution as a minimal document that only outlines the normative and juridical 
principles of both international and cosmopolitan right. By looking at a Kantian 
constitution from the perspective of a contractual agreement to normative principles of 
right, it might be possible to understand the creation of a constitutional document that 
does not formulate any system of institutional government. In this regard, a cosmopolitan 
constitution simply outlines the normative principles that underpin the legal requirements 
of voluntary association, legal obligation and federal membership.
It is at this point that constitutional theory is most useful and relevant to Kantian 
cosmopolitanism. Generally understood, legal constitutions are an expressed 
superstructure erected to secure the rules of organization and the further maintenance of 
those rules themselves.59 In this sense, a constitution is an objectification of norms and
59 F.A. Hayek, Law. Legislation and Liberty. (London, Routledge, 1973), pg. 134.
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expected social rules, designed in an expressed form to facilitate universal obligation. 
Furthermore, constitutions can be seen as a conscious contract between mutually agreed 
participants, outlining the terms and conditions of a juridical order while also providing 
possible limitations to the reach of those conditions. In relation to Kant, a constitution can 
be understood as a possible instrument to secure the requirements of the foedus 
pacificum. This is because a constitution can outline the normative principles of law that 
act as the basis for membership, while also defining various rights which act as 
limitations to the power of the federation itself. These legal limitations are designed not 
so that the federation is completely static, for additional voluntary obligations are not 
prohibited, but are provisions so that change is a result of expected procedures to which 
all the members have recognized as legitimate. In this case, the constitution exists 
because members of the federation have made a conscious decision that a cosmopolitan 
order is beneficial not only to their own interests, but to others who seek to peacefully 
coexist in a bounded sphere where human beings must necessarily tolerate one another.60 
This dedication has significant relevance to a Kantian cosmopolitan ethic and to a 
corresponding experience of global hospitality which legitimates the system. Since 
“living as members of a society, dependent for the satisfaction of most of our needs on 
various forms of cooperation with others, we depend for the effective pursuit of our aims 
clearly on the correspondence of the expectations concerning the actions of others on 
which plans are based with what they will really do.”61
Nevertheless, many constitutional scholars might reject the idea that this 
document qualifies as an actual constitution, suggesting that a constitution by definition 
must outline governmental institutions and the corresponding restrictions to these 
institutions. Otherwise it fails to determine how a system of rule formation and alteration 
is to be legitimated. Nevertheless, it is unconvincing to suggest that a constitution cannot 
be legitimate and / or an actual constitution because it refuses to describe the structure of
fi)government and the way institutions have to operate. Although it is true that
60 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 106.
61 Ibid., pg. 36.
62 For a more detailed argument regarding the versatility of what can be considered a constitution see 
Cecile Fabre, Social Rights Under the Constitution. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), especially 
chapter 3, pgs. 67-79.
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constitutions generally outline governmental institutions and then place restrictions upon 
them, it does not mean that a constitution must have this governmental component in 
order to qualify as the supreme law from which all other laws must be in compliance.63 
What is being suggested by a cosmopolitan constitution is that states form a contract to 
abide by the federal constitution and obligate themselves to the promotion and protection 
of a condition of public right enumerated by the document. The fact that the constitution 
does not outline a world government does not weaken the force or authority of the 
document because the associated members would sign on and therefore believe in the 
objectified and universalized authority of the constitution. It would, in a Kantian sense, 
represent a moral law to which members were co-legislators and thus self-determining 
authors subscribing to the imperative of self-proscribed moral law.
As was briefly mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, many cosmopolitans 
believe that there is a direct relationship between the experience of mutual global 
hospitality and the propagation of a cosmopolitan order. This is because historical 
developments and perceptions of experience largely form our social obligations to both 
national and to any eventual global identity. If a sense of world citizenship is to be 
advanced, it will largely be the result of positive experiences of global interaction and the 
formation of norms based on the fulfillment of certain mutual expectations. One element 
that a cosmopolitan constitution provides is the expressed normative content behind 
principles of cosmopolitan law and a corresponding expectation for mutual obligation 
through contractual agreement. As is clearly stated by Kant, what is needed is “a will 
uniting them, a constitution,” so that individuals can enjoy a common will, understood as 
a believed and expected condition of mutual public right.64 This cosmopolitan will is not 
the result of a purely external source, like a global authority, but a will derived through 
moral reflection and the self-committed imperative to objectify the authority of this will 
into universal law.
Nevertheless, a cosmopolitan constitution does more than enumerate the 
normative principles of public right, for it also becomes a symbolic entity itself, acting as 
the supreme reference point for a common sense of global identity. In this regard, a
63 Thomas Gray, “Constitutionalism: An Analytic Framework,” in J. Pennock & J. Chapman (eds.), 
Constitutionalism. (New York, New York University Press, 1979), pgs. 189-209.
64 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 89.
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cosmopolitan constitution could also provide the juridical basis for what Jurgen 
Habermas has referred to as constitutional patriotism. According to Habermas, the term 
refers to a sense of obligation that is derived by a belief in the procedures and or juridical 
principles that underpin a constitution. This sense of patriotism can be separate from a 
national or ethnic identity and can act as an additional level of patriotic identification 
beyond localized political obligations. The idea of constitutional patriotism is based on 
the premise that “a legally constituted status of citizen depends on the supportive spirit of 
a consonant background of legally non-coercible motives and attitudes of a citizenry 
oriented toward the common good.”65 In other words, if a sense of cosmopolitan 
citizenship is to develop it will do so only through the beliefs of individuals and their 
non-coerced willingness to broaden their identity formation so as to incorporate humanity 
itself. As Habermas states, cosmopolitanism will remain untenable unless “populations 
can be shifted onto the foundation of constitutional patriotism” and a belief in “a 
common ethical-political dimension that would be necessary for a corresponding global 
community and its identity formation.”66 What a cosmopolitan constitution would 
provide is the normative framework from which the formation of a broadened global 
identity can take place and further supplies a vehicle from which a self-imposed sense of 
common motive is secured.
In many regards Kantian cosmopolitanism wishes to establish such a sense of 
patriotism towards a cosmopolitan constitution. According to the Kantian model outlined 
in Chapter Three, the federation would be the result of a small number of republics who 
accept to be governed in the pursuit of their self-interest by the priority of common 
interest-trumping norms and universal law. As Kant suggests, cosmopolitanism cannot be 
coerced, but must be the result of international norm building and a recognized need for 
juridical principles, that “will gradually spread further and further.”67 However, it is 
important to make some distinctions in relation to the study of constitutionalism and the 
idea of Kantian cosmopolitan constitution being suggested. The Kantian constitution that
65 Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. W. Rehg trans., (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996), pg. 499.
66 Jurgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation. M. Pensky trans., (Cambridge, The MIT Press, 2001), 
pgs. 76 & 109.
67 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. tit., pg. 104.
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is being proposed has various distinct characteristics that might distinguish it from what 
is usually understood in the study of constitutions.
First, a Kantian cosmopolitan constitution derives its status and authority from 
both its original enactment and by the acceptance of its principles by joining members. In 
this regard, states voluntarily contract themselves to abide by the cosmopolitan 
constitution and understand that membership can therefore be accepted or rejected based 
on performance of their obligations. In this sense, the constitution “provides the standards
/TO
against which obligatory performance can be measured.” Second, and in relation to the 
above, the cosmopolitan constitution would clearly outline the requirements for 
membership and the general principles to which member states must accept as obligatory. 
Third, in light of Kant’s requirement for the possibility to “renounce” the federation, the 
constitution would have an explicit clause that allows for members to legally withdraw 
from the federation. This clause is necessary to reinforce a sense of self-determinism and 
identity formation within the foedus pacijicum. It is from a self-held belief in 
cosmopolitan law and its objectification within a formal constitution that a sense of 
constitutional patriotism can be fostered. For it is only through identification and 
acceptance that a genuine sense of obligation can be garnered.69 In this sense, any feature 
of positive law within the constitution is derived from a self-commitment to be governed 
in the pursuit of their self-interest by the priority of a system of universal law. Fourth, a 
Kantian cosmopolitan constitution is a mixture of what is usually called natural law and 
positive law. Since membership is dependent on continued compliance to cosmopolitan 
law, Kantian cosmopolitan law is meant to be positive in its constitutional authority to 
persuade compliance and obligation. However, the authority is justified by a naturalist 
consideration located within the internal aspects, moral foundations and a priori 
principles of cosmopolitan law. Jeremy Waldron has argued that the duel nature of
70Kantian jurisprudence is best understood as a form of normative positivism. What 
Waldron suggests is that a Kantian position is one where moral reasoning is meant to 
ground both the fabrication and internal aspects behind the systematic maintenance of 
law, but also that this law itself when constitutionally codified has a commanding force in
68 William Andrews, Constitutions and Constitutionalism. (Princeton, Van Nostrand Co., 1968), pg. 21.
69 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, op. cit., pg. 499.
70 Jeremy Waldron, “Kant’s Legal Positivism.” Harvard Law Review. Vol. 109, pg. 1535.
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creating individual obligations regardless of its normative content. Mary Gregor has 
made a similar conclusion regarding Kantian jurisprudence, proposing that “since people 
do not always do what they can recognize that they ought to do, civil society would be 
necessary to restrain them from interfering with one another’s claim.”71 What both 
Waldron and Gregor are suggesting is that Kantian jurisprudence must have a 
corresponding component of positive law based on a system of accepted legal obligations 
that states, individuals and associations understand as having a commanding force.
So what can we understand a Kantian cosmopolitan constitution to contain? An 
appropriate starting point is to look at Kant’s own treaty of Perpetual Peace and how this 
document can act as the basis for a cosmopolitan constitution. From what is outlined in 
Perpetual Peace, it is reasonable to assume that a cosmopolitan constitution would 
contain the articulation and extrapolation of both the Preliminary and Definitive Articles. 
In tandem, these articles are meant to frame the various prohibitive laws against state 
behavior, the terms of federal membership and the restrictions to the institutional 
complexity of the federation itself. The next two sections will develop upon both sets of 
articles and affix these principles to the idea of a possible cosmopolitan constitution.
A. The Preliminary Articles for a Cosmopolitan Constitution
There are six Preliminary Articles that function as “prohibitive international 
laws.” These laws delineate what state actions are prohibited within the federation so as 
to create a condition of public right and security. In essence, the preliminary articles seek 
to ground the federation on measures of good faith, self-determination and non-
TJinterference. The Preliminary Articles are as follows:
1. “No conclusion of peace shall be considered valid as such if it was 
made with a secret reservation of the material for a future war.”
2. “No independently existing state, whether it be large or small, may be 
acquired by another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase or gift.”
3. “Standing armies (miles perpetuus) will gradually be abolished 
altogether.”
71 Gregor, “Kant’s Approach to Constitutionalism,” op. cit., pg. 71.
72 Covell, op. cit., pg. 102.
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4. “No national debt shall be contracted in connection with external 
affairs of the state.”
5. “No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of 
another state.”
6. “No state at war with another shall permit such acts of hostility as 
would make mutual confidence impossible during a future time of 
peace.”
As Kant makes evident, Articles One, Three and Six are meant to describe the 
necessary principles for the maintenance of good faith between federated members and 
external states. The first article suggests that misrepresented, fraudulent or any “mental 
reservation with a view to reviving pretensionis” is tantamount to contract nullification 
and will not be considered valid by federated members. This implies that states must join 
in good faith and that any intended failure to comply with the articles of the treaty could 
result in a loss of membership. For the purpose of devising a cosmopolitan constitution, 
any failure to comply in good faith with any article of the constitution can be seen as 
unconstitutional and therefore grounds the legal basis for federal exclusion. Furthermore, 
Article Three forbids states to maintain standing armies and suggests that an effort 
between federated states for arms reduction is a necessary element for an experience of 
good faith and continued membership compliance. Nevertheless, it is important to 
explain the fact that Kant was not suggesting that states could not maintain a force for 
self-protection. This is because Kant is very clear that a state must be able to defend itself 
and its population from external attack. By standing army, Kant was referring to armies 
with long range striking capability with no other purpose then conducting foreign wars. 
In this regard, member states could have protective forces and military agreements with 
federated members for mutual defense, but under the cosmopolitan constitution, no single 
state could amass large forces with the purpose of threatening federated or non-federated 
members. Lastly, Article Six further elaborates on Article One and Three by demanding 
that if circumstances are such that a state is forced to engaged in warfare, all federated 
members would conduct these operations in such a manner that future negotiations and 
peace could still be secured. In other words, federated states must resist warfare, but 
when attacked must conduct war in such a manner that it could be seen as a justified 
defense of the foedus pacificum. In addition, warfare by federated members must be
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carried out in such a way that it does not permanently destroy any long-term relations 
with the inhabitants of a state and therefore ruin the possibility of future cooperation.
Articles Two and Four refer to maintaining mutual security and an obligation to 
respect the self-determination of states. Article Two demands that states are self- 
determining and cannot be obtained without the willful consent of its population. In this 
regard, the Kantian constitution would forbid state accession without the expressed 
consent of the inhabitants. Article Four makes three interesting and related demands. 
First, it demands that states cannot use foreign loans as a means to bankrupt and ruin 
other states. Second, it forbids states from amassing large national debts to fund military 
operations. Third, it forbids the loaning of money to states if that money is to be used to 
procure armaments and military power. States cannot borrow money for the purpose of 
military spending, while loaning states are also forbidden to allow other states to borrow 
money with the implicit goal of bankrupting and or destroying the economic stability of a 
state. In this regard, Article Four strictly limits economic practices that might be used by 
federated members as a means for international brinkmanship or as a policy to exert 
economic and or military pressure on other states.
Lastly, Articles Three and Five cement an obligation to non-interference in the 
internal constitutions of other federated member states as well as external non-federated 
states. As aforementioned, article three forbids standing armies designed specifically to 
invade and interfere with other states. The supposition behind the article is put more 
strait-forwardly by article five, which disallows the interference of internal state 
constitutions by external states or by any other federated members. These articles provide 
negative protections, outlining what is prohibited so as to create a condition where states 
can enjoy equal security and right. These articles are normatively grounded in Kantian 
public right, but are also pragmatic necessities for the creation of a positive experience of 
universal obligation and mutual security.
73 It is interesting to note that many modem peace treaties contain almost every aspect of these preliminary 
articles, in that most peace treaties demand good faith by arms reduction, clauses protecting self- 
determination, non-interference demands, anti-military loan restrictions and limits to weapons of mass 
destruction.
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B. The Definitive Articles for a Cosmopolitan Constitution
Whereas the preliminary articles outline the legal restrictions to which states must 
obligate themselves while members of the federation, the definitive articles enumerate 
stronger terms for membership and the normative conditions upon which the federation 
stands. The three definitive articles demand that membership be strictly restricted to 
republics, that the foedus pacificum will be a federation of free states (not a world 
republic) and that all federated members will adopt and abide by cosmopolitan law and 
the laws of hospitality. Since a more detailed discussion of the relationship between state 
sovereignty and the definitive articles is provided in Chapter Three, this section will 
focus on the extent to which the definitive articles could be seen as determining the 
composition of a possible cosmopolitan constitution.
In regard to providing substance to a cosmopolitan constitution, the first definitive 
article places conditions on the types of states that can be considered for membership, by 
strictly demanding that “The Civil Constitution of Every State shall be Republican.”74 In 
this regard, membership is reserved for republics that reflect a domestic condition of 
internal justice and are recognized by other federated members as constituted as such. As 
has been discussed elsewhere, domestic justice and the internal make-up of federated 
states are critical to the sustainability of the foedus pacificum. This is because Kant 
believes that only republican states can maintain a priori principles of justice both 
internally and externally. For Kant, the republican make-up of federated members is 
necessary because they represent the only form of constitution that can secure “the 
freedom of every member of society as a human being, the equality of each with all the 
others as a . subject and the independence of each member of a commonwealth as 
citizen.”75 As Kant argues, these are “laws by which a state can alone be established in
H(\accordance with pure rational principles of external human right.”
74 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 98.
75 Kant, “Theory and Practice,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 74. A connection between Kant’s republicanism 
and a possibility to understand it as being synonymous with liberal democracies is discussed in Chapter 
Three.
76 Ibid.
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It is generally believed that constitutions function primarily to limit government 
and the extent to which democratic majorities may exercise their will at the expense of 
minority opinions.77 It is in this regard that the second article acts largely as a restriction 
to any transnational institutions that could evolve within the federation by stipulating that 
‘The Right of Nations shall be based on a Federation of Free States.”78 In other words, 
the federation is not to have a centralized government, like a world state, but must remain 
a federation of independent and free states bounded together by voluntary contract and a 
self-commitment to principles of international and cosmopolitan right. By this, the 
second article provides constitutional restrictions on the institutional complexity of the 
federation. Thus limiting the power and authority that any multilateral and transnational 
bodies could attempt to acquire. The cosmopolitan constitution fulfills a limiting role 
towards a world government by strictly forbidding it, forcing the institutional complexity 
of the federation to be voluntary and based solely on multilateral networks.
A final condition of federal membership is that by joining the foedus pacificum, 
states obligate themselves to uphold cosmopolitan laws of hospitality and in doing so, 
dedicate themselves to the protection and facilitation of cosmopolitan right. As was 
previously detailed in section two, the laws of hospitality would act as a set of 
cosmopolitan rights that would be considered to have full legal status within the 
federation. States that wished to join the federation must abide by the laws of hospitality 
and must conform and / or reform internal law so that it is in compliance with 
cosmopolitan law. Any violation of cosmopolitan right by member states would be an 
unconstitutional breach of contract that would result in the loss of federal membership. In 
addition, by obligating themselves to the laws of hospitality, members are also binding 
themselves to the fulfillment of these laws when dealing with all foreign individuals, 
including interactions with non-federated individuals, nations and associations.
The constitution as outlined above includes many aspects that are analogous to 
what is commonly understood as representative of modem constitutions. As with the 
structure of most constitutions, the cosmopolitan constitution proposed in this chapter
77 Charles Mcllwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modem. (Ithica, Cornell University Press, 1947), pg.
21. It should be noted that this limiting function is not a necessarily requirement of constitutionalism, only 
that many constitutions maintain articles that do in fact limit government. See Cecile Fabre, op. cit.
78 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,’* in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 102.
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satisfies three contractarian criteria. First, it explicitly outlines what bodies are to be 
considered as participants to the contract and seeks expressed consent from them. 
Second, the terms of constitutional membership are delineated in good faith and in a 
spirit of mutual consensus and understanding. Third, the constitution enumerates a time 
frame from which reasonable expectations for compliance are to be mutually generated. 
In the last case, the constitution is perpetual; assuming consent until a participant legally 
withdraws from the foedus pacificum. However, the cosmopolitan constitution also 
contains additional elements that are ordinarily associated with drafted constitutions. As 
we have seen, the cosmopolitan constitution places limitations on the institutional 
complexion of the federation, while also representing itself as the supreme body of law to 
which all state law must comply. Lastly, the cosmopolitan constitution includes 
something like a bill of rights as represented by its laws of hospitality. These 
cosmopolitan rights represent legal claims for hospitable treatment by all member states 
while also imposing restrictions on how member states can treat all human beings 
regardless of nationality.
Nevertheless before concluding, it should be mentioned that a cosmopolitan 
constitution does not necessarily have to be limited to these articles and or to the 
minimum laws of hospitality that have been outlined. This is because member states 
could willingly choose to adopt additional conditions that would be involved with 
membership and or expand the definition of cosmopolitan right and hospitality to include
7 0more freedoms. This voluntary expansion of cosmopolitan right and the laws of 
hospitality are compatible and congruent with Kantian principles of justice and right. 
What this chapter attempted to provide is the bare skeletal foundation for a cosmopolitan 
constitution and outline the basic normative principles of public right behind the creation 
of a minimal cosmopolitan condition. Although the constitution as discussed in this 
chapter does not allow the formation of a world government, this does not mean that it 
excludes the possibility of cooperative multisectorial networks. As has been detailed in 
Chapter Three, Kant was particularly careful to separate his normative principles of right 
from any detailed prescriptions for the institutional makeup of a cosmopolitan order. This
79 An argument for the possibility for a greater system of distributive justice and its incorporation into the 
cosmopolitan constitution is made in Chapter Five.
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is because Kant understood that he could not foresee the exact practical complexions 
involved in securing a future international consensus. In this light, Kantian 
cosmopolitanism has no particular predictive institutional complexion, only the 
requirement that the process must be the result of a free consensus in line with a priori 
principles of universal public right. Consequently, a Kantian cosmopolitan constitution 
should be seen as attempting to establish the rules of the game to create a legal condition 
necessary to facilitate an order of consensual cooperation, enlightenment, coexistence and 
individual toleration. How complex this cooperative system will ultimately become will 
be solely determined by the wills of various federated states and their shared belief in 
broadening a condition of cosmopolitan public right.
IV. Conclusion
The beginning of this chapter started with a quote by Derrida, which asserted that 
ethics and hospitality should no longer be thought of as mutually exclusive. As Derrida 
argues, ethics and hospitality must be sustained as being thoroughly coextensive. This is 
due to the fact that what is to be considered ethical, will be determined through 
experiences of mutual hospitality and corresponding expectations for a future of similar 
good conduct. As Derrida, Habermas and others have suggested, any move toward a 
cosmopolitan order will have to include a broadened sense of hospitality that promotes 
the ethical interchange of good conduct and mutual respect.
As was mentioned before, Kant also held this view. Nevertheless, for Kant, the 
empirical experience of ethical treatment is only half of the story. This is because Kant 
also believed that current inhospitable circumstances provided enough motivation for us 
to strive toward inaugurating cosmopolitan law. Since humans are unavoidably located 
next to each other and must necessarily live side by side, human reason dictates that 
without ethical interchange current circumstances of intolerance will perpetuate. What 
reason tells us a priori, is that in order for anyone to experience a sense of ethical right, it 
would have to be done within a system of mutually understood rights and obligations. 
However, since historical experiences have not completely delivered ethical exchange, 
right necessitates an additional legal condition, a cosmopolitan condition understood as a
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minimal set of genuinely agreed constraints .governing what all people can reasonably 
expect in the course of living alongside one another. In this regard, Kantian 
cosmopolitanism is an attempt to further facilitate the hospitable toleration of various 
peoples and a future of cooperation by mutual restraints of universal law and justice. This 
necessary condition is true a priori, regardless of, and in addition to, what historical 
circumstances have so far produced.
However, there has often been confusion regarding what a Kantian system of 
cosmopolitan law would entail and or what minimal obligations would be required by a 
cosmopolitan legal order. In an attempt to clarify the confusion, the last two chapters 
have examined the jurisprudence underpinning Kantian cosmopolitan law and 
constructed these normative principles into a basic outline for a cosmopolitan 
constitution. In doing so, this chapter has attempted to untangle the implied laws of 
hospitality found throughout Kant’s writings and to further connect them to a juridical 
system of cosmopolitan law. Although I have in no way exhausted the subtle nuances and 
implications involved in a Kantian cosmopolitan constitution, I believe that I have 
provided some important groundwork toward the exploration of a cosmopolitan 
constitution and its possible relationship to a future global order.
From the normative foundations outlined thus far, Part Two of this thesis will 
provide a more detailed examination and defense of some of the major themes and 
obstacles involved in Kantian cosmopolitanism. As has previously been stated, Kantian 
cosmopolitanism has historically received stanch criticism from realists, pluralists, 
communitarians and relativists. These criticisms I believe largely rest on various 
misunderstandings regarding what universal principles a Kantian cosmopolitan condition 
supposedly requires. In order to clarify these misunderstandings, Part Two will examine 
three critical issues surrounding Kantian Cosmopolitanism. The next three chapters will 
provide a thorough examination of the role of states within a Kantian federation, the role 
of cultural diversity within a universal system of cosmopolitan law and how the 
development of a global system of distributive justice might be possible. By examining 
these critical concerns, it will be possible to better satisfy those who remain skeptical 
about the relevance and / or desirability of a Kantian cosmopolitan order and to clarify its 
position within the future study of international relations theory.
8 6
Part Two
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Chapter Three
State Sovereignty, Federation and Kantian Cosmopolitanism
“Far along the world-wide whisper of the south-wind rushing warm,
With the Standards of the people plunging thro’ the thunder-storm;
Till the war-drum throbb’d no longer, and the battle flags were furl’d.
In the parliament of man, the Federation of the World.
There the common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm in awe,
And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law.” -  Alfred Tennyson
Introduction
There is an undeniable semblance between the poem of Alfred Tennyson and the 
cosmopolitan philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Although Kant was hardly an aficionado of 
poetry, it would be difficult to imagine him unable to appreciate the cosmopolitan vision 
for perpetual peace expressed within Tennyson’s work. The semblance comes from a 
shared belief that the consistent ravishing of conflict will provide a motivation for 
humanity to finally realize the common destruction caused by war and seek a truly lasting 
peace. As Tennyson implies, it is through “common sense,” or in Kantian terminology 
practical reason, from which universal principles could be understood and created. From 
this- premise, Tennyson insinuates that the world should be organized into a kind of 
lawful federation, where various states are united by a dedication to peaceful coexistence 
and mutual security. Lastly, Tennyson contends that if humans are to enjoy a perpetual 
world peace, then some form of universal law must be established in order to codify 
mutual recognition and to regulate the peaceful coexistence of various peoples.
In spite of the prima facie similarities, it would be disingenuous to suggest a 
categorical homology between Kant’s Perpetual Peace and Tennyson’s poem. Unlike 
Tennyson, Kant did not explicitly advocate a federal parliament or recommend any 
institutions for world government. On the contrary, Kant was often critical of a world 
government and the creation of a world state. Alternatively, what Kant suggests is that a 
federation between states should be established in which the members acknowledge 
principles of universal law.. These principles were to be cemented into universal law not 
by an external authority, like a world government, but through the republican make-up of 
each state and the contractual agreement for public right ratified by any cooperating 
member.
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Nevertheless, like the subtle differences that exist between what Tennyson and 
Kant advocated, there is considerable contention between academics regarding the exact 
nature of Kantian cosmopolitanism in relation to the role of states. Some international 
relations theorists suggest that Kant yearned to create a society of world citizens 
independent from states.1 Similarly, Hegelians insist that Kant abandons the moral 
significance of localized state obligations and the communal good of political self- 
determination, replacing it with a universalized moral hegemony.2 Even Kantian scholars 
debate whether Kant truly envisioned a global federation of free states or a world 
republic.3 Others have suggested that Kant’s political philosophy requires strict 
maintenance of state sovereignty and that this is in direct contrast to his aspirations for 
cosmopolitan reform.4 Adding to the confusion, international lawyers have often 
suggested that Kant’s cosmopolitan law is nothing more than a supplement to 
contemporary understandings of international law, merely stipulating how states should 
treat visiting foreign-nationals and that it has nothing to do with regulating a world 
federation.5
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the role of states in a Kantian 
cosmopolitan federation and to clarify the relationship between the rights of states and 
the concept of cosmopolitan law. In order to present a coherent and tenable account of a 
Kantian federation, this chapter is divided into four sections. In Section One, the Kantian 
move away from the traditional natural law concept of jus gentium to the idea of 
cosmopolitan federation and cosmopolitan law is outlined. In doing so, I will discuss the 
historical context of Kant’s cosmopolitanism and the paradigm shift produced by Kant’s
1 An interpretation of this kind can be attributed to Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1977).
2 For the origin of this argument see, G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right. S.W. Dyde (trans.), (New 
York, Prometheus Books, 1996), especially part III.
3 For a radical interpretation of the world republic argument see Sidney Axinn, “Kant on World 
Government,” in G. Funke & T. Seebohm (eds.), Proceedings of the Sixth International Kantian Congress. 
(Washington, University Press o f America, 1989), Vol. 2., pgs. 243-51. For an interpretation suggesting a 
world federation see Fernando Teson, “Kantian International Liberalism,” in D. Maple & T. Nardin (eds.), 
International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives. (Princeton, Princeton University.Press, 1998).
4 For an interesting discussion of the ambiguity involved in Kant’s concept o f sovereignty see Antonio 
Franceschet, Kant and Liberal Internationalism: Sovereignty. Justice and Global Reform. (New York, 
Pelgrave, 2002).
5 One interpretation of this kind can be found in F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace. (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1963).
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contribution to international relations theory. From this background, Section Two 
examines the three definitive articles of Perpetual Peace and their primary significance in 
creating a cosmopolitan order. From this, an argument is furthered that the internal justice 
of a state confers political legitimacy and the acceptability for state membership within a 
cosmopolitan federation. The Kantian distinction between international right and 
cosmopolitan right is further developed, arguing that Kantian cosmopolitanism advocates 
a new level of cosmopolitan law which holds supremacy over the idea of absolute state 
sovereignty. Section Three seeks to resolve the debate between some realist and Kantian 
scholars regarding whether Kant’s cosmopolitanism must be understood as advocating a 
federation of free states or a world republic. Through this discussion, it will be argued 
that Kantian cosmopolitanism is best understood as a federation of free states with the 
caveat that Kant maintained optimism for a continued movement toward broader 
multilateral institutions. The fourth section will conclude by comparing Kantian 
cosmopolitanism to contemporary theories offered by international relations theorists and 
to Rawls’ Law o f Peoples. In doing so, I will maintain that Kantian cosmopolitanism does 
not advocate the immediate destabilizing destruction of states and self-determination as 
many have claimed, but is meant as a mechanism for the lawful coexistence of various 
political communities as a judicial community of the world.
I. A Kantian Move from Natural Law to Lawful Cosmopolitanism
In order to understand how the idea of a Kantian federation and the corresponding 
formation of cosmopolitan law depart from both contemporary international relations 
theory and from theories contemporaneous to Kant, it is important to know something 
about the traditions from which Kant is departing. Through an examination of how Kant 
departed from the natural law tradition, while emphasizing from what theories he drew 
inspiration, we can dispel a claim made against Kant’s efforts for an international 
federation while also highlighting some ambiguities involved in his cosmopolitan vision. 
A brief contextual analysis helps to refute the concern that Kant wants to abandon state 
entities altogether and that he had aspirations for a universal state. As will be discussed 
below, Kant wants to challenge the natural law doctrine supporting state sovereignty
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while also dismissing arguments advocating the creation of a world state. In this regard, 
Kant’s international theory tries to navigate a middle passage between the idea that states 
can act as the ultimate protector of human freedom* while also aware of the fact that 
states are often the primary violators of this very freedom. By understanding in which 
ways Kant abandons the idea of state sovereignty, while also examining what alternatives 
he accepted and rejected, we can locate the international problems that Kant sought to 
remedy and the areas that a reconstructivist argument must improve upon in order to 
make a Kantian cosmopolitan federation coherent.
In the context of eighteenth century European politics, Kant inherited an 
international order based on the concept of absolute sovereignty that was fastened into 
common practice by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). This treaty can be understood as 
establishing a state-centered system that was based on principles of equal state 
sovereignty and the absolute right to internal self-determination without external 
interference. In essence, the Treaty of Westphalia created a Hobbesian anarchical global 
system dominated by state self-interest and motivated by the maintenance of a balance o f  
power without any overarching coordination by international institutions or 
organizations.
Kant was highly critical of the Westphalia model, claiming as he did that a 
“permanent universal peace by means of a so-called European balance o f power is a pure 
illusion.”6 For Kant, the Westphalia model only sought to justify and regulate the rules of 
warfare, providing nothing to help eliminate war or to provide for the lawful coexistence 
of various states. Understanding that the Treaty of Westphalia often sanctioned the use of 
war for political means, Kant refused to refer to the treaty as an important aspect of
n
international law as was commonly done, but consistently insisted that it legitimated a 
world devoid of law, tantamount to Thomas Hobbes’ constant state o f war. In order to 
provide for a lasting peace away from a Hobbesian state o f war, Kant advocated the 
establishment of a lawful federation of states anchored to perpetual peace by a
6 Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying: This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in 
Practice,” in H. Reiss ed., Kant’s Political Writings. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970), pg.
92.
7 In 1794, many international lawyers referred to the Treaty o f Westphalia and the Treaty of Utrecht in 
order to justify the dividing of Poland by larger states. Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts
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commitment to universal law and the acknowledgement of a public right to external 
freedom and universal coexistence.
However, Kant’s ambitions for perpetual peace were uniquely different from his 
contemporaries. This is because the prevailing theoretical doctrines of the time offered 
little alternatives to the Hobbesian paradigm. The dominant theoretical doctrine of 
international relations in Kant’s lifetime was natural law theory and the corresponding 
principle of jus gentium. Although Kant was familiar with the natural law tradition, 
teaching several courses on the subject, he was reticent to fully accept the doctrine. In 
fact, Kant was highly critical of many celebrated natural law theorists, complaining that 
Hugo Grotuis, Samuel Pufendorf and Emeric de Vattel were “sorry comforters” unwilling 
to challenge the doctrine of jus gentium and the lawless supremacy awarded to state 
sovereignty.8 In line with his critique of the Treaty of Westphalia, Kant argued that the 
doctrine of jus gentium sought only to regulate war between major European states and 
was unable to provide for a truly lasting peace by creating a lawful community of states 
grounded on principles of external right and universal law.
Although displeased with the failures of the natural law tradition and jus gentium, 
Kant did understand the value of using three of its major tenets as his starting point. Kant 
recognized that individual states were the central actors in international relations and that 
any cosmopolitan theory would have to deal immediately with how to establish a lawful 
system of rights between existing states and between the individual members of those 
states. In addition, Kant recognized that conditions for the justified use of war had to be 
distinguished from those which violated universal principles of external freedom and 
coexistence. In this regard, Kant recognized that the justified use of war was warranted 
in certain extreme circumstances and that states had the right to defend themselves 
against tyrannical regimes.9 Finally, Kant agreed with certain natural law theorists who 
argued that individuals are by nature sovereign entities and that their freedom must be
and International Order 1648-1989. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992). Kant was highly 
critical o f these justifications.
8 Kant. “Perpetual Peace.” in H. Reiss, op. cit.. pg. 103.
9 This is a complicated aspect of Kant’s political theory. Unfortunately, the subject is too complex for a 
general summary and I cannot deal with it here. However, for a good discussion of this aspect of Kantian 
philosophy see Georg Cavallar, Kant and the Theory and Practice of International Right. (Cardiff, 
University of Wales Press, 1999), especially chps. 3,4, 5 and 6.
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universally respected in the same way that sovereign states were supposed to be 
universally respected under international law.
Despite his disagreement with certain authors, Kant did believe that a few natural 
law theorists were attempting to broaden the scope and universality of the three tenets of 
jus gentium. Notably absent from Kant’s list of sorry comforters is Christian Wolff and 
his seminal work The Law o f Nations Treated According to a Scientific Method. In this 
work, Wolff argued that individuals belong to a single global community and that states 
should be held accountable to this notion of global society. As Wolff maintained, the 
earth should be organized into “a kind of democratic form of government. For the 
supreme state is made up of nations as a whole, which as individual nations are free and 
equal to each other.”10 Nevertheless, Kant seems to be uncomfortable with Wolffs 
proscription for a world government, suggesting that Vattel was correct to abandon this 
aspect in his translation and adaptation of Wolff s work. As Kant writes, “such a [world] 
state is in turn even more dangerous to freedom, for it may lead to fearful despotism... 
distrust must force men to form an order which is not a cosmopolitan commonwealth 
under a single ruler, but a lawful federation under a commonly accepted international 
right.”11 What Kant seems to have taken from Wolff is the acceptance that human beings 
are equal to each other and that this equality can only be assured if states are organized 
into some form of lawful global community. Where Kant departs from Wolff, is in his 
insistence that international institutions should not “interfere in the constitution and 
government of another state” and that world government is a threat to freedom.
The critique of jus gentium and Kant’s argument against Wolffs advocacy for a 
world government illustrates a source of possible tension within Kant’s international 
theory. On the one hand, Kant wishes to create a judicial environment which eliminates 
absolute sovereignty and the injustices often committed by states under this claim. On the 
other hand, Kant wants to create a universal order without the establishment of a world 
government or any formal coercive institutions to secure legal obligation. It seems that
10 Christian Wolff. The Laws of Nations Treated According to a Scientific Method. H. Drake (trans.), 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1934).
11 Kant, “On the Common Saying: This may be True in Theory, but does not Apply in Practice,” in H.
Reiss, op. cit., pg. 90.
12 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, pp. cit., pg. 96.
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for Kant, there is a belief that global justice cannot be secured either through traditional 
natural law models or through the idea of a world government. In this regard, the former 
model is too weak to control states from violating human freedoms both internally and 
externally, while the later has the equal potential to become overly coercive and unjust. 
Therefore, the task for Kant’s cosmopolitanism was to resolve the tension of preserving a 
place for states while also providing a tenable alternative to both the Hobbesian and 
world state paradigms.
A starting point for a Kantian alternative can be found through the examination of 
two major influences within Kant’s political theory. While Kant found the natural law 
tradition to be sufficiently unable to provide for a lawful community of states, he did 
draw considerable influence from the perpetual peace projects of Abbe de Saint-Pierre 
and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.13 Saint-Pierre argued for the establishment of a federation of 
free states based on the rule of law and the creation of an international court of justice. In 
addition, Saint-Pierre abandoned the natural law concept of jus gentium, suggesting that 
the only justification for war is when external enemies would directly threaten the 
peaceful federation of states. In his writings on Saint-Pierre, Rousseau also advocated a 
federation of states with a minimal institutional complexion. In Abstract and Judgement 
o f Saint-Pierre’s Project for Perpetual Peace Rousseau considers the merits of 
establishing an international congress consisting of state representatives, where 
international concerns could be debated through parliamentarian rules of order.14 
However, Kant rejects both Saint-Pierre and Rousseau’s advocacy for coercive 
international institutions. Alternatively, Kant believes the most promising aspect of 
Rousseau’s treatment of Saint-Pierre to be the emphasis placed on the relationship 
between domestic policy and with how states behave in the international environment.
13 Unlike the “sorry comforters” Kant defends Saint-Pierre and Rousseau. See Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in 
H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 104. Kant also defends Saint-Pierre and Rousseau in “Idea for a Universal History 
with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” in H. Reiss, ibid.. pg. 47-48.
14 There is considerable disagreement about howr far Rousseau was willing to give a federation any coercive 
power. For a distinctive anti-federalist interpretation see David Fidler, “Desperately Clinging to Grotian 
and Kantian Sheep: Rousseau’s Attempt to Escape from the State o f War,” in I. Clarks & I. Neumann 
(eds.), Classical Theories o f International Relations. (Houndmills, Macmillan Press, 1996). For a more pro- 
global institution interpretation see Grace Roosevelt. Reading Rousseau in the Nuclear Age. (Philadelphia, 
Temple University Press, 1990).
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Rousseau firmly held that “well constituted states”15 would be more tolerant of similarly 
organized states and more willing to form cooperative international relationships with 
them. As we will see in the next section, Kant further develops this idea from Rousseau 
and that the domestic constitution of international actors has a critical role in Kant’s 
theory of international relations. This is because Kant’s concept of a federation of free 
states is predicated on the first definitive article of Perpetual Peace and the condition that 
“the Civil Constitution of Every State shall be Republican.”16
Although there are many ambiguities in Kant’s international theory, three factors 
remain fairly consistent in relation to the writings of his contemporaries. First, Kant is 
clearly disenchanted with the natural law tradition and with the lawless international 
system propagated by the Westphalian model. Second, Kant firmly maintains that 
perpetual peace and the idea of international right can only be secured through a 
consistent commitment to universal law and a corresponding resolution for public right. 
Third, Kant clearly rejects Wolffs, Saint-Pierre’s and Rousseau’s institutional design for 
international organizations with coercive power. In an attempt to provide an alternative to 
these theories, Kant redirects international relations theory away from the Hobbesian 
paradigm to a model that focuses on domestic justice as the necessary first principle for a 
cosmopolitan order. According to Kant, a federation based on republican states provides 
two conditions necessary for a lawful community of states and the possibility of 
international and cosmopolitan right. The first condition is based on Kant’s assumption 
that republican governments do not fight one another.17 Kant believes that a federation of
15 According to Rousseau “well constituted” states are generally republican in nature, but always 
representative of the general will.
16 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. dt., pg. 99.
17 This Kantian assumption is yet another area for considerable contention between scholars. Many have 
attempted to exonerate Kant by proving this as an empirical fact. However, there are several scholars who 
maintain that democracies are only less likely to fight one another at best and that Kant’s assumption is 
empirically incorrect. Needless to say, this debate is beyond the scope o f this chapter. For the first view see, 
John Oneal and Bruce Russett, “The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits o f Democracy, Interdependence, 
and International Organizations, 1885-1992,” World Politics. 52, (1999). For an overview of this theory in 
general and some critiques see, R.J. Rummel, “Democracies ARE Less Warlike Than Other Regimes,” 
European Journal of International Relations. Vol. 1 (4), (1999), pgs. 429-456. Also see, Bruce Russett, 
Grasping the Democratic Peace. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993) and Michael Doyle, “Kant, 
Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs. 12, (3), (1983), pgs. 204-35 and 12, 
(4), (1983), pgs. 323-53.
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1 ftrepublican states would greatly diminish international conflicts and war. Where 
international tensions might continue to exist, they would not occur between like-minded 
republican states, but between the federation and states that directly threaten the pacific 
alliance. The second condition is based on Kant’s assertion that republican states 
represent the only form of government that can provide justice internally and externally. 
By focusing on the relationship between domestic justice and international policy, Kant is 
attempting to circumvent the need for a coercive world government. This is premised on 
the notion that an equality of freedom is already secured through each individual state 
constitution. It is from this position that Kant accepts Rousseau’s belief that republican 
states are more willing to cooperate with similarly constituted states and to establish 
cosmopolitan principles of global justice which mirror their own internal constitutions.
However, an examination of the various influences within Kant’s work will never 
provide a definitive solution to the ambiguities within his theory. All an historical 
analysis can furnish is some background to help explain how Kant altered international 
relations theory and how we might better understand the role of states within Kantian 
cosmopolitanism. In addition, by looking at how Kant revised the theories of his time, the 
realist position that Kant promoted an overarching world state becomes a questionable 
conclusion. As has been shown, Kant is critical of a world state while also remaining 
equally critical of the unjust global system legitimated by claims to state sovereignty. It is 
from the backdrop provided in this section that a further discussion of Kantian federation 
will be provided in the next section.
II. The Definitive Articles of Perpetual Peace 
and the Jurisprudence of Kantian Cosmopolitanism
The idea for a federation of free states based on a system of corresponding rights 
stems directly from Kant’s overall theory of justice and his metaphysics of morals. The 
foundation for this system of rights is a variation of Kant’s categorical imperative and his 
Doctrine o f Right, namely; “right is... the sum of the conditions under which the choice 
of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal law of
18 Kant’s explanation for this conclusion rests on the idea that “the consent of the citizen is required to 
decide whether or not war is to be declared, [and that] it is very natural that they will have great hesitation
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fireedom.”19 According to Kant, reason itself dictates that humans have an obligation to 
leave the state o f nature and establish a “civil condition” to which the maintenance of 
external freedom and coexisting public right can be managed. Since the world is not an 
infinite plane, but a sphere where individuals must necessarily occupy a finite space next 
to one another, reason dictates the establishment of a system of public right. As Kant 
proclaimed, “the peoples of the earth have thus entered in various degrees into a universal 
community and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the 
world is felt everywhere.”20 From this empirical consideration, reason dictates that 
restraints on external freedom ought to be universally applied and mutually consistent,
*y 1
limiting external freedom equally between all members of the earth. Mary Gregor 
defines the jurisprudence behind the concept of public right as, “the sum of laws that 
need to be publicized in order to produce a rightful condition, one in which individuals,
9 9nations and states can enjoy their rights.”
In order to provide a rightful condition that maintains symbiotic Cohabitation 
between human beings and the states of the world, Kant advances a tripartite system of 
jurisprudence divided into domestic law, international law and cosmopolitan law. As the 
names of the tripartite distinction suggest, a judicial system of public right is to be 
properly maintained through three corresponding forms of rights and law, which in 
tandem create a universal condition where “the freedom of each can coexist with the 
freedom of all the others.”23 The first rightful condition involves domestic law and the 
establishment of rights and duties that are to exist between citizens and their government 
(citizen to citizen, state to citizen). The second form of public right involves international 
law and the necessary establishment of a rightful condition that should exist between the 
various governments of the world as representative entities (state to state). The third 
rightful condition involves the establishment of cosmopolitan law and the rightful 
condition that should exist between all humans and all states, regardless of national origin
embarking on so dangerous an enterprise.” Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” op. rit., pg. 100.
19 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals. M. Gregor ed., (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1996), pg. 24.
20 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 107.
21 Thomas Pogge, “Kant’s Theory o f Justice,” Kant-Studien. 79, (1988).
22 Mary Gregor, “Kant’s Approach to Constitutionalism,” in A. Rosenbaum (ed.), Constitutionalism: The 
Philosophical Dimension. (New York, Greenwood Press, 1988), pg. 71.
23 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 41.
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or state citizenship (states to all humans, especially non-citizens). It is no surprise that 
there is a direct link between the tripartite as outlined in the Metaphysics o f Morals and 
the three definitive articles of Perpetual Peace, since each section of Kant’s treatise deals 
directly with the establishment of the aforementioned rightful conditions: 1. The Civil 
Constitution of Every State shall be Republican (citizen to citizen, state to citizen), 2. The 
Right of Nations shall be based on a Federation of Free States (state to state), 3. 
Cosmopolitan Right shall be limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality (states to all 
humans, especially non-citizens).
The purpose of the following three subsections is to provide a brief outline of the 
Kantian concept of domestic, international and cosmopolitan law respectively. From this 
discussion, the argument will be made that the definitive articles correspond to the 
categorical imperative and represents an attempt to create a rightful condition of universal 
law without the need for an overarching world government. It is in Section Three that I 
will attempt to resolve the debate regarding the nature of Kantian cosmopolitanism and to 
further refute the argument that it necessarily advocates the eradication of states 
altogether.
A. Domestic Law, Popular Sovereignty and Domestic Justice
As was mentioned at the end of section one, an extremely important element of 
Kant’s federation of free states is the first definitive article of Perpetual Peace and the 
condition that “the Civil Constitution of Every State shall be Republican.”24 As was 
suggested earlier, Rousseau was a source of inspiration for Kant and provided the 
grounding for his theoretical shift away from the natural law tradition. In following 
Rousseau’s emphasis on domestic politics and justice, Kant altered the Hobbesian 
paradigm by focusing on domestic justice as a precondition for establishing a global civil 
condition of public right. Kant predicates the foundation of the federation on domestic 
law and republicanism because he firmly believes that a republican constitution is the
24 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, loc. cit.
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only form of government that can secure and maintain justice both internally and 
externally.25
In many ways there is a direct connection with contemporary liberal democratic 
theory and Kant’s use of republican terminology. Although Kant specifically dismisses 
democracies as “despotism,” this opinion is largely based on Aristotelian concepts of 
direct democracy and the belief that democracies cannot maintain a meaningful
96separation of powers. As Kant insists, states can have various configurations (anything 
from dictatorships to democracy), but that there are only two forms of government, 
republican or despotic. For Kant, a republican form of government separates the 
executive and the legislative branch whereas a despotic form of government does not. In 
addition, a well constituted republic strives to approximate three universal principles; the 
“freedom for all members of society,” the “dependence of everyone upon a single 
common legislation” and “legal equality as citizens.”27 In contrast to despotism, a 
republican form of government locates these principles through an idealized “united 
general will of the people” and a dedication to its citizens by dividing power between the
* • 9Rlegislative, the executive and the judicial branch. In this regard, Kant’s discussions of 
republicanism come considerably close to contemporary understandings of liberal 
democracy and representative government. As has been suggested by many scholars, 
Kant’s conception of republicanism is closely synonymous with current understandings 
of representative democracies and it is from this resemblance that their interchange has
90been deemed warranted. " .'
Georg Cavallar, among others, has suggested that the first definitive article of 
Perpetual Peace and Kant’s treatment of republicanism within the Metaphysics o f Morals 
directly confirm a transition away from the concept of absolute state sovereignty to what 
has been called popular sovereignty. According to Cavallar, “state sovereignty is relative 
in the sense that it is dependent upon popular sovereignty. It is also relative in the sense
25 Kant’s justification for this argument can be found in The Metaphysics o f Morals, op. cit., pgs. 89-95.
26 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” op. cit., pg. 101.
27 Ibid.. pg. 99.
28 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 90-91.
29 The exchange of liberal democracy and Kantian republicanism is common and it is with very few 
exceptions that this connection is denied. For a good discussion regarding the various views on this subject 
see, Franceschet, Kant and Liberal Internationalism, op. cit., especially chp. 4.
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that Kant accepts it as provisionally legitimate.”30 In this regard, the domestic legitimacy 
of the state directly influences whether or not a state is considered a sovereign and 
whether it should be considered to have a legitimate claim as a global representative. As 
Cavallar points out, Kant is adamant in his conviction that republicanism is the only form 
of government that “can be derived from the idea of an original contract.”31 A republican 
contract is legitimate precisely because it represents the “united will of the people” and is 
derived from the fact that sovereignty lies with the people. Although the united general 
will is not meant as a practical legislative mechanism as some interpretations have 
suggested, it does represent the metaphysical ideal of what a sovereign should exemplify 
in its mutual relations with all cohabitants of the earth. In this regard, the idea of a united 
general will is meant to act as both a moral guide for determining whether a state is to be 
considered as a representative sovereign or as a despotic state, but also to make the 
determination that an existing order must accommodate the fact that the world is shared 
in common.33
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to insinuate that Cavallar’s interpretation of 
popular sovereignty is beyond a question of doubt. This is because considerable 
ambiguities exist in Kant’s treatment of sovereignty. Although Cavallar does capture a 
predominate theme within the Kantian concept of sovereignty, there are textual counter­
points where the concept of sovereignty is claimed as necessary regardless of the form of 
government involved. One such counter-example is located in Kant’s discussion of the 
state of nature and his premise that any state authority is better than a lack of state 
authority. As Kant argues, “any legal constitution, even if it is only in a small measure 
lawful, is better than none at all.”34 From this, Kant is expressing the importance of 
having an absolute sovereign to maintain stability and to allow for an environment where 
the progression of human morality is at least possible. Moreover, Kant’s discussion of
30 Cavallar, Kant and the Theory and Practice of International Right, op. cit., pg. 57.
31 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” ibid.
32 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, loc. cit.
33 The idea of a “united general will” is open to several conflicting interpretations and it is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to flush out the various distinctions. For an interesting discussion of the major 
interpretations and the adding of an additional view, see Katrin Flikschuh, Kant and Modem Political 
Philosophy. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), chp. 5. Also see Mary Gregor, The Laws of 
Freedom. (Oxford, Blackwell Press, 1963).
34 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 118, footnote.
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justice does not allow individuals to revolt against a state because he believes that a 
return to the state of nature is worse than living under a despotic regime.35 Kant reiterates 
his commitment to this stance when he writes, “man is an animal who needs a master... 
to force him to obey a universally valid will under which everyone can be free.”36 
Therefore, without a state to force a civil order and the compliance to law, the human 
condition will revert to the state of nature where the possibility of public right and moral 
progression is impossible. Although a state may be despotic, it still maintains order and at 
least allows for the possibility of reform towards the metaphysical ideal of popular 
sovereignty.
Some Kantian scholars have suggested that Kant’s willingness to accept any form 
of sovereignty, even a tyrannical regime, represents an inherent perplexity in his notion
\7of justice and its extrapolation to international relations. The complication is based on 
the clear fact that Kant upholds a republican government as the only constitution that can 
ideally maintain internal and external justice. From this premise, a tension arises from the 
fact that Kant is also willing to allow for the maintenance of unjust states, if  a removal of 
those states meant a return to the state of nature. However, these ambiguities in Kantian 
sovereignty are not necessarily fatal to his overall argument. This is because there are 
distinctions that can be made between a legal order and a sovereign based on public right 
and justice. For Kant, the condition of public right presupposes the existence of a legal 
order and a legal order is a necessary first step in reforming states toward justice. As Kant 
writes in the Doctrine o f Right’.
“The spirit of the original contract (anima pacti orignarii) involves an 
obligation on the part of the constituting authority to the kind o f 
government suited to the idea of the original contract. Accordingly, even if 
this cannot be done all at once, it is under obligation to change the kind of 
government gradually and continually so that it harmonizes in its effect 
with the only constitution that accords with right, that of a pure republic, 
in such a way that the old (empirical) statutory form, which served merely 
to bring about the submission of the people, are replaced by the original 
rational form, the only form which makes freedom the principle and
35 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 95.
36 Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 46.
37 Franceschet, Kant and Liberal Internationalism, op. cit.
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indeed the condition for any exercise of coercion, as is required by a 
rightful constitution of a state in the strict sense of the word.”38
Therefore, without a condition of stability and lawfulness, no matter how small a 
change it is from the state of nature, a movement toward the ideal of popular sovereignty 
is impossible. In this regard, the first necessity for the establishment of a just society is to 
leave the state of nature for there is no possibility of a civil condition while in a constant 
state of war. From this basis, Kantian philosophy maintains that there is a continued need 
to reform political order towards the metaphysical ideal of justice and public right.39 As 
Antonio Franceschet claims, “Kant’s view is that once the sovereign creates a mere 
lawful civil union out of anarchy, it alone will have the force and legislative legitimacy to 
progressively re-create itself and to produce a society based increasingly on the just 
principles of the original contract.”40
We can draw two implications from the Kantian position on domestic justice in 
relation to his cosmopolitan theory. First, the primacy of domestic law in Kant’s overall 
global vision illustrates that Kant does not advocate the removal of states as some realists 
and Hegelians have suggested. In fact, the basis for any continued move toward 
cosmopolitan principles is maintained and propagated through republican state reform 
and a dedication to approximate the metaphysical condition of public right, both 
internally and eventually externally. In this regard, the state’s legal apparatus and 
republican government, as understood as popular sovereignty, is given considerable 
priority in providing the foundations for a continued movement toward cosmopolitan 
justice. Second, there is a consistency between the metaphysical ideal of popular 
sovereignty and the categorical imperative. This is due to the fact that Kantian 
republicanism is aligned with reason to promote universal law, which is based on creating 
those “conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another 
in accordance with a universal law of freedom.”41 In this case, what is needed is “a 
constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws which
38 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 112.
39 Ibid.
40 Franceschet, op. cit., pg. 50.
41 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 24.
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ensure that the freedom of each can coexist with the freedom of all the other.”42 As we 
will see below, a federation of free states that is premised on the first definitive article 
creates a foundation for a broader cosmopolitan order. Although the federation does not 
have any coercive power like that of a state, it does convey a legitimate condition of 
public right and establishes the normative principles for which the federation embodies 
and propagates.
B. International Law, Federation and International Justice
In An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment, Kant writes that “the 
problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of a law 
governed external relationship with other states, and cannot be solved unless the latter is 
also solved.”43 Kant substantiates this claim through empirical qualifications and the 
historical reality that domestic freedom is not secured through the Westphalia model. 
Kant contends that this is due to the fact that states cannot enjoy their own freedom if 
they are constantly under threat from external forces. As Kant submits, “civil freedom 
can no longer be so easily infringed without disadvantage to all trades and industries, and 
especially to commerce, in the event of which the state’s power in its external relations 
will also decline.”44 Although this statement was meant to discourage states from military 
aggression and to highlight the counter-productive costs involved in expansionist 
policies, it was also meant to relate the fact that states have become increasingly 
interconnected and that warfare destabilizes the freedom of everyone. In addition, under 
the Treaty of Westphalia, international right was not seen in context of a rightful 
condition for mutual coexistence, but was often interpreted as an extended right for 
sovereignties to go to war. What reason dictates, according to Kant, is the establishment 
of a fully juridical condition of public right, where states obligate themselves to universal 
principles of law and mutually agreed principles of public right.
42 Immanuel Kant, Appendix, “Transcendental Logic II, Dialectic, I, Ideas in General,” in J.M.D. 
Meiklejohn trans., The Critique of Pure Reason. (New York, The Colonial Press, 1900).
43 Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment,” in H. Reiss, pp. cit., pg. 47.
44 Kant, “The Idea o f a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” in H. Reiss, ibid.. pg. 50.
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The second definitive article of Perpetual Peace addresses the establishment of 
international public right by proscribing that “The right of Nations shall be Based on a 
Federation of Free States.”45 Pace many realist critiques of Kant’s international theory, 
the federation is not analogous to a coercive world state, but is meant as “a voluntary, 
progressively expanding association of free and independent states, whose defining 
purpose was merely to bring a permanent end to war.”46 Since states are in a continuous 
warlike condition under the Westphalia model, either preparing for war or engaged in 
one, Kant suggests that the federation would differ from traditional peace treaties. As 
Kant writes, the agreement to the foedus pacificum “would differ from a peace treaty 
(pactum pacis) in that the latter terminates one war, whereas the former would seek to 
end all wars for good.”47 In this regard, the federation is to be understood as the 
constitutional foundation that enshrines the normative regulative principles to which all 
consenting members obligate themselves.
Therefore, the federation relies on a voluntary dedication by each member state to 
observe the law established by the federation and to uphold their obligation to the 
principles of international right. In this sense, the federation has no centralized authority, 
but relies on self-policing by each individual state. By consenting to the formalities of the 
contract, states are in fact obligating themselves to the conditions of membership and to 
the encouragement of others to follow suit by maintaining the benefits associated with a 
pacific alliance. There are three normative principles that the federal constitution is meant 
to capture in regard to the commitments needed for state membership and for the 
establishment of public right. The first is a commitment to fulfill contractual agreements 
established between cooperating states in good faith. The second is based on a sense of 
internal freedom and a commitment not to intrude in the internal constitutions of 
cooperating states. The third dictates that wars should be limited to immediate threats to 
the federation and should always be constrained in such a way that the possibility of a 
future peace is not rendered impossible.
45 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, ibid.. pg. 102.
46 Charles Covell, Kant and the Law of Peace: A Study in the Philosophy of International Law and 
International Relations. (New York, Palgrave Publishers, 1998), pg. 124.
47 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, og. cit., pg. 104.
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One practical question that immediately arises is to what degree this model would 
allow for international institutions or for the establishment of organizations designed to 
adjudicate the various complications that would undoubtedly occur within the federation. 
As we know from the previous chapter, Kant did not necessarily mean that the federation 
had an actual written constitution. Moreover, Kant did not provide guidelines for how 
states would organize various institutional aspects of the federation. This is because 
Kant’s argument focuses specifically on the normative foundations that reason dictates as 
necessary for the establishment of a lawful condition of public right between all members 
of a shared earth. However, we can imagine that if the normative foundations of the 
federation were not codified and objectified in unambiguous terms, then 
misinterpretations and confusions would arise. Similarly, cooperating members would 
.want verifiable proof of mutual consent and some institutional body would have to be 
entrusted to maintain such records. Additionally, Kant believed that international 
commerce and the interconnectedness of trade would grow exponentially under the 
foedus pacificum and it is reasonable to assume that current complications in international 
trade would also apply to the federation of free states. As can be imagined, transnational 
institutions and cooperative schemes would be needed to circumvent possible tensions 
between states and to adjudicate circumstances involving various conflicting claims to 
international right.
Despite the vagueness regarding the extent of cooperative schemes within the 
federation and Kant’s lack of practical institutional design, movement towards a more 
cooperative multilateral network within the federation is possible. This is because there is 
no incongruity between the establishment of a lawful constitution and the establishment 
of procedures for the adjudication of disputes between cooperating states. What Kant 
expressly prohibits is the establishment of a centralized authority. However, there is no 
inconsistency with procedural schemes between cooperative members as long as those 
federal procedures are voluntary and do not authorize a centralized government with the 
power to coerce. Therefore, this provision does not exclude multisectorial institutions 
designed to coordinate issues of public health, environment, mutual security, trade, 
migration and other international concerns. In addition, a system of arbitration could be
48 Covell, ojj. cit., pg. 138.
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established within the federation without the need for a world sovereign to mediate 
disputes. Through mutual deliberation agreements and a commitment to universal 
principles of right, it is fathomable that a fairly sophisticated network of multilateral 
bodies could regulate matters of cohabitation without the need for an overarching global 
sovereign.
Nevertheless, it is true that the degree to which these multilateral institutions had 
any practical effect would depend on a commitment by states to police themselves and to 
uphold agreements decided through multilateral arbitration. In contrast to Kant’s 
optimism about the rationality of republican cooperation, scholars who support the 
establishment of a world state advise that self-policing is not reliable enough to maintain 
rule compliance between federated states and that stronger institutional methods of 
enforcement are required. However, this critique is not altogether indicative of how states 
actually cooperate. Although institutional organizations under the Kantian model do lack 
the power to enforce compliance, it does not necessarily mean that states would 
automatically fail to comply in opposition to established laws. As Thomas Franck has 
illustrated, states often regulate themselves in relation to international covenants, 
especially if those international pacts are believed to be legitimate and representative of 
their overall interests. As Franck demonstrates, “there are obligations owed by states 
which they widely recognize as concomitants of community membership and which are 
accurate predictors of actual state behavior.”49 Franck elaborates by suggesting that, “in 
mature voluntarist communities... the capacity of members to obligate does not derive 
only from the specific consent of the members but as a concomitant of the status of 
membership.”50 In this regard, there is a strong pull for states to comply and uphold 
international commitments not only because they morally bind themselves through 
consent, but also because their membership status is derived from communal compliance 
and recognition.
In many respects Franck’s conclusion regarding voluntarist communities captures 
the sense of normative obligation involved in a Kantian federation. Thomas Donaldson 
reaches a similar conclusion when he writes that “Kant hoped to modify existing practice
49 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990), 
pg. 192.
50 Ibid.. pg. 193.
106
to allow a somewhat more centralized order and thus reduce the uncertainly of 
international rules while preserving the basic sovereignty of individual states.”51 Under 
the Kantian federation as outlined above, states play a primary role in reforming 
international ethics toward the demands of reason and the establishment of a universal 
law that is consistent with the idea of a united general will and the categorical imperative. 
This normative commitment is maintained on two fronts. First, only republican states that 
uphold Kantian principles of domestic justice can be considered sovereign in the true 
sense and this sovereignty is by design obligated to universal principles of public right.52 
Second, the ideal of a federation of free states is what like-minded states must seek to 
approximate and therefore should obligate themselves to universal principles that are 
consistent with reforming the existing order toward the metaphysical ideal. However, 
there is a third level necessary for a true condition of public right. For it is not until Kant 
introduces his most radical element of cosmopolitan law that a more profound sense of a 
global civil condition is produced.
C. Cosmopolitan Law, Cosmopolitan Right and Global Justice
Without a doubt, the most novel aspect of Kant’s international theory is located in 
the third definitive article of Perpetual Peace and the provision that “Cosmopolitan Right 
shall be limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality.”53 Despite the fact that both the 
third definitive article and Kant’s discussion of cosmopolitan law in the Metaphysics o f 
Morals represent his most radical shift away from natural law, it also remained the least 
developed aspect of his tripartite of law. Although Kant claimed that the maxims of 
“cosmopolitan right are easy to formulate and assess on account of its analogy with 
international right,”54 the extrapolation of cosmopolitan jurisprudence has not been as 
straight forward and easy as Kant had assumed. This is because there remains
51 Thomas Donaldson, “Kant’s Global Rationalism” in T. Nardin & D. Mapel (eds.), Traditions of 
International Ethics. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), pg. 148.
52 A contemporary variation that explores this foundation as the basis o f a future system o f international 
law can be found in Allen Buchanan, Justice. Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for 
International Law. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004).
53 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 105.
54 Ibid. pg. 128.
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considerable debate surrounding theological extent that cosmopolitan law is to have on 
creating universal obligations in relation to the idea of an equal earth in common (this 
debate will be further discussed in the next section). Where widespread agreement seems 
to exist is that cosmopolitan law was meant to expand the scope of public right beyond a 
strict state-centered focus to one that encompassed all members of the earth. As Charles 
Covell suggests, cosmopolitan law “was the body of public international law... 
constituting the juridical framework for the intercourse of men and states, considered in 
their status as bearers of the attributes of citizenship in an ideal universal state that 
extended to embrace all mankind.”55 What remains a source of disagreement however is 
the extent to which Kant’s universal citizenship should establish egalitarian principles of 
justice and to what magnitude this justice creates obligations between various 
communities of the world.
Some scholars have suggested that Kant’s cosmopolitan law is synonymous with 
contemporary discussions of universal human rights and that cosmopolitan law demands 
a minimal threshold for which individual freedoms .cannot be violated.56 Others have 
dismissed the capacious readings of cosmopolitan law and have suggested that it is 
nothing more than a supplement to contemporary understandings of international trade 
law, merely stipulating how states should treat visiting foreign-nationals engaged in 
international commerce.57 Adding to the confusion, some cosmopolitans have claimed 
that Kantian cosmopolitan law is an attempt to create additional institutions for the 
expression of individual autonomy under the growing interdependence of globalization.58 
Although various interpretations abound and many Kantians remain agnostic in respect to 
the aforementioned interpretations, it is broadly accepted that Kant sought to create a 
level of cosmopolitan law that would obligate both states and individuals to the 
hospitable treatment of all human beings regardless of their citizenship or national origin. 
As was discussed in Chapter 2, this conclusion is clear because Kant proclaims this much
55 Covell, Kant and the Law of Peace, op. cit., pgs. 141-142.
56 This interpretation is a popular one, for various discussions regarding this connection see Derek Heater, 
World Citizenship (London, Continuum, 2002) and Sharon Anderson-Gold, Cosmopolitanism and Human 
Rights. (Cardiff, University o f Wales Press, 2001).
57 Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, op. cit.
58 For a general overview of this argument see Daniele Archibugi & David Held, Cosmopolitan 
Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order. (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995).
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when he wrote: “hospitality means the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility 
when he arrives on someone else’s territory.”59 Although Kant maintains that individuals 
can be turned away, especially if they act in a lawless manner, he also stipulates that this 
can only be done if it is “done without causing his death.”60 Kant distinguishes hospitality 
as a form of right versus merely a type of philanthropy by arguing that anyone could 
“claim a right to resort, for all men are entitled to present themselves in the society of 
others by virtue of their right to communal possession of the earth’s surface.”61 Kant goes 
on to ground this principle in his cosmopolitan teleology by suggesting that “no-one 
originally has any greater right than anyone else to occupy any particular portion of the 
earth” and “we are here concerned not with philanthropy, but with right.’ Although 
states are not obligated to grant all visitors communal membership, for Kant believes this 
involves a further contractual agreement between individuals, Kant does impose the 
provision that states cannot act inhospitably toward foreign visitors.
Nevertheless, textual evidence makes it clear that Kant does not limit the extent of 
the third definitive article to the condition of internal federated hospitality. This is 
because Kant believes that hospitality is necessary in order to create “those conditions 
which make it possible for [individuals] to attempt to enter into relations with the native 
inhabitants. In this way, continents distant from each other can enter into peaceful mutual 
relations which may eventually be regulated by public laws, thus bringing the human race 
nearer and nearer to a cosmopolitan constitution.”63 Although this might seem limited in 
scope, this aspect of cosmopolitan law is in fact considerably more robust than it appears. 
This is because the clause not only dictates how states must treat all human beings, but 
also demands that civilized relationships be established between any communities that 
have contact with one another. One such Kantian example is in relation to colonial 
expansionism and the requirement that states cannot engage in “inhospitable conduct” in 
their discovery of new lands. As Kant strictly proclaims:
59 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 105.
60 Ibid.. pg. 106.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
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“If the settlement is made so far from where that people resides that there 
is no encroachment on anyone’s use of land, the right to settle is not open 
to doubt. But if these peoples are shepherds or hunters (like the Hottentots, 
the Tungusi, or most of the American Indian nations) who depend for their 
sustenance on great open regions, this settlement may not take place by 
force but only by contract, and indeed by a contract that does not take 
advantage of the ignorance of those inhabitants with respect to ceding 
their lands.”64
The potency of the third definitive article is that it moves beyond the internal 
affairs of federated members to stipulate practical standards of hospitality that all states 
must maintain in relation to all global communities, especially non-state communities 
affected by colonial expansion. In this regard, the third article makes three dramatic 
claims that directly diminish the role of state sovereignty. First, cosmopolitan law 
demands the hospitable treatment of all humans by all states regardless of nationality and 
locality. In consideration of this, states can no longer dictate the treatment of foreign 
nationals based on self-interest, but must prevent hostilities that might violate an 
individuals legal claim to hospitable treatment. Second, this legal condition for hospitable 
treatment is to be grounded as an actual legal right that would be enshrined in the pacific 
constitution and act as a condition for federated membership. As several international 
lawyers have suggested, the formal codification of cosmopolitan right is reminiscent of 
contemporary discussions of universal human rights and it could be argued that there is a 
strong degree of connection between the two.65 Third, any dealings with communities 
outside of the federation must conform to the principles of cosmopolitan law and to 
peaceful mutual relations that will allow the potentiality for a future civil condition. In 
light of this, states cannot hold inconsistent internal / external relations, but must treat all 
non-member communities with a sense of equally valid consideration as long as those 
communities do not directly threaten the existence of the pacific federation.
In this regard, Kantian cosmopolitan law provides the judicious atmosphere 
necessary to regulate global interactions in line with reason and the establishment of a 
civil condition of global public right. By inscribing the requirements of cosmopolitan 
right into global public law, Kant seeks to eradicate various enticements to war and to
64 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 122.
65 Fernando Teson, A Philosophy of International Law. (Boulder, Westview Press, 1998).
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create a lawful order where the violations of rights are no longer a sanctioned action 
under the prerogative of absolute state sovereignty, but are considered violations of 
international legal covenants. In the words of Kant, “the idea of a cosmopolitan right is 
therefore not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten 
code of political and international right, transforming it into a universal right of 
humanity... [and] only under this condition can we flatter ourselves that we are 
continually advancing toward a perpetual peace.”66
III. The Scope of Federation and Kantian Cosmopolitanism
Before examining Kantian cosmopolitanism in relation to contemporary 
international relations theory, it is important further to discuss whether or not Kantian 
cosmopolitanism should be understood as advocating a world federation of free states or 
as actually espousing the establishment of a centralized cosmopolitan republic. This 
predication is important to clarify since there remains considerable disagreement in 
contemporary political theory regarding Kant’s ultimate global order. As was mentioned 
earlier, scholars from various disciplines have offered highly contested interpretations of 
Kant’s cosmopolitan vision. Generally, the debate surrounds perceived inconsistencies in 
what scholars have labeled Kant’s ideal-theory for a universal cosmopolitan purpose and 
Kant’s non-ideal treatment of international relations. There are roughly three schools of 
thought within the debate.67
The first position suggests that Kant actually envisioned a world republic or a 
universal society and sought to create a community of individuals independent from 
states. This conclusion is reached either through interpretations that seek to rectify 
contradictions in Kant’s cosmopolitan teleology or by those who suggest that Kant’s 
moral and political philosophy can only be made consistent through a world republic 
reading. As Hedley Bull has written, Kantian “imperatives enjoin not coexistence and 
cooperation among states but rather the overthrow of the system of states and its
66 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 108.
67 For brevity, I have classified many interpretations into three general categories. However, each 
interpretation maintains distinct and unique arguments to which this chapter cannot explore at length.
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replacement by a cosmopolitan society.”68 Some Kantian scholars have also endorsed a 
similar interpretation, maintaining that Kantian ideal theory requires individuals to live 
under common civil laws of a cosmopolitan republic and that the idea of a federation was 
merely Kant’s second best ideal.69 In addition, Hegelians are particularly cautious of 
Kant’s cosmopolitan intentions, suggesting a Kantian desire to overthrow self- 
determination and the right to self-protection afforded to autonomous communities by the 
Hobbesian paradigm. Although direct textual evidence often suggests the opposite 
conclusion, many Hegelian and realist scholars insist that Kant had hegemonic 
aspirations for a universal world state.70
An alternative to this interpretation is that Kant dismissed a world republic as 
dangerous to freedom and had considerable concerns about its potential for unbridled 
despotism. This interpretation is based on the fact that Kant explicitly argued for a global 
federation while attacking the idea of a world republic.71 Attempting to make Kant’s 
federation defendable, those of us who favor this reading cite substantive textual 
evidence in support of a federation of free states and delineate this from Kant’s adamant 
stance against a world republic. As Kant himself proclaimed, “such a [world] state is in 
turn even more dangerous to freedom, for it may lead to fearful despotism... distrust 
must force men to form an order which is not a cosmopolitan commonwealth under a 
single ruler, but a lawful federation under a commonly accepted international right.”72 
Kant clarifies this stance further when he adds, “this federation does not aim to acquire 
any power like that of a state, but merely to preserve and secure the freedom of each state 
in itself, along with that of the other confederated states.”73 Proponents of this view also
Suffice to say that this section will present them only on a surface level and will be unable to explore the 
subtle distinctions between them.
68 Bull, Ittd , pg. 25.
69 Pierre Laberge, “Kant on Justice and the Law of Nations,” in D. Maple & T. Nardin (eds.), International 
Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives, op. cit., pgs. 82-102.
70 Martin Wight, “An Anatomy of International Thought,” Review of International Studies. (13), 1987, pg. 
226. An expansion o f this interpretation of Kantian cosmopolitanism can also be found in M. Wight, 
International Theory: The Three Traditions. G. Wight and A. Roberts (eds.), (Leicester, Leicester 
University Press, 1991).
71 It should be mentioned that Kant originally advocated a world republic in his writings prior to 1793. 
However, Kant abandoned this position for a model based on a federation of free states and remained 
committed to this model in all his political writings after 1793.
72 Kant, “On the Common Saying: This may be True in Theory, but does not Apply in Practice,” in H. 
Reiss, op. cit., pg. 90.
73 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, ibid.. pg. 104.
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propose that the first definitive article of Perpetual Peace, that the civil constitution of 
every state shall be republican, provides for continuity in the transition from Kant’s moral 
philosophy to his political theory since every state within the federation is obligated to be 
“representative and to respect human rights” without the presence of any overarching 
global authority.74
Nevertheless, there is a third position that provides somewhat of a link between 
the two aforementioned arguments. This interpretation stipulates that Kant did indeed 
favor a federation for practical and empirical reasons, but also believed that something 
more than the federation was needed to fulfil the ultimate cosmopolitan ideal. The 
explanation behind this argument is that Kant saw a global federation as an evolutionary 
stage in a more pragmatic move toward something resembling a world republic.75 
However, unlike the world republic interpretation mentioned above, this position does 
not assume that Kant necessarily advocated a world republic, but was only optimistic 
about a future movement towards a broader cosmopolitan political order. The most 
persuasive aspect of this interpretation is that it is able to maintain Kant’s firm stance that 
any movement toward transnational or global institutions would be voluntary and 
unforced. Although this position does not immediately rule out the possibility of a future 
world republic, as Matthias Lutz-Bachmann has argued,77 it still accommodates the 
textual fact that a world republic was not Kant’s immediate choice and that he had 
considerable reservations about the creation of a world republic.
A reconciliation of these three positions might be possible if we are willing to 
understand Kantian cosmopolitan theory as having serious concerns about the formation 
of a world republic, while also understanding that given the right conditions, the 
establishment of voluntary transnational cosmopolitan institutions is not ruled out. 
However, as was mentioned in Section Two, the conditions necessary to consider this 
political order would have to be consistent with Kantian principles of external freedom
74 Teson. “Kant's International Liberalism.” op. cit.. pg. 105.
75 Cavallar, Kant and the Theory and Practice of International Right, op. cit.
76 For an extrapolation of what a new form of Kantian cosmopolitan governance might look like see 
Daniele Archibugi “Models of International Organization in Perpetual Peace Projects,” Review of 
International Studies. 18, (1992), pgs. 295-317.
77 Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, “Kant’s Ideal of Peace and the Philosophical Conceptions o f a World 
Republic,” in J. Bohman & M. Lutz-Bachmann (eds.). Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan 
Ideal. (Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1997), pgs. 59-77.
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and public right. For it is clear that the establishment of these institutions could only be 
justified on Kantian grounds if there were also guarantees that individual freedoms would 
not be threatened by a possible despotic world order. This conclusion is reasonable based 
simply on the fact that Kant’s political theory is preoccupied with the freedom of the 
moral agent.78 Therefore, the distinction that is being suggested by the third interpretation 
is an important one, but one that leads immediately back to considering the world 
federation interpretation over a world republic reading. For it seems that Kant was only 
optimistic about a future order with more institutional complexity than his initial 
federation of states, but was also unwilling to assign an overarching governmental 
structure as the best means to fulfill the cosmopolitan ideal. As was pointed out earlier, 
this position does not rule out the possibility of future cosmopolitan institutions, but it 
does stipulate that any movement towards transnational institutions must be completely 
voluntary and strongly anchored against the possibility of global despotism. If we are 
willing to consider this interpretation as plausible, then it also seems reasonable to 
assume that a Kantian system of checks and balances would be necessary to regulate 
these global institutions and that individual member states would maintain some right to
70defend themselves against possible tyranny. In this regard, whatever form of global 
governance that is to evolve from the federation would still maintain the original 
underpinnings of the federal system and would provide for state succession when the 
original constitutional procedures were violated. Kant himself demands this much when 
he writes that the federation “must be an alliance which can be terminated at any time, so 
that it must be renewed periodically.”80
Although the reconciliation above represents a plausible bridge between many 
ambiguities in Kant, it is nevertheless unnecessary to reach an immediate conclusion in 
order to provide a reconstruction of Kantian cosmopolitanism. What is necessary, is that 
a federation of free states is understood as an important step in Kantian cosmopolitanism.
78 Donaldson, “Kant’s Global Rationalism,” op. cit., pgs. 136-157. Also see Gregor, “Kant’s Approach to 
Constitutionalism,” op. cit., pgs. 67-87.
79 Kant maintained that “rightful states” had an obligation to protect themselves from external aggression 
and that this right was inalienable. See Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, in Reiss, op. cit., pgs. 164-171.
80 Ibid.. pg. 165. These principles illustrate that peaceful coexistence is the paramount concern of the 
alliance and that any federation must be contractual and ratified continually by member states in order to 
reiterate mutual agreements and secure obligation.
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It is also important to understand that Kant made certain not to pretend to understand the 
complexities of any practical cosmopolitan order. As Kant suggests, a cosmopolitan 
federation will be the result of international norm building and a recognized need for
Q 1
mutual coexistence, that “will gradually spread further and further.” In this light, 
Kantian cosmopolitanism has no particular predictive institutional complexion because a 
global order will be the result of millions of variables, for which no theory could foresee 
or account. In addition, considering Kant’s belief in the progression of human 
enlightenment, a future form of political organization could still be invented and there is 
no reason to assume that Ka.nt believed that a world republic had to be the only design 
that could effectively regulate a future cosmopolitan order.
Moreover, there is no theoretical reason why a federation model necessarily 
contradicts cosmopolitan justice and morality as some realist’s claim. Many 
contemporary cosmopolitans acknowledge that moral cosmopolitanism could be perfectly 
compatible in principle with a Kantian federation and its corresponding opposition to a 
world state. As Brian Barry and Charles Beitz indicate, “it may be that the best way to 
realize the ideals of moral cosmopolitanism lies in organizing humanity in a society of 
states that retain their separate statehood while subjecting themselves to the requirements 
of international covenants or some universal principles.” Therefore, whether or not 
Kant subconsciously sought a future world republic or required the continued 
maintenance of a federation of free states is immaterial. This is because it is clear that a 
federation of free states was his starting point and that any movement from this 
cosmopolitan foundation would have to be consistent with Kant’s moral principles of 
external freedom, voluntary co-legislation and right. It is from this basic premise that a 
further exploration of the Kantian conception of cosmopolitanism will be advanced in 
relation to the role of states and to contemporary understandings of state sovereignty.
81 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in Reiss, op. c]t., pg. 104.
82 Brian Barry, “International Society from a Cosmopolitan Perspective,” in D. Maple and T. Nardin eds., 
International Society. (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1999), pg. 144. For a similar statement
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IV. Kantian Cosmopolitanism and its Relationship to 
Contemporary International Relations Theory
There are considerable implications stemming from Kantian cosmopolitanism in 
relation to the role of states in contemporary international relations theory. As was 
mentioned throughout this chapter, there has been substantial confusion regarding how 
states figure into Kant’s cosmopolitan vision. On the one hand, international relations 
theorists like Hedley Bull and Martin Wright have concluded that Kantianism seeks to 
replace the state system with the establishment of a cosmopolitan republic. On the other 
hand, there is also a belief by some cosmopolitans that Kant’s international order is too 
minimalist to instigate any real global reform and that his theory of sovereignty 
surrenders his cosmopolitan principles to the absolute authority states.
However, these critiques do not capture the complexity involved in Kant’s 
cosmopolitan federation. The confusion arises from the fact that Kant is both unwilling to 
endorse a world republic while also reluctant to accept the possibility that absolute 
sovereignty can support a cosmopolitan condition of public right. As we have seen 
throughout this chapter, Kant did not agree with those who advocated the inauguration of 
a world state. In fact, Kant sustained a very consistent critique of world government and 
clearly sought to provide an alternative to both the Westphalian and world state 
archetypes. Although there are indications that Kant hoped for a continued movement 
toward a broader cosmopolitan order, this order was to be propagated through internal 
state reform and a consensual movement toward multilateral cooperation. Nevertheless, 
despite the fact that a Kantian federation is predicated on the willingness of states to 
obligate themselves to formal principles of public right, the conditions to which states 
must commit to are not as minimalist and weak as some critics suggest. This is because 
the members of a Kantian federation already preserve domestic justice and a dedication 
to universal principles of right. As Teson rightly points out, “only an alliance defined by 
the definitive articles is morally justified” and membership is tightly restricted to states 
that are committed to uphold these universal principles. In this sense, sovereignty is
from Beitz see, Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations. (New Jersey, Princeton 
University Press, 1979), pg. 124.
83 Teson, “Kantian International Liberalism,” op. cit., pg. 104.
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conditional within the Kantian federation. It is conditioned on the normative principles of 
popular sovereignty, conditions of public right, equal justice, external freedom and 
universal law.
Therefore, the concept of state sovereignty is both transformed and weakened in 
three significant ways by Kant’s legal tripartite. First, Kantian sovereignty differs from 
traditional Hobbesian definitions that emphasize absolute claims to bounded territory and 
established power bases. Under the Kantian model the definition of sovereignty is 
premised on the ideal of popular sovereignty and domestic justice. Second, the condition 
of enjoying external freedom as a sovereign, and therefore of being truly able to exercise 
sovereign freedom, is contingent on the rule of law and the establishment of a global 
condition of public right. This demands commitment to universal principles that are 
sometimes beyond the prerogative of immediate state self-interest. Within the Kantian 
model, it is only through federal membership that a legitimate claim to right can be 
maintained and instituted. Therefore, membership demands conformity to universal 
principles that directly reduce claims of absolute sovereignty and suppress international 
policies based on self-interest alone. Third, cosmopolitan law in effect supersedes state 
sovereignty in that it demands compliance to universal principles of human worth 
regardless of citizenship or national origin. States no longer have final authority 
concerning how to treat individuals internally or externally. Under the Kantian model a 
state cannot violate individual rights internally because the first article requires popular 
sovereignty and a condition of domestic justice. States are also unable to violate 
individual rights externally or to harm foreign visitors because the second and third 
articles prohibit any interference with another constitution and disallows the ill treatment 
of any visiting person.
In this regard, the Kantian model moves beyond realist conceptions of a modus 
vivendi because it establishes a normative society based on the general acceptance of 
common ethical principles and on the creation of interest-trumping norms. Whereas a 
modus vivendi is based entirely on power relationships and therefore limits cooperation to 
the realm of self-interest alone, a Kantian federation is based on a universal normative 
order where principles of public right supersede alterations based on self-interest. 
Nevertheless, this is not to say that self-interest is not a motivating factor in maintaining
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the Kantian federation. Kant clearly suggests that it is in the self-interest of states to 
organize themselves into a lawful condition of public right. The difference is that a 
Kantian federation seeks to establish a society whose members accept to be governed in 
the pursuit of their self-interest by the priority of common norms. From this acceptance, 
federated members reject the principle that modifications are possible without those 
modifications first being validated by universal considerations.
As a result, the Kantian model outlined in this chapter compliments and bolsters 
many international relations thinkers that have drawn influence from Kantian political 
theory. Andrew Hurrell and Andrew Linklater have both attempted to provide a 
consistent and relevant treatment of Kantian universal ethics within the study of 
international relations.84 Nevertheless, both these treatments have started from a premise 
of federation and only loosely justified why this position should or could be adopted. 
Taking this into account, the model provided in this chapter fits soundly with Linklater’s 
claim that Kant’s international relations theory sought to implement an “ethical 
community in which the ends of rational beings are harmonized in accordance with
flf
rational principles imposed upon themselves.”
In relation to other contemporary theories of international relations, the Kantian 
model sustains differences from the minimalist theory suggested by John Rawls in The 
Law o f Peoples*6 This is because unlike Rawls, Kant is unwilling to accept a hierarchical
R7ranking of societies and the various degrees to which these societies secure justice. In 
this respect, the federation creates a universal ethical order because it is clear that the first 
definitive article of Perpetual Peace mandates the formal existence of popular 
sovereignty and a minimal sense of domestic justice based on Kant’s Metaphysics o f 
Morals. Since federal membership is formalized exclusively on representative 
government and a dedication to approximating the requirements of public right, many of 
Rawls’ “decent” societies would fail to meet Kantian requirements and would be
84 Andrew Hurrell, “Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in International Relations,” Review o f International 
Studies. 16, (3), (1990): 183-205. Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory o f International 
Relations. (Basinstoke, Macmillan, 1990).
85 Linklater, ibid.. pg. 103.
86 As outlined in John Rawls, The Laws of People. (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1999).
87 For a more detailed contrast and comparison between Rawls and Kant see, Patrick Hayden, John Rawls 
Toward a Just World Order. (Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2002), especially chp. 4.
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disallowed membership. However, this rejection does not mean that some level of 
cooperation could not be maintained between members and non-members. This is 
because Kant explicitly claims that relations between societies are unavoidable and that 
they must be maintained in such a way that the potentiality of a future civil condition is 
possible. In this regard, the members of the federation should extend the reach of norms 
to non-members and encourage conformity, but they cannot accept these societies as 
being sovereign representatives and must assure that they are not in fact providing 
assistance to despotic regimes. In addition, members of the Kantian federation must reject 
states that maintain violations to cosmopolitan right and who directly threaten the 
universal principles established by the pacific alliance. Despite the fact that Rawls 
borrows the term a law o f peoples from Kant, his theory does not provide a significant 
law of peoples like Kant’s cosmopolitanism because it is too relativistic in its willingness 
to abdicate universal human protections in exchange for the supremacy of localized
Q Q
systems of order.
If there is a contemporary model in political theory that best encapsulates the 
possible institutional spirit of a future Kantian federation, it is most likely to be found in 
what has been labeled as cosmopolitan democracy. This is because unlike some 
cosmopolitan arguments for establishing a world state, cosmopolitan democracy 
promotes a system of multilateral and transnational global governance that still leaves 
room for states to determine significant aspects of domestic policy. The cosmopolitan 
democracy model therefore endorses the Kantian shift away from the idea of coercive 
global institutions to a system of democratic institutions based on consent and a 
dedication to self-regulating normative principles. However, unlike the vacuum of Kant’s 
institutional design, the cosmopolitan democracy model suggests that states should 
commit themselves to additional democratic principles in order to create global 
institutions that can tackle problems of global cohabitation. Although this does not mean 
that states necessarily give up their independence, it does suggest that states would have 
to bind themselves to additional procedures of global interdependence and to the final 
outcomes of a mutually agreed governance process. As David Held writes, “by inscribing 
a set of democratic rights into a constitution, a political community commits itself both to
88 For a critique that Rawls maintains a relativistic conception of human rights, see ibid.
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safeguarding individuals in certain ways and to protecting the community as a democratic 
association; for these rights are the rules and procedures which cannot, without 
inconsistency and contradiction, be eliminated: they are the self-binding conditions of 
democracy.”89
Prima facie, an additional commitment to democratic procedures does not seem to 
necessarily conflict with the normative foundations involved with a Kantian federation. 
In fact, it illustrates one possible move toward a broader cosmopolitan order that might 
be provided without also establishing a centralized world government. One important 
feature about the relationship between cosmopolitan democracy and Kantian 
cosmopolitanism is the crucial element of consent and self-binding obligation. If a global 
federation is to function based on institutionalized commitments to a multilateral system 
of global governance, these institutions will need to contain important protective 
principles that all participating states believe as self-regulating. In this sense, states would 
have to see themselves as participating with others in grounding the authority of those 
moral rules and that these rules increase an equal condition of co-legislation and public 
right. However, the most important similarity between cosmopolitan democracy and 
Kantian cosmopolitanism is the stress that both theories place on the need to establish 
universal principles of justice beyond immediate state self-interest. In the case of this 
chapter, the focus has not been on what international law has provided historically based 
on realist assumptions, but on what law should provide globally in relation to the 
normative foundations necessary to create a condition of universal justice. The 
assumption has therefore been a Kantian one in direct contrast to the realist position, that 
mutual cohabitation and external freedom is not possible without a normative ethical 
system of public right and universal law.
V. Conclusion
The focus of this chapter has been to provide some clarification in respect to the 
role of states and state sovereignty within Kantian cosmopolitanism. By examining the 
various ambiguities involved in the formation of a Kantian federation, it has been argued
89 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order. (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995), pg. 200.
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that Kant did not seek to create a world state as several international relations theorists 
suggest. In fact, the direct opposite has been indicated and it has been shown that states 
actually play a significant role in any future move toward a cosmopolitan order. In 
addition, it has also been argued that despite Kant’s unwillingness to support the 
possibility of a coercive world government, his theory still manages to provide a minimal 
foundation for a coherent normative order based on universal principles and the 
concomitance to those principles by like-minded states.
Although Kant provides a fairly consistent outline for a possible cosmopolitan 
federation, there still remain significant ambiguities that future scholarship must 
redevelop, reconstruct and work through. At least three major areas of reconstruction and 
development are needed in order to provide a truly comprehensive and tenable account of 
Kantian federation. The areas that Kantian cosmopolitanism must seek to rectify, are 
based on questions surrounding the institutional complexion of the federation, its scheme 
of distributive justice, its relationship with various cultural perspectives, and with how a 
transition from theory to practice is to be sustained. In other words, Kantian 
cosmopolitans need to provide additional provisions for how the federation will function 
institutionally; how it deals with burdened states; the relationship it maintains between 
itself and repressive or rouge states / cultures; and how it will rectify problems associated 
with global inequality. It is essential that further theories are developed for these concerns 
before Kantian cosmopolitanism can have a universally convincing moral claim to reform 
the existing global system. It is for this reason, that the next chapter attempts to 
understand the relationship between cultural diversity and Kantian cosmopolitanism, 
while the last two chapters attempt to extrapolate some normative principles for a 
Kantian system of global distributive justice and various links between Kantian theory 
and actual world practice.
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Chapter Four
Cultural Difference and Kantian Cosmopolitanism
“Human reason is a dye spread more or less equally through all the opinions and all the manners o f us 
humans, which are infinite in matter and infinite in diversity.” - Michel de Montaigne1
Introduction
One usually does not characterize an anthropological quotation by Michel de 
Montaigne as having much in comparison with Kantian cosmopolitanism. Scholars of 
both Montaigne and Kant would suggest that the cultural pluralism of Montaigne’s theory 
directly conflicts with the cosmopolitanism of Kant. However, this assumption not only 
neglects some similarities between Montaigne and Kant, but also exemplifies the general 
confusion regarding what Kant’s cosmopolitan law is meant to achieve. In comparison to 
Kant, Montaigne suggests that human reason is a characteristic found universally in all 
forms of social morality. In relation to Montaigne, Kant maintains the empirical reality 
that human diversity exists, but that the bounded surface of the earth forces us to 
“consistent interaction” and therefore creates a philosophical need for practical reason in 
the formation of universal ethical principles and cosmopolitan law? Where Kant and 
Montaigne differ is not in regards to the fact that human reason is the basis for all 
morality or with the fact that diversity exists, but in regards to whether human reason can 
ever reconcile our various differences under some form of cosmopolitan law. For 
Montaigne, the diversity of opinion is infinite, suggesting that universal cosmopolitan 
principles cannot capture all the complexities of various cultural perspectives. In contrast, 
Kant argues that the scope for social diversity is finite and inherently interconnected, 
bound by the spherical shape of the earth. As Kant suggests, “since the earth is a globe, 
[humans] cannot disperse over an infinite area, but must necessarily tolerate one 
another’s company.”3 Since the surface of the globe is finite, “the peoples of the world
'Michel De Montaigne, “On Common; and Never Easily Changing a Traditional Law,” M.A. Screech (ed.), 
The Complete Essays.
2Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in Hans Reiss, Kant's Political Writings. (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1970), pg. 106.
3 Ibid., pg. 107.
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have entered in various degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the 
point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere.”4
What is interesting about Montaigne, is that he accepts the universalized notion of 
human reason as the underpinning for social morality, but maintains that this capacity in 
and of itself creates infinite and irreconcilable divisions. Montaigne seems to be 
suggesting that since human reason is infinite in ability, it is therefore also infinite in 
creating antithetical and incommensurable differences. In contrast, Kant maintains that 
human reason is a universal mechanism that provides the means to bridge particular 
cultural divisions in a confined global community. Although Kant recognizes the 
difficulty of materializing a cosmopolitan ethic, he was enthusiastic about the potential of 
practical reason to resolve problems that are confined by empirical considerations of 
spherical cohabitation.5 As Kant proclaims, “no one can or ought to decide what the 
highest degree may be at which mankind may have to stop progressing, and hence how 
wide a gap may still of necessity remain between the idea and its execution... for this 
depends on freedom [of reason], which can transcend any limit we care to impose.”6 In 
this regard, both Kant and Montaigne believe the creative possibilities of human reason to 
be endless, but disagree whether this infinite human capability can ever reconcile our 
various moral differences.
The aim of using this quotation at the start is not to directly compare and contrast 
Montaigne’s theory with the cosmopolitanism of Kant. The quote was used to give a 
snapshot of the tensions that are usually believed to exist between cultural pluralists and 
cultural relativists on the one hand, and Kantian cosmopolitanism on the other. Although 
historical divisions between versions of cosmopolitanism and these theories exist, I 
believe these tensions have been overestimated in relation to a Kantian form of 
cosmopolitanism. Critics of Kantian cosmopolitanism have articulated a much more 
demanding and imperialistic vision of cosmopolitanism than Kant himself prescribed.
4Ibid„ pg. 108.
5 In many respects Kant’s logic of reason follows the Stoic philosophy of Marcus Aurelius; who states, “i f  
reason is common, so too is law; and if  this is common, then we are fellow citizens. If this is so, we share in 
a kind or organized polity. And if that is so, the world is as it were a city state.” Marcus I, The Meditations. 
(New York, Hackett, 1983), Sect. 14.
Immanuel Kant, “Appendix: Transcendental Logic II, Dialectic, I, Ideas in General,” The Critique of Pure 
Reason. J.M.D. Meiklejohn (trans.), (Colonial Press, New York, 1900), pg. 246. Also found in Reiss. Ibid.. 
pg. 191.
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Contrary to these views, the Kantian model does not advocate the removal of communal 
ties, or the replacement of culture with an ethical rationality beyond human reach. As has 
been suggested in the previous chapters, Kantian cosmopolitanism seeks to create a 
minimal global standard for cosmopolitan law, that not only protects individual human 
worth, but also creates the minimal normative principles necessary to make the peaceful 
coexistence of individuals, associations, cultures, and states, in a pluralistic global society 
possible.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine a cosmopolitan understanding of culture 
and to determine whether contemporary claims from culture necessarily inhibit a Kantian 
vision for cosmopolitan law. By, providing an alternative view of culture, and by 
responding to cultural critics of cosmopolitanism, this chapter will defend a place for 
Kantian cosmopolitan law within contemporary debates about cultural diversity. In the 
broadest sense, the cosmopolitan position I defend in this chapter consists of two related 
parts. The first part seeks to reevaluate the significance of traditional formulations of 
cultural identification and broaden the scope of human interconnectedness. What I mean 
by this, is that the first focus of Kantian cosmopolitanism, and the first section of this 
chapter, is to reevaluate the philosophical merit traditionally attached to cultural 
community. In doing so, this chapter will examine the significance of cultural 
identification, whether culture must be considered as a protected entity, and where the 
boundaries of cultural identification end, if these boundaries end anywhere at all. The 
second focus of this chapter is to provide an alternative perspective on cultural 
communities in discussions of global diversity and to assess whether cultural relativism 
and cultural pluralism necessarily undermine Kant’s cosmopolitan theory.
To understand how the idea of culture fits into Kantian cosmopolitanism, this 
chapter is divided into five sections. In the first section, a brief summary of the critiques 
made against Kantian cosmopolitanism by cultural relativists and cultural pluralists is 
given. The second section then moves from these critiques to a discussion of the 
difficulty involved in delineating cultural boundaries and locating an accurate 
epistemology of culture. Section Three provides a Kantian alternative to contemporary 
claims of culture by providing an alternative cosmopolitan epistemology of culture. The 
fourth section contains two parts. First, a response will be given to the relativist argument
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that humans are constituted by their community and therefore cannot live valuable lives 
without immersion in a culture of meaning and purpose. The second part will further 
examine the claims of cultural relativism by focusing on whether a lack of universal 
morality necessarily makes cosmopolitan law an impossible theory. Section Five moves 
beyond cultural relativism by discussing the role of pluralism in Kantian 
cosmopolitanism, arguing that the Kantian model actually derives rational motivation and 
justification from a notion of plural antagonism. The chapter concludes by reexamining 
the three main propositions of Kantian cosmopolitanism and culture. In that section, I 
outline what a Kantian cosmopolitan perspective entails and recap how cosmopolitanism 
might adequately provide an alternative to contemporary claims from culture. 
Throughout this chapter, my argument is that Kantian cosmopolitanism is not only 
theoretically relevant in contemporary context, but that many cosmopolitan critiques 
from culture only offer practical considerations of coordination and do not necessarily 
render the cosmopolitan perspective incoherent or impossible.
I. Claims from Culture: Cultural Relativism and Cultural Pluralism
Similar to the theory of Montaigne, cultural relativists and pluralists posit three 
general attacks against a Kantian vision for cosmopolitan ethics. These critiques are 
meant to theoretically undermine cosmopolitanism and illustrate the unattractiveness of 
the normative conclusions maintained by Kantian cosmopolitans. First, many relativists 
criticize Kant for ignoring the moral significance of communal belonging. These critics 
argue that Kantian cosmopolitanism is grossly unrealistic in its psychological 
assumptions of the perfectibility of human reason to create universal ethical 
understanding outside, and sometimes in direct contrast to, particular cultural norms and 
practices. The underlining premise of this critique is that individuals need to belong (and 
indeed already belong) to immediate communities of meaning and purpose, without 
which, individuals suffer an existential void of nothingness that fosters psychological and 
sociological instability. In this regard, cosmopolitanism is often accused of demanding a
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“psychological revolution” away from communal embeddedness, thus destroying various 
social allegiances and the order of human meaning provided by those obligations.7
The second criticism suggests that Kantian cosmopolitanism is too demanding a 
form of utopianism that replaces a plurality of meaningful world values with aspirations 
for a universal ideal. This argument, which is generally made by cultural pluralists, 
suggests that the avocation of cosmopolitanism fails to take into account the complexities 
of a world where a plurality of values exist. As some theorists argue, these pluralities of 
stabilizing cultural and ethical perspective are greatly jeopardized by the “nightmarish
o
hegemony of cosmopolitanism” that seeks to override the meaningful plurality of 
differing communities. Within this argument is the underlining principle of cultural 
pluralism, that conflicting conceptions of the good are a real aspect of humanity, and 
should be accounted for in political schemes which threaten this diversity and the 
corresponding right to various forms of self-determination.
The third criticism comes from conventionalist cultural relativism and is an 
extension of the aforementioned critique. Cultural relativists often maintain that Kantian 
cosmopolitanism seeks to replace a plurality of values in the world with a moral 
universalism that both diminishes the richness of human diversity, but also has the 
aspiration to create a universal world state.9 As Ronald Beiner has described the anti­
cosmopolitan position, “scratch a cosmopolitan and you’ll find an imperialist just below 
the surface.”10 Although Martin Wight has more realist concerns with the cosmopolitan 
ramifications of destabilizing international power balance, he nevertheless illustrates the 
sentiments of relativism. For both Wight and cultural relativists argue that there are no 
universally valid moral principles and that morality must be understood as being relative 
to particular cultures. In this regard, Kantian cosmopolitanism is seen as a destabilizing 
force that ignores the moral conventions of particular cultures and the relative moral 
validity derived from being immersed in those cultural communities.
As with Wight, all three cosmopolitan critiques hold that humans are not perfectly 
reasonable beings, that they have various competing conceptions of the good, that this
7 Ronald Beiner, “Nationalism, Internationalism, and the Naim-Hobsbawn Debate,” Archives for European 
Sociology, XL, I, (1999), pg. 178.
8 Martin Wight, “An Anatomy of International Thought,” Review of International Studies. 13 (1987).
9 Ibid.
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diversity cannot / should not be forced into a hegemonic universal ethic, and that by 
attempting to underscore the moral significance of local communities, cosmopolitans are 
in fact attempting to create an imperialistic utopia. However, for these criticisms to derail 
Kantian cosmopolitanism and render it incoherent, they must show that their arguments 
are not accounted for by cosmopolitan theory. In order to make cosmopolitanism an 
unattractive theory, communitarians must prove that individuals can only derive a 
meaningful existence from one particular culture and that this relationship is so profound 
that culture retains an intrinsic worth that cosmopolitanism necessarily threatens. In 
addition, cultural relativists must show that there is no possibility for cross-cultural ethics 
and that cultures are themselves so morally isolated that cosmopolitan law is impossible. 
Finally, in order for cultural concerns to truly render cosmopolitanism as unfeasible, 
pluralists must show that a plurality of goods in the world actually limit the possibility of 
cosmopolitanism. If appeals from culture are successful in proving these points, then 
cosmopolitanism is indeed in jeopardy. Nevertheless, as this chapter will illustrate, all 
three critiques fail to convince and indeed in some ways strengthen Kant’s argument for 
cosmopolitan law.
II. Some Confusion Regarding Cultural Communities and Identity
Before discussing the role of culture in Kantian cosmopolitanism, it is necessary 
to highlight a central and immediate problem that all discussions of culture face. The 
problem is in discovering what a cultural community is and how we should understand 
the value of culture in political theory. One of the principle concerns of a cosmopolitan 
approach is the way in which this question is answered. In many respects, it seems that 
there is little agreement or accepted approach to the idea of communal identity and 
culture. However, despite this lack of common definition and understanding, many 
theories of multiculturalism, communitarianism, cultural pluralism, nationalism, realism, 
cultural relativism, individualism, liberalism, and cosmopolitanism, discuss community 
and culture as if they are self-evident entities.11 Contemporary political theory is rife with
10 Beiner, ]oc. cit.
11 This is certainly true with communitarian theorists, but is also evident within liberal movements, 
particularly with John Rawls and Will Kymlicka, who base their theories of justice on the assumption that
127
claims for cultural self-determination and with normative proscriptions premised on the 
assumption of clearly delineated cultural identities.12 As Seyla Benhabib has suggested, 
“culture has became a ubiquitous synonym for identity, an identity marker and 
differentiator.”13 Benhabib has termed this oversimplified epistemology as a reductionist 
sociology o f culture and suggests that many contemporary discussions of culture are 
based on three faulty assumptions about cultural entities: (1) that cultures are clearly 
delineable wholes; (2) that all individuals have some kind of culture and a description of 
that culture is possible; and that (3) subgroup variants pose no important problems in the 
formation of cultural identities.
It is an underlining theme within this chapter that the complexities between 
culture and identity is a difficult, if not impossible, relationship to understand and is not 
as self-evident as has been traditionally assumed. In addition, there are serious 
implications in assuming a reductionist sociology o f  culture. As Terence Turner 
maintains, we “risk essentializing the idea of culture as the property of an ethnic group or 
race; it risks reifying cultures as separate entities by overemphasizing their boundedness 
and distinctiveness; it risks overemphasizing the internal homogeneity of cultures in 
terms that potentially legitimize repressive demands for communal conformity; and by 
treating cultures as badges of group identity, it tends to fetishize them in ways that put 
them beyond the reach of critical analysis.”14 Even if there were an ability to recognize 
the existence of distinct cultural entities through scientific observation, as some scholars 
maintain,15 what is there to suggest that we would also be able to understand their 
epistemological complexities over time? As Michael Waltzer suggests, cultural
communities are closed and bounded. As Yael Tamir suggests, “most liberals are liberal nationalists.” The 
implication I am trying to suggest is that most modem theories utilize arguments from community or 
culture without analyzing what these “things” actually are. It is in this section that I attempt to understand 
these “things” better. For more on Tamir’s critique, see Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism. (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1993). See page 139 for above comment. For a more extensive discussion 
regarding the assumption of cultural entities, see R. Grillo, Pluralism and the Politics of Difference: State. 
Culture and Ethnicity in Comparative Perspective. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
12 For a snapshot of contemporary debates around culture and some of the key scholars involved, see Paul 
Kelly (ed.), Multiculturalism Reconsidered. (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2002).
13 Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era. (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2002), pg. 2.
14 Terence Turner, “Anthropology and Multiculturalism: What is Anthropology and What Multiculturalists 
should be Mindful of?” Cultural Anthropology. 8 (no. 4), pg. 411-29.
15 For a greater discussion regarding ideas of culture and identity see, Charles Geertz, The Interpretation of 
Cultures. (New York, 1973) and E. Hatch, Theories of Man and Culture. (New York, 1973).
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communities are in constant change and flux, making a consistent knowledge of those 
groups difficult.16 In this regard, the first concern for cosmopolitanism is with 
understanding exactly what is meant when theorists appeal to culture and whether or not 
these appeals are consistent enough to restrict the limits of normative ethics in relation to 
cosmopolitan law.
So how has culture been historically defined? Classical definitions suggest that 
cultural communities represent and embody some form of identifiable group cohesion
1 <7
which is manifested through various combinations of common language, a desire for a 
common homeland, racial similarities, communal ethics,18 common rituals,19
9 0  91nationality, collective memories, ethnic similarities, common religion, shared history
99and / or shared mission. Many anthropologists understand culture as something 
interpreted through group practice that can be positively identified through group rites,
9^myths and rituals of belonging. Some multiculturalists have attempted to define cultural 
community as something intuitively perceived in historical context, where cultural 
communities are groups that can be understood as exhibiting shared lives.24 Others, 
understanding the difficulties of definition have suggested a more flexible classification 
for cultural community that is based on the notion of group recognition, where social
16 Michael Waltzer, “Pluralism: A Political Perspective,” in Will Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights o f Minority 
Cultures. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), pg. 139.
17 For a discussion of language, identity and culture see Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: 
A Report o f Human Knowledge. G. Bennington (trans.), (Minneapolis, University of Minneapolis Press, 
1984).
18 For a relativist discussion of ethics and culture see Emile Durkheim, Ethics and the Sociology of Morals. 
T. Hall (trans.), (Buffalo, Prometheus Books, 1993).
19 For a classic anthropological analysis o f cultural kinship see Claude Levi-Strauss, Elementary Structures 
of Kinship. (Boston, Beacon Press, 1967).
20 For a discussion of culture and nationalism see Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. (Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1983), especially the introduction.
21 For a discussion of the cultural dimension of ethnicity see A.D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations. 
(Oxford, Blackwell, 1986).
22 Although some cultures might contain all o f the aforementioned qualities, all o f the definitions I have 
examined suggest that cultures must contain at least one or more of the aspects outlined above. However, 
there is considerable disagreement between various scholars and each generally occupies their own niche as 
to what aspects of culture are o f critical importance. However, the plethora of views does suggest one fact, 
that whatever culture is, it is many things and that it is not easily understood.
23 For a discussion of ethnography and methodology see Alfred Kroeber, Anthropology. (New York, 
Harcourt Brace, 1948).
24 For an example of this view of cultural definition see, B. Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism. 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2000).
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groups derive their identity not through internal aspects alone, but from their
i j  c
relationships with external groups who acknowledge the existence of that group.
Nevertheless, these distinctions of cultural community are still problematic in that 
they immediately appeal to further internal aspects that are often both essentially 
contestable and subject to problems of infinite regress. What seems to be the consistent 
aspects found within these definitions of cultural community, is the condition that 
individuals within a group believe that they are in fact members of that community and 
that these individuals are somehow distinguishable as belonging to that particular culture. 
In this case, two elements are common between the definitions of cultural community. 1) 
That people identify with one another as members of their respective group and believe 
they share common values of mutual interchange; 2) and that this sense of kinship can be 
identified externally, creating forms of recognition between delineated groups. In the 
broadest sense, a cultural community is usually defined as a group of individuals who 
identify with and derive epistemological meaning from similar values. What makes the 
community an identifiable culture, is that other groups can recognize that these 
individuals maintain some aspects of meaningful mutual interchange and feelings of 
belonging.
However, as was alluded to earlier, understanding what a cultural community is 
and the normative weight political theory should assign to these social groups is difficult, 
since communal values and personal identifications are in a state of constant change and 
flux. In addition, every community, even intolerant communities who force strict 
obedience, have subgroup complexities which make the determination of a cultural 
community's make-up difficult to externally understand, if not impossible. This problem 
is further compounded by the fact that communal identification is fluid and often.contains 
indefinite configurations. It is reasonable to assume that cultural communities have 
complex levels of hierarchical values and that various members can identify with cultural 
aspects that span a large distribution of beliefs and obligations.
25 For a contemporary example of this type of preference for “groups” versus culture see, Iris Marion 
Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990). It is also worth 
mentioning the inherent Hegelian aspect of Young’s preference for identification from external recognition. 
Hegel’s discussion of community identity through recognition of the “other” can be located in Hegel’s The 
Phenomenology of Spirit. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977) especially chapter 4.
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The foregoing points suggest that when focusing on the role of culture in political 
theory, it would be an error to base normative proscriptions on what Benhabib has 
described as a reductionist sociology o f culture. As an alternative, a Kantian 
cosmopolitan approach makes four very different assumptions about culture. The Kantian 
premises have considerable theoretical implications for the understanding of culture and 
the place for culture in political theory. It is in the next section that I will outline four 
Kantian assumptions in relation to the reductionist sociology o f culture.
III. Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology 
and the Cosmopolitan Alternative to the Reductionist Sociology of Culture
As was outlined earlier, a reductionist sociology o f culture is based on three 
assumptions; that cultures are delineable wholes; that all individuals belong to some kind 
of culture and that a description of that culture is possible; and that subgroup variants 
pose no important problems in the formation of cultural identities. In contrast to viewing 
culture in this manner, a Kantian cosmopolitan approach posits four alternative premises.
The first premise of Kantian anthropology is that cultures are already 
cosmopolitan. That is, cultures are indeterminate amalgamations of various influences 
that consist of a multiplicity of allegiances, ideas, beliefs and values. In this sense, a 
culture cannot be assumed as a single bounded entity, but must be viewed as a fluid 
organism that is constantly swayed by converging tides of internal and external
narratives. The boundary of culture is not whole, but blurred and interlocked with
0(\multifarious cultural connections. Although cultural communities display practices of 
kinship and signification, the identification relationships between participants consist of
07both self-affirming and opposing narratives. Many of these narratives originate from 
external sources or through adaptations of traditional ideals. History itself seems to 
suggest as much, since cultures have evolved with, and adapted to, various internal and 
external influences and traditions. It seems rather absurd to suggest that cultures have not
26 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. V. Dowdell (trans.), H. Rudnick (ed.), 
(Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), especially part 2, section E.
27 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement. J. Meredith (trans.), (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1973), 
sect. 83.
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historically developed from various external sources or that they maintain a consistently 
anchored and unified identity.
In relation to the second reductionist assumption that all individuals have some 
kind of culture and that a description of that culture is possible, the cosmopolitan position 
becomes much more complicated. The cosmopolitan would agree that everyone belongs 
to at least one culture, but would disagree that everyone maintains only a single unified 
cultural identity. In this sense, all humans are bom into one culture or another and 
therefore have been influenced by at least one cultural source. However, the 
cosmopolitan does not accept that everyone is confined to a single identity, but that 
humans actually maintain complex identification relationships with various and 
sometimes conflicting cultural sources. This is not to say that an individual cannot 
identify or believe to identify with a dominant cultural source. What is being suggested is 
the rarity of finding singular cultural influences and that most humans maintain complex 
identification relationships. It is not uncommon to hear someone describe themselves as 
being many things, such as a Democratic Sunni Iraqi, an Island Marsh Iraqi Arab, or as 
an African American Christian Conservative. Within each of these signifiers we find 
multifaceted cultural connections and identities, none of which can be easily reduced to 
represent a unified whole.
Complete knowledge of a cultural community is impossible in the sense that we 
cannot empirically know what a cultural community is, only that as a totality, various 
individuals are thought as coordinated together to form a whole. Since individuals are 
made up of a plethora of cultural influences, a description of a cultural community can 
only be understood with the application of metaphysical categories. However, in order to 
suggest such metaphysical categories of community, we also have to assume the existence 
of certain a priori principles for categorical organization. As Kant maintains within the 
Critique o f  Pure Reason, community should be thought of as “a whole divided into it’s 
parts, and since no one of them can be contained under the other, they are thought as 
coordinated with, not subordinated to, each other, and so determining each other, not in 
one direction only, as in a series, but reciprocally, an in an aggregate.” In this sense,
28 The fact that individuals maintain multifaceted cultural connections can be witnessed by the increased 
use of “cosmopolitan ethnographies” and “multi-site” research in contemporary anthropology.
29 Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., pg. 134.
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cultural identity is not understood as prior to and representative of all, but is thought of as 
a possible category of coordinated interests between mutually exclusive parts. These 
reciprocal relationships can only make sense if the individual is seen as the locus of 
cultural meaning in relation to a universal whole. In contrast to the reductionist sociology 
o f culture, Kant makes a distinction between the terms communio (exclusive sharing of 
time and space protected from the outside) and commercium (associations deriving from 
dynamic exchanges and respect between individuals), favoring the use of the second in 
his metaphysical understanding of cultural community.30
The cosmopolitan and multifarious makeup of culture forces a reconsideration of 
cultural identity away from exclusive and unified communal identities to notions of 
individual identification relationships. This has considerable implications for the 
reductionist assumption regarding internal variants and subgroup complexities. Since 
subgroup complexities and their exchanges with various cultural elements play a critical 
role in how cultural communities form, they also create difficult hurdles for claims of 
cultural solidarity. In the Kantian case, we can only assume the category of cultural 
identity if we also assume coordinated influences and reciprocal identities that are 
confirmed and recognized by participating members. In this regard, the category of 
cultural identity becomes transcendentally significant through principles of participation 
and individual representation. If the principles of mutual coordination and coexistence are 
not understood as categorically a priori, then the concept of a unified cultural community 
is incoherent and is replaced by notions of determinism and tyranny. In order to form the 
perception of a “thorough-going community” we cannot design an object of possible 
perception, but must ground the notion of cultural identity on metaphysical principles of 
“mutual interaction and coordination” to which all empirical factors must relate.31
3° Communio is the Latin word for “fortification” and was used by Johann Gottfried Herder in describing 
the exclusivity o f communal identity and language. Commercium on the other hand is the Latin word for 
communal identity formed through respectful communication and exchange. Kant had great concern with 
Herder’s isolationist and “determined” understanding of community. In fact, Kant rarely used Herder’s 
favorite word gemeinschaft (community) preferring the word Gesllschaft (society) in his discussions of 
moral communities. For the Latin translations, see The Oxford Latin Dictionary: Collectors Edition. 
(Norwalk, The Easton Press, 1993). For a discussion on the tension between Herder and Kant see F.M. 
Bernard (ed.), Herder on Social and Political Culture. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969).
31 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pg. 211.
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Nevertheless, many appeals from culture wish to avoid the inherent individualism 
involved in taking a Kantian approach to cultural community. Some argue that culture 
constitutes self-identification and is therefore somehow an entity prior to subjective 
identification that “has to be worth fostering, not as contingent instruments, but for 
themselves." If these types of cultural claims are to be taken seriously in political 
theory, then we must ask important questions regarding the role of culture in. the 
formation of universal ethics and make decisions as to what value we should therefore 
place on normative appeals made from cultural communities. It is in the next section, that 
the cosmopolitan alternative will be applied in response to two arguments made from 
culture. First, a brief response will be given to the argument that humans are constituted 
by their community and therefore cannot live valuable lives without immersion in a 
cultural community of meaning and purpose. Second, a response will be given to the 
relativist argument that morality can only be understood in relation to particular cultures 
and that the idea of universal cosmopolitan ethics is both culturally destructive and 
practically impossible.
IV. Cultural Relativism and the Critique of Kantian Universalism
In the last section, a cosmopolitan alternative to the reductionist sociology o f 
culture was given. From that discussion it was suggested that: (1) Cultures have blurred 
boundaries with indeterminate narratives and influences; (2) That although individuals 
have at least one cultural source, they are not necessarily restricted to a single cultural 
influence and generally identify with a multiplicity of different values; (3) That 
knowledge of a cultural identity is impossible without metaphysical categories based on a 
priori assumptions of mutual coordination; (4) That internal sub-group complexities must 
be understood in relation to these a priori principles before a claim of cultural identity can 
be coherent. However, this epistemology of culture is in direct contrast to many 
contemporary arguments that stress the importance of bounded cultures. Cultural 
relativists, for example, maintain that moral principles are only valid relative to particular 
bounded cultural entities. From this premise, cultural relativists make two claims. The
32 Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments. (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1995), pg. 137.
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first claim is generally called the dependency thesis, which specifies that all moral values 
are constituted from cultural immersion and enculturative conditioning. The second claim 
is often referred to as the diversity thesis and argues that morality varies from culture to 
culture, so that there are no moral principles that can be accepted universally.
A. The Cosmopolitan Response to the Dependency Thesis
The dependency thesis maintains that cultural communities are the source of our 
social nature and constitute our moral beliefs about what makes a good life possible. 
These virtues are derived and transmitted through cultural immersion and have profound 
influence on the reciprocal relationships formed between human beings. Many relativists 
argue that cosmopolitanism fails to capture the value derived from a cultural
• l ' l
community. They have criticized the inherent individualism of cosmopolitanism 
because it neglects “the causal process of enculturative conditioning” and therefore fails 
to account for the fact that cultural communities act as exclusive sources of moral virtue 
and social understanding.34
There are two troubling normative implications that follow from the relativist 
demand that all sources of morality are constituted by causal processes of enculturative 
conditioning. First, the dependency thesis is a literal application of a reductionist 
sociology o f culture, in so far as it holds that morality is dependent on the fact that 
individuals are immersed in a single bounded culture without which they are unable to 
establish meaningful moral lives. As was stated earlier, the claim that cultures are 
bounded entities is not representative of how most cosmopolitans understand cultural 
communities. According to the Kantian epistemology outlined above, cultures maintain 
complex and blurred boundaries with indeterminate narratives and influences. If we hold 
this position as plausible, then it would be an error to understand individuals as 
constituted solely by a single cultural source. In order to account for cultural complexities 
we must understand individuals as having multifarious identification relationships where 
various moral commitments are derived. The claim that individuals must have a single
33 Taylor, op. cit. pg. 127.
34 Melville Herskovits, Cultural Relativism: Perspectives in Cultural Pluralism. F. Herskovits (ed.), (New  
York, Random House, 1972).
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culture in order to form moral lives places tremendous normative purpose on maintaining 
homogeneous ethical beliefs regardless of the ethical principles involved.
Moreover, cosmopolitanism is not suggesting that individuals do not derive moral 
value from their cultural community or that humans should abandon communal 
obligations. This statement would be false since most cosmopolitan theories recognize 
that individuals need access to cultural material in order to form conceptions of the good 
life. Where cosmopolitanism differs greatly from cultural relativists, is in the fact that 
cosmopolitans believe there is nothing to suggest that membership in a single cultural 
community is required in order to form a meaningful life. As Jeremy Waldron has 
argued, cultural material can be found through various cultural sources and these multiple 
sources can both influence and support perfectly rewarding lives. Although cultural 
immersion in a single culture may be what people are circumstantially provided, the 
claim that immersion is necessary for meaningful existence, is by empirical measurement 
questionable. As Waldron states, "the cosmopolitan strategy is not to deny the role of 
culture in the constitution of human life, but to question the assumption that the social 
world divides neatly into particular distinct cultures, one to every community, and the 
assumption that what everyone needs is just one of these entities ~ a single, coherent
 ^c
culture — to give shape and meaning to his life." What the cosmopolitan perspective 
suggests is, that although each individual has an equal ability for a social existence, they 
also have an equal capacity to be an active co-legislator and translator of multifarious 
cultural values and there is no theoretical reason why the need for one automatically 
rule’s out the other.
The second normative concern with the dependency thesis is that causal 
conditioning is not based on any rational human process, but is a purely determined and 
conditioned response to cultural embeddedness. By holding a singular view of moral 
conditioning, cultural relativists dismiss human reason as a possible source of moral 
identification and therefore devalue any imperatives people might develop for holding 
certain universal morals as true. What is troubling with this account, is the level of 
reductionism that relativists assign to their understanding of culture. For cultural
35 Jeremy Waldron, "Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative" in Will Kymlicka (ed.), The 
Rights of Minority Cultures. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), pg. 105.
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relativists are basing normative proscriptions on strict determinism, maintaining that the 
reasons for holding certain moral beliefs are not predicated on any rational criteria, but 
are simply determined by bounded cultural circumstances. However, this conception of 
morality is not entirely convincing, for it seems that cultural norms are often maintained 
and facilitated in context of rational thought and human reasoning. It would seem that if 
there are norms and practices that matter to us, then those practices contain some form of 
rational justification. Although one culture might justify their norms differently than 
another culture, it does not mean that the process of human reasoning in moral 
justification is absent. In this regard, enculturative conditioning can only be part of the 
story, for humans and communal groups take their norms and practices seriously 
precisely because those norms are embedded in a structure of reason and reasoning.
So why do cultural relativists place so much normative weight on the idea of a 
bounded cultural morality? What seems to be the primary concern with the relativist 
critique of cosmopolitanism is the moral focus that cosmopolitanism places on individual 
moral reason versus cultural community. Since all cosmopolitan theories advocate equal 
moral significance to human beings universally, devaluing certain aspects of 
particularism as a source of moral significance, relativism can be seen as a defense of 
communal identification derived from cultural immersion. Generally, relativistic attacks 
contain an existential fear, of an “unencumbered self,”37 where individuals live without a 
sense of immediate community and meaningful purpose. In this regard, many claims 
from culture are based on a fear that cosmopolitanism promotes the idea of individuals as 
isolated rational atoms that are disconnected from social bonds or from other meaningful 
obligations.38 Where the crucial divide between cosmopolitanism and relativism exists, is 
that relativism assigns the role of “enculturative conditioning” to be the source of moral 
importance versus allowing for the creation of moral obligations derived from abstract 
universal principles of reason. Therefore, cultural relativism represents a prominent 
opposition to cosmopolitan ethics, for they directly advocate reductionist schemes of
36 Jeremy Waldron, "What is Cosmopolitan?," The Journal of Political Philosophy. (8), 2, (2000), pg. 239.
37 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982).
38The argument that cosmopolitanism, and liberalism in particular, “atomizes” the individual is best 
expressed by Charles Taylor, “Atomism” in S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, Communitarianism and 
Individualism. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992).
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bounded community versus the more individualist based constructions of universal ethics 
found within cosmopolitanism.
In their insistence for bounded cultural communities, cultural relativists are 
clearly claiming that cultural communities are encapsulated entities that should be 
protected from cosmopolitan ethics. Behind this suggestion, is an implication that any 
devaluing of cultural supremacy results in radical normative shifts that reduce immediate 
communities of meaning and purpose. However, this approach is awkward in relation to 
Kantian cosmopolitanism because it seems to be suggesting that universal principles will 
in-effect make particular cultures less meaningful or reduce feelings of belonging. 
Although we can accept that some cultures are more or less equipped to accommodate the 
necessary changes associated with cosmopolitan ethics, this does not necessarily mean 
that universal principles are inherently anti-communal or will ultimately cause a whole 
culture to disintegrate.
This suggests that there is confusion by cultural relativists regarding what a 
Kantian cosmopolitan approach entails in regard to culture. Kantian cosmopolitanism is 
not suggesting that culture is not valuable in the formation of individual morality, but that 
cultural morality also has a contingent value based on the reasoned beliefs of its 
members. Although scholars discuss things called cultural communities, it seems that it 
can only be at an abstract and generalized level because we cannot define them without 
alluding to the fact that the people within the cultural community identify themselves as 
members or derive meaningful life purpose through some form of cultural participation. 
In this case, cultural communities should not be discussed in terms of inalienable worth 
based on a concept of enculturative conditioning, but must be explored in relation to the 
value derived by the participants of that cultural community. In this case, there is human 
reason behind cultural identification and this rational process should not be dismissed 
simply because reductionist's claim cultural integrity as more important for meaningful 
existence than the reason behind human existence in the first place. For it seems absurd to 
consider a bounded cultural entity as intrinsically good regardless of any good relayed to 
its members.
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B. The Cosmopolitan Response to the Diversity Thesis and the Possibility of 
Universal Ethics
There are two claims, made from the diversity thesis. The first claim is 
anthropologically descriptive and asserts that there are no universally objective morals. 
What follows from this claim is that judgments between cultures cannot be substantially 
made since there is no objective measurement in which to make an appeal. The second 
claim is a proscriptive claim that since we cannot make cross-cultural comparisons 
cultures should therefore be considered to have equal value as entities in themselves. In 
this regard, cultures are to be respected as equally valuable entities and cannot / should 
not be subject to external judgments by other cultural entities.39
What is troubling about the second claim, is that the normative prescription for 
equality of culture is a universal claim in opposition to its own descriptive premise. If we 
are unable to make judgments because each culture is relative only onto itself, then how 
can cultural relativists make the normative assertion that cultures are to be held equally 
valuable in relation to one another. Surely this qualifies as a universal standard of 
measurement. If the descriptive claim is correct, then the implication is that the 
proscriptive claim made by cultural relativists lacks merit. In this regard, there is an 
inherent conflict between its descriptive, proscriptive, and anti-universal claims.
Moreover, the descriptive component of the diversity thesis and its assertion that 
Kantian cosmopolitanism fails because of a lack of universal morality is not without its 
own inherent confusion. The fact that there is no universal moral code does not mean that 
there cannot be equally recognized morals. In addition, the entire cosmopolitan project 
exists exactly for the reason that there is a lack of universal ethics in the world. In this 
regard, cosmopolitans accept the notion that there is not a universal morality as a matter 
of fact, but reject the idea that universally recognized ethics is necessarily impossible. For 
Kantian cosmopolitanism to be impossible, the cultural relativist would have to prove this 
impossibility, otherwise cosmopolitan ethics only has practical coordination problems 
and not problems that are necessarily theoretical roadblocks.
39 Herskovits, toe. cit.
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Furthermore, a relativist perspective that cultural communities are bounded 
entities that need to be protected from external influence and judgment seems to 
contradict the reality of cultural transiency. The fact that cultural relativists complain that 
Kantian cosmopolitan principles, in effect, reduce the bonds of cultural groups, is 
nevertheless, not truly representative of how groups evolve, interconnect, share traditions 
and assimilate into other cultures. As Jeremy Waldron suggests, “people have always 
lived in a kaleidoscope of culture, moving freely amongst the products of innumerable 
cultural traditions.”40 Charles Westin agrees with this when he argues that, "cultures are 
not rigid monoliths given once and for all, but are receptive and responsive ways of 
constructing meaning, continuously battered by requirements to change and develop, and 
by counter-forces stressing ideals of purism, opposing newfangled expressions and
••41interpretations.
History itself shows this vision of culture to be correct, for massive cross-cultural 
pollination has taken place throughout the chronology of human existence. As Chandran 
Kukathas states, "the fact that in the history of interaction people have been able to 
understand each other sufficiently to trade, immigrate, and intermarry suggests a 
substantial commonality amongst peoples.”42 As was suggested before, the main tenant 
of Kantian cosmopolitanism is the belief that cultural communities are largely already 
cosmopolitan. What was meant by this suggestion, is that cultural communities have 
historically evolved along side other groups, thus assimilating, emulating and infusing 
with the various ethical perspectives of their neighbors. As history has shown, groups 
often borrow, steal and copy the more successful aspects of other cultural communities. 
Furthermore, cultural communities often fuse with one another, to the point that 
distinctions are no longer visible or believed, thus creating new cultural formations.
A Kantian cosmopolitan concern is that individuals often identify with their 
cultural and communal obligations. Therefore, its task is to assess whether this cultural 
identification prohibits the acceptance of any form of cosmopolitan law. As Waldron has
40 Jeremy Waldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative,” University of Michigan Journal 
of Law Reform. 25. (1992). pg. 782.
41 Charles Westin, "Temporal and Spatial Aspects of Multiculturality", in R. Baubock and J. Rundell (eds.), 
Blurred Boundaries: Migration. Ethnicity. Citizenship. (Aldershot. Ashgate. 19981. pg. 61.
42 Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom. (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2003), pg. 66.
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suggested of a Kantian position, “we are always likely to find ourselves alongside others 
who we disagree with” and it is this reality that supports the cosmopolitan philosophy 
that some sort of mechanisms for peaceful coexistence should be considered.43 In 
addition, humans have lived “side by side, clustered together in circumstances where they 
simply have to deal with one another, wherever the initial disparity between their views 
of justice, morality and right.”44 Although historically cultural communities have engaged 
in conflicts that end in bloody and violent war; they have also figured out ways to coexist 
next to, and tolerate, various associations and communities. It is from the reality of an 
ability for mutual cohabitation that cultures can in fact share common goals of security 
and right; and that they can agree to, fuse, change, evolve and coordinate ethical 
principles. It is from this ideal of agreed coexistence based on cosmopolitan law that 
Kantian cosmopolitans peg their hopes for the emergence of a normative ethical 
cosmopolitan order.
Thus, Kantian cosmopolitanism is not suggesting that local obligations should be 
universally abandoned or that a universal morality exists. What Kantian cosmopolitanism 
is suggesting, is that existing cultural communities are not to be considered as bounded 
entities containing the pure source of human morality. The point of cosmopolitanism on a 
whole is that human beings are living in a world of human beings and only incidentally 
are members of community organizations. Furthermore, those organizations are simply 
creations of many different factors that have historically evolved from indeterminate 
amalgamations. Given the possibility for cultural normative shifts, it is not impossible to 
imagine various levels of subjective obligation and identification, one of which could be 
cosmopolitan law. As has been suggested by Kant, just because a theory has a degree of 
difficulty does not mean that it cannot be achieved, but simply that there will be 
complications involved in the effort to achieve it.45
43 Waldron, “What is Cosmopolitan?,” op. cit., pg. 240-241.
44 Ibid, pg. 241.
45 Kant, “On the Common Saying: This may be True in Theory but it does not Apply in Practice,” in H. 
Reiss, op. cit.. pg. 61-92.
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V. Coexist versus Cohere: Kantian Cosmopolitanism and Cultural Pluralism
A common critique of Kantian cosmopolitanism is that the world consists of a 
plurality of incommensurable cultural goods and that these antithetical perspectives 
restrict the idea of universal ethics. Cultural pluralism suggests that since a plurality of 
viewpoints exist, various cultural communities will lack the motivation to accept 
cosmopolitan principles. The question cultural pluralists often ask cosmopolitanism is; 
why would a cultural community give up their notion of the good life for some imported 
perspective? In addition, if some viewpoints are in drastic opposition, then how could a 
bridge be forged between these incommensurable differences?
A Kantian response is to accept the cultural pluralist premise, but deny the 
conclusion. In other words, the very fact that various conceptions of the good exist, does 
not mean that minimal ethical foundations cannot be formed. In contrast, Kant believed 
that the motivation behind the creation of cosmopolitan law was because there is a 
necessity to adjudicate disagreement between cohabitants of a spherically bounded world. 
In this sense, pluralism provides the rational motivation behind the creation of 
cosmopolitan law. Brian Barry summed up this Kantian notion when he wrote, "the very 
fact of irresolvable disagreement over the nature of the good life, once we get beyond the 
basics, is itself a premise in the argument for liberal institutions. For, in the face of these 
disagreements, what we need is a fair way of adjudicating between conflicting demands 
that they give rise to."46
If we conceive of Kantian cosmopolitan law as concerned with the rightful 
existence of various cultures, then cosmopolitanism is not a revolutionary threat to 
various communities, but serves as an attempt to facilitate coexistence. Although 
communitarians are correct in their claims that a cosmopolitan order will, in some 
psychological sense, result in a normative mental shift, this does not necessarily mean 
that this normative change has to be destructively revolutionary and sudden 47 The goal of
46 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality. (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2001), pg. 263.
47 History provides vivid examples of "revolutionary" changes in ethical belief that did not result in massive 
upheaval and destruction of social and ethical structures. The peaceful "revolutions" in the former Eastern 
European states are an excellent example of normative shifts in ethical thought that did not weaken social 
cohesion, but in fact strengthened communal obligation and normative order. For a good discussion of the 
nonviolent normative shift in East Europe, see Jan Pakulski's, East European Revolutions and Legitimacy
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Kantian cosmopolitanism should not be advocated as a method of radical universalism at 
the cost of plurality. How Kantian cosmopolitanism should be understood, is as an 
attempt to come to terms with the plurality of various societies in some sort of minimally 
recognized framework of cosmopolitan law. In other words, we should not view Kantian 
cosmopolitanism as utopian imperialism, but as a conception for seeking peaceful global 
coexistence through the utilization of jurisprudence and constitutional coordination. This 
coordination should be understood as being the result of a genuine consensus and 
understanding for hospitable coexistence, and not understood as philosophical 
imperialism aimed to subvert natural order by demanding violent psychological shifts.
However, those who make appeals for the respect of a plurality of cultures are 
still extremely skeptical of Kantian cosmopolitanism. For many, the cosmopolitan project 
is not about coexistence, but about moral cohesion, that is, about moving human beings 
toward a universal and hegemonic ethic that denies plural differences and various forms 
of life. Nevertheless, this view of Kant is mistaken. It is not how Kant believed humans 
actually existed or how we naturally evolve. As will be shown below, Kant's justification 
for cosmopolitan law was not only to adjudicate disagreement, but to provide an 
environment where disagreements could continue the evolution of humanity without the 
murderous effects witnessed throughout history.
The best expression of Kantian pluralism is discovered in what would initially 
seem an unlikely work. In the Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, 
Kant outlines several propositions relating to human nature and how we might understand 
a unified human purpose. Within this essay, Kant maintains that human evolution is not 
situated in the reason of one human being or the collective reason of a single society, but 
is only reasonably understood as having purpose when derived from the entire human 
species. As Kant claims, "accordingly, every individual man would have to live for a vast 
length of time if he were to make complete use of all his natural capacities; or if nature 
has fixed only a short term for each man's life, then it will require a long, perhaps 
incalculable series of generations, each passing on its enlightenment to the next, before 
the germs implanted by nature in our species can be developed to that degree which
Crisis, in J. Frentzel-Zagorska (ed.), From One Party State to Democracy (Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1993), pg. 
67-87.
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corresponds to nature’s original intention."48 For Kant, culture was not the product of one 
individual, or a series of individuals, but was produced by mankind as a whole. If a 
diversity of culture is to have a historical purpose for humanity, it must be thought as also 
having a universal purpose for humanity. However, for this idea of universal purpose to 
be rendered practically coherent, political circumstances ought to be organized according 
to universally valid laws which mirror the ideal.
In some regards, the Kantian idea of a cosmopolitan purpose can be related to 
John Stuart Mill’s concept of experiments in living. In both cases, a minimal framework 
of law is meant to provide an environment where competing perspectives could be 
reasoned through and tested socially. The importance for this exchange of ideas was that 
it continued the evolutionary progression of humanity. Like Kant, Mill believed that 
disagreement was the necessary spark plug for human enlightenment and for the 
promotion of the species. It is through an open forum of debate that humankind could 
partake in various experiments in living, constantly reforming and reevaluating better 
ways of living. As suggested by Kant, "Nature should thus be thanked for fostering social 
incompatibility... Without [this], all man's excellent natural capacities would never be 
roused to develop."49 Nevertheless, like Kant, Mill understood that disagreement left 
alone and unchecked would led to violent restrictions of reason and liberty, thus 
threatening the major mechanism from which all conclusions of living are derived. For 
both Kant and Mill, the lawless limiting of reason also limited the ability to exchange our 
experiments and would ultimately cause human progress to stall. As Kant himself 
maintains, "this purpose can be fulfilled only in a society which has not only the greatest 
freedom, and therefore a continual antagonism among its members, but also the most 
precise specification and preservation of the limits of this freedom in order that it can 
coexist with the freedom of others."50 Kant's cosmopolitan purpose in this sense, is an 
educational process in both our private and social lives, that seeks to limit prejudices
48 Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," in Reiss, op. cit., pg. 42.
49 Ibid.. pg. 45.
50 Ibid.
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which might prevent the discovery of better methods for furthering the human 
experiment.51
Therefore, the pluralist assumption that Kant seeks to create a single utopian 
culture is not what Kant suggested. What Kant advocates is a minimal legal framework 
that allows for a plurality of various forms of life to coexist. Cosmopolitan law was 
sought not only for Kant’s perpetual peace project, but to create an intellectual 
environment from which humanity could continue to evolve and adapt. The Kantian 
metaphysical ideal of history cannot alone command the universal respect of others, but 
merely illustrates that if external freedom is to be understood as having a human purpose, 
it should only be restricted in accordance with universal principles of right. In this case, 
what is needed is "a constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in 
accordance with laws which ensure that the freedom of each can coexist with the freedom 
of all the other."52
VI. Kantian Cosmopolitanism and Diversity
The chapter began with a discussion contrasting Kantian cosmopolitanism and 
Montaigne's cultural relativism. In that discussion, I suggested that Kant and Montaigne 
both believed the creative possibilities of human reason to be endless, however disagreed 
whether this infinite human capability could ever reconcile our various moral differences. 
The disagreement between Montaigne and Kant pertains, not to the idea that human 
reason acted as the basis for cultural morality, but to the degree to which the infinitive 
scope of human reason has to create antithetical and incommensurable cultural 
differences. The purpose of this chapter has been to argue that the cosmopolitan 
epistemology of culture is a viable alternative in contemporary concerns for cultural 
diversity. Although the chapter did not offer a complete analysis of the relationship 
between culture and Kantian cosmopolitanism, it hopefully demonstrated that cultural 
relativism and cultural pluralism do not provide inherent restrictions on the possibility of 
cosmopolitan law.
51 Kant also discusses this at great length in, "An Answer to the Question; What is Enlightenment?," in 
Reiss, op. cit., pg. 55.
52 Ibid.. 46. & 52.
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By trying to defend Kantian cosmopolitanism I have recommended some 
grounding for an alternative approach to culture in global theory. The cosmopolitan 
approach that I have suggested consists of three theoretical propositions for continued 
discussions within culture, cosmopolitan law and political theory.
First, cultural communities are already cosmopolitan. What this means, is that 
cultural communities are fluid amalgamations of various cultural influences and 
obligations. Cultures are therefore not the bounded entities that many claims from culture 
assume. They are categorical shapes that are in a constant process of creation and 
reformation. In this regard, (1) Cultures have blurred boundaries with indeterminate 
narratives and influences. (2) Although individuals have at least one cultural source, they 
are not necessarily restricted to a single cultural influence and generally identify with a 
multiplicity of different values. (3) Knowledge of a cultural identity is impossible without 
metaphysical categories based on a priori assumptions of mutual coordination. (4) 
Internal sub-group complexities must be understood in relation to these a priori principles 
before a claim of cultural identity can be coherent.
Second, although humans share a need for cultural material in order to form 
meaningful moral lives, they also identify with a multiplicity of cultural influences and 
can derive perfectly rewarding lives from multifarious cultural sources.53 As Waldron 
has suggested, people maintain and are able to adapt to "a variety, a multiplicity of 
different and perhaps disparate communal allegiances."54 What this suggests is that the 
relativist dependency thesis that humans must be immersed in a single culture of meaning 
and purpose in order to live rewarding moral lives is empirically suspect. It seems 
reasonable to assume that both individuals and communities adapt to new influences and 
that members often maintain multilevel obligations and identification relationships. 
Furthermore, the fact that humans maintain multifarious cultural identities supports the 
Kantian notion that cosmopolitan law is not an idealistic impossibility, but a theoretically 
plausible alternative. Although it is true that we often inherit norms from our social 
environment, it is also true that these traditions are constantly in a state of metamorphosis . 
between external and internal cultural influences. Given the possibility for multifarious
53 John W. Cook, Morality and Cultural Differences. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999), pg. 156.
54 Waldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative,” in W. Kymlicka, op. cit., pg. 110.
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cultural identities, it is not impossible to imagine various levels of subjective obligation 
and identification, one of which could be cosmopolitan law.
Third, cultural pluralism and Kantian cosmopolitansim are not necessarily 
incompatible. Cosmopolitan law does not deny the existence of a plurality of possible 
conflicting cultural goods, but suggests that these conflicting goods should be organized 
under a cosmopolitan framework that allows for adjudication through minimal ethical 
principles. The fact that a plurality of communal interests exist, supports the Kantian 
claim that cosmopolitan law is a viable alternative to adjudicate global disagreements. It 
seems that contemporary political philosophy is wrestling with the problem of diversity 
and coexistence in an increasingly interdependent world. Kantian cosmopolitanism 
strives to answer the question of how a diverse world can coexist freely and peacefully. 
In this regard, cosmopolitan law is not a denial of cultural diversity and pluralism, but an 
offered solution. For Kant, the solution is to provide human beings with a political 
environment that supports the coexistence of various cultural identities, without the 
demand for homogenous and bounded cultural entities.
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Chapter Five
Kantian Distributive Justice 
and the Capability for Effective Autonomy
“Modem constitutions owe their existence to a conception found in modem natural law 
according to which citizens come together voluntarily to form a legal community o f free 
and equal consociates.” - Jurgen Habermas
Introduction
Contained in the quote above is a principle inherent to the contractarian tradition, 
whereby constitutions numerate the rights individuals must grant one another if they want 
to socially cooperate under an order of universal positive law. In this regard, the modem 
constitution becomes the instantiation of cooperative moral law. The modem constitution 
translates moral law to positive law which is meant to both reflect the beliefs of 
individual participants, but also to secure these individual freedoms by a commitment to 
equal and universal obligation. However, implicitly lurking within the quote is a 
conception of universal justice. In other words, these rights are mutually granted to 
individuals on some formulated understanding of social cooperation and this 
understanding rests on a conception of justice. Furthermore, in order to formulate how 
benefits and burdens are to be fairly allocated in connection to a conception of social 
cooperation we would also need to understand which normative principles this 
distribution is ultimately concerned to protect. The question would have to be asked by 
any participating member; who should have rights, who should have duties, and who 
owes what to whom? It would seem that John Rawls located this contractarian concern 
correctly when he suggested that, “the first virtue of a scheme of social cooperation is a 
mutually agreed conception of justice.”1
The purpose of this chapter is to examine Kantian justice and to develop some 
primary normative principles of distributive justice necessary for a cosmopolitan 
constitution. In other words, my goal is to discover, outline and argue for normative 
principles of distributive justice that would be consistent with Kant’s discussion of justice 
and his outline for a cosmopolitan constitution. Nevertheless, it should be stated from the
1 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. (Harvard, Harvard University Press, 1971), pg. 5.
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start that I will by no means provide all the normative substance of Kantian distributive 
justice. This chapter is only an attempt to understand some of the primary elements 
implicit in Kant’s discussion of justice and relate them to a consistent construction of 
cosmopolitan distributive justice. Through an examination of Kantian justice and an 
extrapolation of his theory, this chapter will argue that Kantian autonomy demands robust 
normative principles of distributive justice and that these principles should be moral 
considerations for human capabilities within a formulation of a Kantian based 
cosmopolitan constitution.
The chapter is comprised of four sections, each dedicated to examining the 
distributive principles required by a possible scheme of Kantian cosmopolitan justice. 
The first section will explore Kantian principles of justice and attempt to relate Kant’s 
concern with freedom to normative principles of distribution. In the second section, the 
concept of Kantian social welfare and distributive justice will be analyzed in order to 
show a strong relationship between Kantian freedom, human autonomy and social justice. 
The third section will compare the concept of effective autonomy to Martha Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach, arguing that her capabilities approach provides the basic normative 
requirements necessary for Kantian autonomy. In the fourth section, a brief association is 
made between Kantian justice and his cosmopolitan theory, outlining how his normative 
principles for human autonomy translate into a concern for global justice.
I. Normative Principles of Kantian Distributive Justice
What is Kant’s concept of justice? It would seem that any attempt to understand 
Kantian cosmopolitanism in relation to schemes of distributive justice would have to 
begin by resolving this question first. Furthermore, since Kant does not fully develop a 
theory of distributive justice, it would make sense to examine any construction of Kantian 
social distribution in light of his overall theory of justice. By understanding the primary 
normative concern within Kant’s works, it will help guide the further extrapolation of a 
Kantian conception of distributive justice. This section examines four areas of Kantian 
justice: A. Kant’s conception of freedom and justice; B. Kantian civil justice; C. Some 
implications of civil justice for distributive schemes; D. The idea of effective autonomy
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and the normative concern of distributive justice. By exploring these four subjects, I wish 
to make the argument that Kantian justice requires normative principles of distributive 
justice which focus on the individual ability to effectively translate self-law into a 
hypothetical kingdom o f ends? In order to provide an environment for effective 
autonomy, it will be argued that Kant’s theory of justice demands a fairly robust 
distributive scheme. It will be in section three that a further outline of these normative 
principles in comparison with contemporary discussions involving capability theory will 
be provided.
A. Freedom and Justice
The concept of freedom is the pivotal concern in Kant’s philosophy of justice. As 
we have seen in Chapter One, freedom of the will becomes a necessary condition for 
continued social freedom, for individuals can only self-legislate the moral law if they are 
unrestricted by external constraints. In which case, the overall concept of Kantian 
freedom maintains two related aspects: negative freedom, or the capacity to act 
independently of external restraint; and positive freedom, the “property of the will to be a 
law onto itself.” It is through the aspect of positive freedom that individuals subject 
themselves voluntarily to moral law by legislating it for themselves. The capability to 
self-legislate is the power to be morally autonomous and is what Kant maintains as the 
ultimate source of human dignity.
Nevertheless, there is a further distinction within Kant’s conception of freedom 
that should be discussed if we are to understand what Kantian justice requires. The 
distinction is between what Kant called internal and external freedom. Some scholars 
argue that negative and positive freedom is synonymous with Kant’s definition of internal 
and external freedom. However, this assumption is incorrect and the distinctions are 
important to delineate in order to understand the complex philosophy of Kant. Although 
the distinctions are closely related, they nevertheless have different implications.
2 The kingdom of ends is a metaphysical ideal “of every rational being as one who must regard himself as 
legislating universal law by all will’s maxims... [in] a systematic union of different rational beings through 
common laws... according to universal validity.” Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of 
Morals. J. Ellington (trans.), (Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Co., 1993), pg. 39..
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The concept of internal freedom is comprised of both positive and negative 
freedom, for the term directly relates to an individuals psychological / physiological 
ability to have an independent free will and, in return, autonomously create self- 
motivating law. Internal freedom is purely cognitive and is Kant’s response to both 
Michel De Montaigne’s social determinism and David Hume’s psychological empiricism. 
Conversely, external freedom is concerned with self-legislation in relation to an 
individuals social context and the ability to co-legislate in the kingdom o f ends. In regard 
to external freedom, negative and positive freedom have different implications, for 
negative freedom is meant as an absence of external “lawless” coercion,4 while positive 
freedom is concerned with how the autonomous will can be translated to the co-legislated 
general united will. In the Kantian model of justice, negative freedom (both internal and 
external) is a necessary condition of positive freedom (both internal and external), 
because individuals can only set the moral law for themselves if they are free from 
“lawless” restrictions.
As a result, internal freedom is related primarily to Kant’s ethical discussions 
(autonomous self-law), whereas external freedom is the main focus of Kant’s theory of 
justice (equal autonomy within a kingdom of ends).5 It is through Kant’s discussions of 
external freedom, based on the assumption of internal freedom, that he claims a necessity 
to secure public right and “the restriction of each individual’s freedom so that it
3 Ibid.. pg. 49.
4 A distinction between lawful and lawless coercion should be made. For Kant, the principle of justice 
determines what is the legitimate lawful use o f coercion and what is lawless coercion (Kant also calls 
lawless coercion “violence”). Since civil law is a matter of coercion, Kant believed any coercion that does 
not conform to the a priori ideal of justice is “lawless violence” and a direct violation of external freedom. 
Nevertheless, lawful coercion based on principles of justice, which is the subject o f co-legislation of wills, 
is therefore what justice requires in order to maintain everyone’s “rightful” external freedom. Immanuel 
Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals. M. Gregor (ed.), (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), pg. 
113-118.
5 Internal freedom is usually associated with Kant’s critical philosophy as found in the three critiques, 
whereas external freedom is usually associated with Kant’s political theory or with areas of transitional 
overlap from his critical concerns (free will) to his political (autonomy). As Kant, I assume that internal 
freedom (free will) is possible, focusing on external freedom for the rest o f this chapter. It is also worth 
noting that internal and external freedom are synonymous with autonomy, for they both relate the 
formulation of ends in relation external forces. In most cases, when I discuss external freedom, I am also 
suggesting the possibility of autonomy and vice versa. For a more detailed discussion of Kant’s nuance use 
of autonomy see Karl Amerik, Kant and the Fate of Autonomy. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2000), pg. 1-66.
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harmonizes with the freedom of everyone else.”6 As has been discussed in previous 
chapters, Kant’s wider conception of justice is based largely on his principle of right, 
where “the sum total of those conditions within the will of one person can be reconciled 
with the will of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom.”
So what is Kant’s conception of justice? From the short discussion above, we can 
understand Kantian justice as an attempt to facilitate a civil society where autonomous 
agents can socially coexist in accordance with universal freedom, which is for Kant, the 
property of co-legislation and the voluntary subjugation to moral laws legislated by 
themselves. Kant himself sets out to answer the question of justice when he proclaims, 
“what else, then, can freedom of the will be but autonomy, i.e. the property that the will
Q
has of being a law unto itself.” Therefore, for Kant, justice is “a systematic union of 
different rational beings through common laws”9 which have been determined as 
universally valid through autonomous reflection (internal freedom) and cooperative co­
legislation (external freedom).
The implications of Kant’s theory of justice are considerable and a few 
clarifications might aid in the further development of distributive principles. First, the 
concept of internal and external freedom is an individualist construct. This is obvious in 
the fact that Kant’s concern is not with how social morality determines human morality, 
but with how social morality is to be legitimated or invented through autonomous 
reflection and social co-legislation. Second, the concept of right is an egalitarian 
principle, since it affirms the equal restriction of everyone’s external freedom in order to 
promote more equal external freedom. Since autonomy is the ultimate source of human 
dignity, Kant maintains that freedom must be equally respected, and as a result, equally 
guaranteed for everyone. Third, the concept of justice is universal, since it demands the 
universal restriction of freedom in order to maximize an equal external freedom for 
everyone, in all places and at all times. Fourth, Kant’s theory of justice is an a priori ideal 
for public right and is meant to provide the normative grounding to which all external
6 Kant, Immanuel, “On the Common Saying: This may be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in 
Practice,” in H. Reiss (ed.), Kant’s Political Writings. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970), pg. 
73.
7 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 24.
8 Kant, Groundine for the Metaphysics of Morals, loc. cit.
9 Ibid. pg. 39.
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laws are to be legislated. In this regard, Kantian justice is meant to provide the a priori 
categorical standard that all external legislation is to be held accountable.10 Fifth, the 
main function of civil authority is to maintain the rule of law, protect the rights of its 
subjects and to legislate civil laws in accordance with the principle of justice. All of these 
principles and definitions express essentially the same thought, “that justice is a condition 
in which each individual’s external freedom is restricted so as to make it consistent with 
the freedom of all others in the framework of a common law or system of laws.”11
Nevertheless, Kantian justice takes on further dimensions in relation to external 
freedom. Kant’s discussion of justice is divided into two subdivisions, civil justice and 
criminal justice. Both divisions relate directly with external freedom in that they address 
the relationship between autonomous individuals and social cooperation. However, for 
the purposes of this chapter, it is the realm of civil justice where exploration of 
distributive justice is meaningful.
B. Civil Justice and Kant’s Distributive Vagueness
Civil justice is itself a complex assortment of concepts, but can be reduced to 
three forms, protective, commutative and distributive. Protective justice relates directly to 
negative freedom and the cooperative role of securing equal protection under equal 
rights. Commutative and distributive justice are concerned more with aspects of positive 
freedom, or with securing a person's freedom to do certain things within a social 
environment. All forms relate directly to Kant’s broader use of justice, namely, how to 
distinguish rightful external freedom from the “lawless” freedom found within the state
1 9of nature. With this in mind, both protective and commutative justice are regarded as 
private rights (rights held by individuals that can be secured through one on one 
relations), whereas distributive justice is what Kant believes to be public right (right held 
by individuals only under civil condition). The distinction between private and public 
right is defined by the possibility of universal external freedom. This is because
!° I expand upon this idea in section II, where I discuss Kant’s principle o f  publicity.
11 Allen Rosen, Kant’s Theory of Justice. (Ithica, Cornell University Press, 1993), pg. 9.
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protective and commutative justice can be found (albeit in extremely limited form) within 
the state of nature, whereas distributive justice can only be possible within a civil 
condition. For Kant, the only way to guarantee all three forms of justice is within a civil 
condition of justice, although limited forms of protective and commutative schemes are 
possible in the state of nature.
Although Kant arranges the three forms of justice in complicated fashion, the first 
two concepts are easily understood. Protective justice is the idea of equal security under 
equal rights and “the restriction of each individual’s freedom so that it harmonizes with 
the freedom of everyone else.”13 In this regard, protective justice is concerned directly 
with equal protection from physical harm or from other acts of “lawless” coercion. Kant 
believed that individuals could form limited protective schemes in the state of nature, but 
that only within a civil society could negative freedom (absence of violent coercion and 
“lawless” threat) and therefore the possibility for external freedom, be ultimately secured 
for everyone.
Commutative justice is directly related to Kant’s concept of external freedom, 
where individuals can relate their autonomous self-law to “binding” social obligations. 
Kant maintained that within the state of nature, individuals could form limited schemes of 
cooperative interchange, where basic contracts could be secured between one individual 
and another (or small groups), and where some obligations could therefore be considered 
as morally binding. Nevertheless, Kant maintains that without universal cooperation and 
equal enforcement from all trading members, schemes of commutative justice in the state 
of nature will quickly disintegrate back to warlike anarchy.14 It is therefore only in a
12 As I suggested before, the Kantian definition of justice is a metaphysical a priori ideal and is meant to 
provide the normative grounding to which all external laws are to be both legislated and considered as 
promoting greater external freedom. I discuss this process further in section II.
13 Kant, “On the Common Saying: This may be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice,” in Reiss, 
loc. cit.
14 Kant uses an example of buying a horse to illustrate the problem. Kant states that a right is established to 
an “acquisition” [the horse] through the “formalities of the exchange between” the buyer and seller. 
However, this exchange represents only rights granted between individuals and not to the ownership of the 
horse, since there is no formal way to protect ownership from a third party claim. Kant suggests that “no 
trade in external things, no matter how well it may agree with the formal conditions [agreed by the buyer 
and seller] can guarantee a secure acquisition.” It is only through a civil court and the assignment of 
“rights to things,” that property and exchange can be protected. Kant considered the civil assignment of 
rights to be a matter of distributive justice, however, as we see in the next paragraph, he fails to elaborate 
how this is done. The “horse” discussion is found in, Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 64-72.
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universal scheme of civil justice that external freedom in regards to commutative 
commitments can be secured for everyone.
Kant’s vision of distributive justice is not as clearly defined as the other concepts 
of civil justice. Distributive justice is certainly concerned with external freedom and the 
obligatory relationships between individuals within a scheme of social cooperation. 
However, the discussion of this public right is limited. When we unpack all the 
discussions of distributive justice within Kant’s text, we find that distributive justice 
relates to the distribution of public right, but is ultimately referred back to the a priori 
ideal of justice without many practical examples or detailed analysis. The concept seems 
to be directly concerned with social cooperation and the civil state’s role in both 
assigning rights, but also in adjudicating conflicts between individual rights. This 
suggests that when rights conflict, distributive justice is the area of political legislation 
aimed at resolving these conflicts. These conflicts are to be resolved by legislating laws 
that reflect the principle of justice and therefore secure “the restriction of each 
individual’s freedom so that it harmonizes with the freedom of everyone else.”15 
According to Kant, distributive justice is the realm where public rights are maintained in 
accordance with the principle of justice and a broader application of the categorical 
imperative. Distributive justice, in this sense, is meant as an expansion of the categorical 
imperative, for it is broadened to a more universal concept of public right, namely; “act in 
such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of 
another, always as at the same time as an end, and never as a means.”16 Unfortunately, 
what Kant means by this in relation to a scheme of distributive justice remains unclear, 
for he fails to explain how benefits (ends) and burdens (means) of distributive justice are 
to be socially assigned.
C. Kantian Civil Justice and some Implications for Distributive Justice
The primary focus of justice for Kant is securing external freedom and autonomy. 
As we have seen, this freedom consists of both an internal freedom {free will) and an
15 Kant, The Metaphysics o f Morals, loc. cit.
16 Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 36.
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external freedom (co-legislation and autonomy in social context). Distributive justice, or 
how Kant’s social cooperative scheme fairly distributes rights, is the exclusive concern of 
external freedom and the relationship between co-legislation and justice. One 
consideration for distributive justice is the assigning of negative rights from “lawless” 
coercion. These negative rights are for Kant to be distributed evenly, so that everyone’s 
external freedom harmonizes with the external freedom of everyone else. In this sense, 
negative rights from violence, coercion, fraud, theft, and general acts against individual 
property are equally assigned and therefore demand equal obligation from all cooperating 
members. Kant states this position very clearly as the first principle o f law, proclaiming 
that the use of state coercion is to prevent interference with liberty.17
However, the assignment of social rights of distributive justice becomes more 
complicated in relation to Kant’s positive duties, or in regards to a public claim for the 
assistance of others. This complication arises from the fact that it is one thing to ask 
individuals to leave everyone else alone, and another to tell them that they have an 
obligation to positively assist another person. However, if Kant’s ultimate normative 
concerns are external freedom and autonomous co-legislation in the kingdom o f ends, 
then there seems to be an argument to be made for a fairly robust concept of positive 
distributive justice. If equal autonomy (internal and external freedom) is the ultimate, 
protective value for Kantian justice, then we must also assume that the effective use of 
one’s autonomy requires a certain civil environment beyond the realm of respecting only 
negative freedom. Autonomy as protected by only negative duties to noninterference, 
raises the question; what good is being autonomous in self-direction, if an individual has 
no resources in which to survive? Even if we assume that one has access to subsistence 
level resources, we can further ask what good is individual autonomy if people have an 
unequal ability to co-legislate for reasons outside of their control? How can those without 
sufficient life opportunities in Kant’s society effectively translate their autonomous 
reflections to a hypothetical kingdom o f endsl Kant certainly maintained that a legitimate 
and just order is one that derives its legislation from the reasoning of a hypothetical 
general united will. In order for the expression of this co-legislated will to be possible, it
17 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., 145.
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would seem logical to assume that certain political organizations would be critical in 
fostering the effectiveness of one’s autonomous expression.
The immediate problem with Kant’s discussion of distributive justice, in regards 
to positive freedom, is that he does not sufficiently explain how to secure an effective use 
of one’s autonomy in social context (external freedom). Although having negative rights 
to autonomous expression is an important step for continued civil co-legislation, having 
this negative right is useless if one does not have the means to exercise it. In this case, 
individual autonomy is a hollow procession, for it’s very existence is not only based on 
processing the ability to think autonomously (internal freedom), but also on processing a 
reasonable ability to act upon one’s own self-reflection in co-legislation (external 
freedom).18 What results from Kant’s theory of justice, is that we have a priori external 
restraints and requirements, but no cohesive distributive outline for guaranteeing the 
effective use of one’s external freedom and autonomy. More coherent principles of 
distributive justice are needed to move Kant from a priori demands for freedom within a 
kingdom o f ends, to the effective use of autonomy in social co-legislation.
D. The Idea of Effective Autonomy
It is at this point that I wish to introduce the idea of effective autonomy. The 
concept of effective autonomy directly relates to Kant’s concern for human autonomy 
and the distributive principles needed for the development of external freedom (co­
legislation). The relationship I have in mind is the following: effective autonomy is the 
ability to reasonably achieve the intended or desired result o f one’s conscience and self­
legislation in a social context (co-legislation, external freedom and the kingdom o f ends). 
The effective condition of one’s autonomy is considerably influenced by what I call an 
aspect capacity, or the interrelationship between an individual’s social environment and 
the development of their co-legislative capabilities. The concept of aspect capacity is the 
ability to formulate, hold and act upon an individuals social conscience based on 
external elements (aspects or facets for external freedom) affecting the development o f
18 My argument is that autonomy is only useful for Kant if one’s autonomy is in fact effective within social 
co-legislation. This aspect o f autonomy is different from the pure psychological ability to be autonomous, 
in that it focuses on the ability to reasonably act upon one’s autonomous conclusions in social context.
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one’s co-legislative capabilities. In this regard, effective autonomy is meant as an a 
priori ideal of autonomy and the social capability to pursue self-determined ends, while 
aspect capacity relates to whether social conditions exist that promote the effective ability 
of this autonomous capability.
It might be best to further introduce the concept of effective autonomy and aspect 
capacity by use of analogy. In microbiology, specifically in genetic research, the 
development of genotypes are often affected by the regulation of proteins from other 
genetic strands or dominant genes within a specific genetic pool. If certain genes have 
genetic malformalities, genes further down the double-helix loose valuable proteins and 
thus fail to develop to their genetically determined capacity. The area between their 
determined capacity and the actual level of development could be labeled as what I am 
calling aspect capacity. Since the gene is unable to develop to its full capacity, due to a 
failure from external nutrition, the gene suffers from a reduction in its aspect capacity 
(the restrictions placed upon the capacity of a gene by external factors outside the 
capabilities of the gene).
The concept of effective autonomy is analogous to the development of the gene. 
On the assumption that internal freedom is possible, as Kant assumes, external forces 
beyond one’s total control shape the development of one’s external freedom and ability to 
co-legislate. If the civil state reduces the possibility for autonomous development, then 
the individual's aspect capacity is reduced and the effectiveness of one’s autonomy is 
retarded and lacks external freedom. Nevertheless, if the civil state provides an 
environment that allows for the development of one’s autonomy, and individuals are 
actually able to participate in co-legislated ends, then that individual’s aspect capacity is 
increased along with the effectiveness of their autonomous external freedom.
If we assume that all human beings have certain capabilities for autonomous 
judgment and a corresponding ability to act upon them (given an environment that in 
some way supports this ability), then the area between their capacity and their actual 
development can be called an aspect capacity. The aspect capacity, in this regard, is the 
area where an agent’s personal ability for autonomous action is either retarded or 
promoted in its development by external aspects. One social scenario could be that 
individuals can reason, judge and can wish to act upon their autonomous thoughts, but are
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unable to, since political, environmental and economic factors adversely affect ones 
effective autonomy by limiting one’s aspect capacity. However, if the political, 
environmental and economic elements increase the capability to reasonably achieve the 
intended result of autonomous self-legislation, then we could say that the individual 
enjoys more effective autonomy and that the civil environment increases one’s aspect 
capacity.
The goal of Kantian justice (external freedom), it seems to me, is to equally 
legitimate the restricting external elements on one’s aspect capacity (negative freedom) 
while providing a social position in which everyone’s autonomous capabilities develop 
and function (positive freedom) towards the kingdom o f ends. In the Kantian model of 
justice, negative freedom (both internal and external) is a necessary condition of positive 
freedom (both internal and external), because individuals can only set the moral law for 
themselves if they are free from “lawless” restrictions. Nevertheless, the realization of 
external freedom requires both the reducing of inequalities created by “lawless” freedom 
and also the reducing of arbitrary civil inequalities, so that each individual is an effective 
agent in co-legislation and the kingdom o f ends. For Kant, the ultimate source of human 
dignity is the ability to be morally autonomous and to obligate oneself to co-legislated 
morals within civil society, based on universal principle of justice and public right.
Besides the problem one might have with the Kantian assumption that internal 
freedom (free will) is possible, my definition of effective autonomy immediately rises 
another critical point of clarification. A clarification is needed for what I mean by 
“reasonably achieve.” To clarify what the limitation of “reasonably achieve” means, it 
needs to be connected to the principle of justice, since effective autonomy is directly 
related to external freedom. As we know, justice requires that the will of one person can 
be reconciled with the will of another in accordance with a universal law. of freedom. The 
universal law of freedom suggests the categorical imperative, which mandates that all 
moral actions should be considered in light of whether they can be made universal. The 
“reasonably achieve” clause of my definition suggests the same, that co-legislation must
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conform to the categorical imperative in order to eliminate moral legislation that cannot 
be reconciled with the will of others and therefore violates justice.19
An example of reasonableness might be helpful. Imagine someone who through 
autonomous reflection decided that the murder of a certain race was a justified social 
policy. Clearly this violates Kantian justice and could therefore be considered 
unreasonable for an applied universal principle. In this regard, the self-legislation of the 
individual cannot be accepted within co-legislation. Since effective autonomy relates 
only to aspects of external freedom, it is only concerned with the effectiveness of one to 
promote co-legislated ends in regards to universal principles of justice. If one’s 
autonomous will violates the principle of justice, in that it cannot reconcile all wills under 
universal law, then it is unreasonable and cannot be considered for the kingdom of ends.
So what are the implications of effective autonomy for Kantian distributive 
justice? I believe the implications are that a Kantian theory of justice ultimately demands 
a reasonable effectiveness of one’s autonomy and the ability to co-legislate in a 
hypothetical kingdom o f ends. In order to secure the effectiveness of individual 
autonomy, it seems necessary to provide a civil environment that promotes the 
development of external freedom equally. In order to further provide for this 
environment, normative duties for distributive justice must be incorporated into the civil 
constitution. Furthermore, these normative principles of distributive justice are primarily 
concerned with the ability for effective autonomy and increased aspect capacity by all 
participating members. In other words, under a Kantian conception of justice, the civil 
authority has to distribute rights so that both basic needs and the development of 
individual autonomy is secured under Kantian justice. It will be my argument in section
19 My term “reasonably achieve” needs another obvious clarification, namely, how do you know when 
someone is effectively autonomous and has “achieved” the requirement of distributive justice. Although 
my response to this question is developed at greater length in my discussion of capability theory, I can try 
to provide a response here. Reaching the ideal o f effective autonomy, intuitively speaking, requires 
adequate nourishment, education, health care, political and social access, and freedom of conscious to a 
level where any less would diminish the capacity to act autonomously within an agreed conception of 
justice. In the Kantian sense, autonomous actors would rationally agree to a social contract only if they 
subjectively believed their power to be co-legislators was effective and that their participation in the 
formation of the kingdom of ends was socially guaranteed. This, as I said earlier, would have to include 
both principles of distribution and principles of right. For a different Kantian approach with a similar 
conclusion see Onora O’Neill, Faces of Huneer: An Essay o f Poverty. Development and Justice. (London, 
Allen and Unwin, 1986), chp. 7 & 8.
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three, that this idea of effective autonomy can be best understood in relation to Martha 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach.
II. Kantian Social Welfare and Distributive Justice
However, before we discuss the relationship between effective autonomy and 
capability theory, it is important to understand exactly how Kant discussed social welfare 
policy and governmental duties to equally promote external freedom. This will enable us 
to further expand his theory of justice into more concrete normative principles of 
distributive justice. Once we further understand that effective autonomy demands a 
certain amount of public resource distribution and a robust theory of distributive justice, a 
brief examination of a Kantian argument for global justice can be undertaken. In addition, 
it will be from this discussion of effective autonomy and Kantian social welfare that a 
strong case for distributive justice can be made in comparison with capability theory.
There is a problem however with uncovering Kant’s relationship between the 
satisfaction of human development, social welfare legislation and the role of authoritative 
power. In many instances, Kant seems to make contradicting claims concerning social 
welfare. On the one hand, Kant claims the political order should be nothing more than a 
minimalist watchman state. Many Kantian scholars profess that Kant envisioned only a 
negative duty of the state to protect the polity from outside threats, to protect individual 
liberty, enforce contracts, and to prevent fraud. Related to this minimalist conception, 
social welfare legislation is interpreted as an abuse of political power outside the 
legitimate scope of state duty. Only in cases of extreme upheaval or economic chaos can 
a government legitimately take positive social action to secure the stability of the state, in 
an attempt to avoid a return to the Hobbesian state of nature.
Conversely, textual evidence also provides compelling evidence that Kant 
envisioned a fairly robust system of social welfare. In several circumstances, Kant 
proclaimed a principle o f publicity, where government has a moral duty to ensure the 
“human needs” of its citizens. In order to make sense of this contradiction, it is important 
to discuss both the minimalist and the more robust interpretations of Kant’s social 
welfare theory and to attempt to reconcile a coherent understanding. From this exercise, it
161
can be shown that Kant maintained a lexical hierarchy concerning the priority of welfare 
and external freedom.20 A lexical prioritization that ultimately demands a more robust 
system of distributive justice than has typically been assumed. A system of distributive 
justice that supports the sort of effective autonomy and external freedom that is 
profoundly important to Kant’s ideal of a kingdom o f ends.
A. The Minimalist Interpretation of Kant’s Social Welfare
Kantian scholars who endorse the minimalist interpretation point to three major 
areas of Kant’s thought. The first argument is that Kant had a profound fear of 
governmental paternalism. Kant repeatedly proclaimed that state legislation directed 
toward fostering the happiness of citizens effectively treats autonomous individuals as 
“immature children who cannot distinguish what is truly useful or harmful to 
themselves.”21 According to Kant, legislation based on governmental ends produces the 
“greatest conceivable despotism” and removes the individuals right to pursue their own 
end as long as those ends do not violate the laws of justice. In his strongest statement 
against governmental promotion of social welfare and a state conception of happiness, 
Kant claims that this sort of “paternal government [demands]... how one ought to be 
happy... leaving subjects with no rights whatsoever.”23
The second argument for the minimalist state is to be found in Kant’s conception 
of justice. Kant claims that “justice has nothing to do with the end which all men have by 
nature (i.e. the aim of achieving happiness) or with the recognized means of reaching that
end.”24 All justice requires is “the restriction of each individual’s freedom so that it
25harmonizes with the freedom of everyone else.” Minimalists argue that this statement,
201 have been greatly influenced and have constructed much of this argument from Allen Rosen’s 
discussion of Kantian welfare in Kant’s Theory of Justice, op. cit.
21 Kant, “On the Common Saying: This May be True in Theory but it does not Apply in Practice,” in H. 
Reiss, op. cit., pg. 74.
22 As I previously outlined, Kant’s greater conception of justice is based largely on his principle of right 
The principle of right is “the sum total o f those conditions within the will o f one person can be reconciled 
with the will o f another in accordance with a universal law o f freedom.” Kant, The Metaphvsic o f Morals. 
op. cit., pg. 24.
23 Kant, “On the Common Saying: This May be True in Theory but it does not Apply in Practice,” in H. 
Reiss, ]oc. cit.
24 Ibid., pg. 73.
25 Ibid.
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in addition to Kant’s vague discussion of distributive justice, supports the notion that 
individuals only have negative duties to respect the freedom of others, and therefore do 
not have a duty to provide for their needs. It has been argued from this textual evidence 
and many other similar passages found throughout the works of Kant, that social welfare
Oftcan not be based on Kant’s conception of justice.
The final argument for the minimalist interpretation derives from Kant’s first 
principle o f law and the corresponding taxonomy of duties. As Kant outlines in The 
Doctrine o f Virtue, the only justified use of state coercion is to prevent interference with
77liberty. Many scholars who use Kantian philosophy as an argument for the minimalist 
state claim that Kant’s first principle o f law is the only acceptable use of state coercion.
It is therefore asserted that no state policy to improve the lives of others is acceptable 
without consent. The application of social welfare policy without direct consent is 
coercion and in violation of the first principle o f law. Furthermore, Kant’s taxonomy of 
duties seems to forbid the state to compel anyone to adopt an end. Since an end is a goal 
formulated from an individual’s autonomous reflection and choice (internal freedom), the 
state cannot force an end to assist others. The duties o f virtue are the consensual adoption 
of ends and are exclusive of the duties o f justice, which only demand the omission of 
external violations of liberty.29
As textual evidence shows, the argument against a social welfare interpretation of 
Kant is not a weak one. Throughout the works of Kant, readers will find textual evidence 
to support many of the aforementioned minimalist claims. As a result, the only social
26 Similar textual evidence can be found in another translation. See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical 
Elements of Justice. J. Ladd trans., (New York, Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), pg. 35. Also see Kant’s The 
Metaphysics o f Morals, op. cit., pg. 24. For an argument defending this minimal interpretation of Kantian 
justice, see Howard Williams, Kant’s Political Philosophy. (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1983), pg. 196- 
98.
27 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 145.
28 Robert Nozick claims that Kant’s first principle of law and the corresponding duties of justice prohibit 
anyone from using someone as a means. Nozick proclaims that all external policies are coercive without 
expressed consent to being a participant in the end itself. Nevertheless, G.A. Cohen has correctly shown 
that Nozick has misinterpreted Kant, for Kant does not only proclaim that everyone is to be “never as a 
means,” but that duty demands that we also treat others “always at the same time as an end.” In other 
words, Cohen suggests that the Kantian model allows for individuals to use one another as a limited means, 
as long as they are also treated as an end. For these conflicting arguments, see Robert Nozick, Anarchy. 
State, and Utopia. (New York, Basic Books, 1974), and G.A. Cohen, Self-Ownership. Freedom and 
Equality. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995). Quotes involved in this footnote are from Kant, 
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 36.
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welfare legislation believed by minimalist interpretations as valid is a system of social 
welfare promoted when the civil state is threatened by collapse. In other words, 
minimalists agree that Kant maintained a governmental duty for the survival of the civil 
state and that state survival can override the negative freedoms protected by the duties of 
justice. However, overriding negative freedom is only legitimate under “special 
circumstances” where the civil states existence is threatened.30 Bruce Aune perhaps 
provides the best articulation of what the minimalists accept as the only form of 
appropriate welfare legislation:
“Although Kant insists that the end to be promoted by public law is not the 
happiness of citizens but a juridical condition that ensures and protects their rights 
(or lawful liberty), he claims that ends can only be realized in a stable, enduring 
social order. To ensure that the state or civil society is stable, strong enough to 
resist foreign enemies, and able to maintain itself as a community, the lawmakers 
may pass laws that do contribute to the prosperity of the people... What we should 
call welfare legislation is therefore justifiable, according to Kant, when and only 
when it is necessary for the continued existence of civil society.”31
The minimalist argument can therefore be summarized as containing two main 
attacks. First, that the state cannot force the acceptance of an end and therefore cannot 
promote social welfare. Secondly, governmental duties regarding social welfare are not 
imperative and are therefore secondary to the ultimate imperative of negative freedom. 
Only in the case of extreme decline, can government compel welfare legislation for the 
continued existence of the civil state.
B. Kant’s Principle of Publicity and the Argument for Distributive Justice
Before the minimalists can assume the validity of their interpretation, it is 
important to reconsider why Kant thought that the existence of civil society was 
necessary for both internal and external freedom. The reason civil order is significant is 
that it acts as the mechanism to protect and foster individual autonomy and a system of
29 This argument is best articulated by Mary Gregor, Laws of Freedom: A Study of Applying the 
Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysics o f Morals. (New York, Barnes and Noble, 1963), pg. 35 -36.
30 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 97.
31 Bruce Aune, Kant’s Theory of Morals. (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1979), pg. 157.
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public right. It is the concern with individual autonomy and the right to equally express 
this autonomy socially (external freedom), that the existence of the civil state becomes so 
critical. If the civil state is ill, then the possibility for meaningful external freedom is also 
ill, and there exists the possibility that the cooperative order will collapse. This collapse, 
according to Kant, is more destructive than any legislation aimed at rebuilding the health 
of the state, and in essence, at securing the individual autonomy that provides co­
legislation and the extended formulation of a possible united general will. Kant 
understands that equal autonomy is only effective when bound within civil justice and 
therefore allows social welfare legislation in cases where the relationship between 
autonomy (internal freedom) and universal co-legislation (external freedom) is 
threatened. Nevertheless, Kant takes this concept further:
“The general will of the people has united itself into a society which is to 
maintain itself perpetually; and for this end it has submitted itself to the 
internal authority of the state in order to maintain those members of the 
society who are unable to maintain themselves. For reasons of the state the 
government is therefore authorized to constrain the wealthy to provide the 
means of sustenance to those who are unable to provide for even their 
most necessary natural needs... on this obligation the state now bases its 
right to contribute what is theirs to maintaining their fellow citizens.”32
It would seem from this passage that several important implications concerning 
social welfare legislation could be made. First, the governmental duty for human welfare 
is a united commitment reflecting the will of citizens in a hypothetical kingdom of ends. 
Second, autonomous individuals create civil society and the governmental apparatus for a 
critical purpose, namely the preservation of civil society and, in essence, external 
freedom and justice itself. From this comes the third and most important implication, 
namely that basic human needs must be provided for by the government in order to
maintain the continued “reason o f the state” (enforcing maxims directed by autonomous
'>'1
reflection and acceptance) and for the assumption of a hypothetical united general will 
to be a legitimate expression of co-legislation.
32 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 101.
33 Ibid.
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What is also important from the above passage is the implied state duty of welfare 
assistance and its relationship between authority and individual. Kant discusses a duty to 
assist others as a responsibility where “everyone who has the means to do so should be 
beneficent to those in need.”34 Like all Kantian maxims, benevolence is derived from the 
“practical love of human beings” and the reasoned judgment that “I want everyone else to 
be benevolent to me (when in need), hence I ought to be benevolent (when able) toward
i f
everyone else.” Kant extrapolates this individual reasoning to authoritative duty by 
claiming that, “indirectly, inasmuch, as he takes over the duty of the people (universal 
action), the supreme commander possesses the right to levy taxes on them for their own 
preservation, in particular, for the relief of the poor, founding hospitals, and churches, in 
other words, for what are generally called charitable and pious institutions.”36 This 
passage is critical because it suggests that governments assume the role of benevolence, 
through a hypothetical general will as a collective apparatus for the maxim, while the 
individual’s duty of benevolence is also intact. This is profoundly important because it 
not only confirms that government has a duty to maintain the existence of civil society, 
but that it also has a duty of welfare toward the people. Kant considers these duties to be 
separately important when he plainly suggests, the establishing of taxes is “not for the 
needs of the state, but for the needs of the people.”37
It would seem from the aforementioned passages and further discussions on the 
nature o f the state found throughout Kant’s writing38 that there exists a contradiction 
between the governmental duty of social welfare outlined above and the argument 
suggested by minimalist interpretations. Although no absolute discovery can be made as 
to Kant’s original intention, we can attempt to make coherent sense of his social welfare 
theory in general. It is in attempts to clarify and reconcile Kant’s theory, that I will 
discuss his largely non-cited principle o f publicity and illustrate the lexical priority given
34 Ibid.. pg. 200. This is very similar to Peter Singer’s claim that “if  it is in our power to prevent something 
bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, 
morally, to do it.” In Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs. (1) 
1971-72, Pg. 229-243.
35 Ibid.. pg. 201.
36 Ibid.. pg. 101.
37 Ibid.
38 A discussion of the nature o f the state can be found in almost every political document of Kant. 
Throughout his written works, the nature of the state is consistent with the interpretation outlined above.
166
to the position of effective autonomy in civil order. Through this discussion it will be 
argued that the ultimate protection of external freedom demands a fairly robust system of 
distributive justice and that this system does not contradict, and in fact compliments,
I Q
Kant’s principle of justice.
In Perpetual Peace, Kant outlines the welfare duties of government and the 
deliberation process necessary for legislation to remain consistent with external freedom 
and justice. Kant discusses a negative and a positive corresponding political duty that 
work in tandem to create the principle o f publicity. The negative “political” duty relates 
directly to identifying maxims that morally violate the principle of justice and are thus 
ungrounded for domestic or international law. The positive duty of government is to 
identify maxims that are both consistent and complimentary with the interest of justice. 
The principle of publicity asserts that maxims that do not fail the test of application and 
in fact promote greater justice are required to be made public and are therefore 
“reconciled with both right and politics.”40 Conversely, the principle of publicity also 
demands that unjust policies must be “logically subordinated to the juridical duty to 
reform existing injustices so that they gradually approach the a priori ideal of justice.”41 
Accordingly, Kant maintains that maxims that satisfy the rule, “conform to the universal 
aim of the public (which is happiness).”42 Furthermore, this is not a violation of 
governmental duty, as minimalists claim, since it is “the particular task of politics” to 
facilitate the principle of publicity.43
Unfortunately, Kant does not expand on the principle of publicity and proclaims 
that he must “postpone the further elaboration and discussion of this principle until 
another occasion.”44 However, unlike the claims made by minimalists who suggest that
39 A similar conclusion suggesting that social welfare and Kantian justice are compatible can be found in 
Alexander Kaufman, Welfare in the Kantian State. (Oxford, Clarendon, 1999). However, his argument is 
based on an examination of Kant’s teleological argument regarding “purposive agency” and how humans 
require economic and social equality it order to realize this purpose. A similarly argued conclusion based 
on agency and happiness has been furthered by Paul Guyer in Kant on Freedom. Law and Happiness. 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000). In both cases, these arguments are complimentary to my 
argument for effective autonomy in that they concern the ability of individuals to be an active agent in 
social context and the formulation of co-legislated social morality.
40 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 130.
41 Ibid., pg. 97.
42 Ibid.. pg. 130.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
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Kant is simply contradictory or was senile at the time,45 the discussion of the principle of 
publicity fits nicely with the principle o f humanity among Kant’s other metaphysical 
principles. Allen Rosen, for example, suggests that “the principle of publicity amounts to 
the rule that maxims are fit to serve as public laws if their adoption as laws would 
promote the happiness of all citizens.”46 It would seem that this is a generally correct 
interpretation, for the principle of publicity can reconcile the concerns championed by the 
minimalists. The lexical ordering is in place; rights and benevolence are authentic moral 
obligations, where the duty to respect individual rights trump the duty of benevolence, 
but only when they come into conflict with justice.47 It is the duty of government to test 
distributive policies and thus further the “particular aim of politics.”48 In other words, the 
duty of government is the process of politics and finding a suitable equilibrium between 
social benevolence and a general conception of equal justice. Since the united general 
will is meant to legitimize benevolent principles, the government is not forcing an end, 
but overseeing the fact that these principles meet co-legislated demands of universal 
justice.
In order to further extrapolate a universal duty of social welfare policy and devise 
a maxim of distributive justice, Rosen has applied the Kantian method of indirect proof 
provided by reductio ad absurdum.49 Since all rational individuals will that their needs are 
met, and since there are no guarantees that the satisfaction of needs can be achieved 
without the assistance of others, the rational person would will that the help of others 
would be equally available should he find himself in need of it. When coupled with the 
principle o f publicity, the government becomes the appropriate expression of maxims 
derived by a general united will, and the general united will is the collective expression of
45 Both Aune and Williams suggest that the principle o f publicity is simply inconsistent and 
underdeveloped, and should therefore be considered as irrelevant to Kant’s general theory (pg. 157, pg.
196, op. cit. respectively). However, I believe this stance to be dangerous for Kantian scholars, for it fails to 
allow for the possibility that Kant’s theory evolved and grew. Although Kant was quite old, I believe this is 
more reason to suggest that his attempt to reconcile equality and autonomy was furthered by this principle.
46 Rosen, Kant’s Theory of Justice, op. cit. pg. 182-183.
47 Ibid.. 183.
48 Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, loc. cit.
49 Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, loc. cit. Kant makes similar complimentary arguments 
in the positive throughout the “Doctrine of Virtue.” See footnote 36.
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autonomous actors, if this maxim meets the co-legislated demands of justice, then a 
social welfare policy could be legitimately instituted.50
If we are to understand Kant as having concern for providing social welfare in 
order to foster the effective expression of individual autonomy, we must understand how 
this provision would be situated in the original constitution. Rosen has tackled this 
question by examining Kant’s rational contract, suggesting that “no people could 
rationally agree to a constitution that failed to contain a provision guaranteeing (at least) 
the basic needs of all citizens. Constitutionally guaranteed rights to a minimal level of 
well-being are thus, on Kantian principles, part-of the structure of any just and rational 
civil society.”51 Rosen bases this interpretation on Kant’s understanding of the nature o f  
the state and its ultimate invention for the protection of civil society. Allowing Rosen’s 
conclusion to speak for itself, “survival is a primary purpose of political society, it is 
natural to suppose that rational participants in a social contract would give recognition to 
this fact by incorporating into the constitution of their state a duty on the part of 
governments to provide for their basic needs.” It is the importance of achieving some 
greater equality of autonomy through cooperation and the security of civil society, that 
participants in constructing the original contract would rationally accept welfare 
principles. We find that Kant confirms Rosen’s conclusion when he states:
“[Individuals] have acquired an obligation to the commonwealth, since 
they owe their existence to an act of submitting to its protection and care, 
which they need in order to live; on this obligation the state now bases its 
right to contribute what is theirs to maintaining their fellow citizens.”53
However, there remains an important question. If we understand that Kantian 
justice requires a formulation of social cooperation that supports a system of distributive 
justice based on normative principles what are some of the normative principles 
necessary for the effective autonomy of cooperating members? It is in response to this 
question that Kant fails to provide an acceptable distributive theory moving from a priori 
principles of justice to distributive cooperation. Although Kant’s discussion of a priori
50 Rosen, op. cit., pgs. 198-208.
51 Rosen, op. cit., pg. 206-207.
52 Ibid.
53 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 101.
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principles of moral imperative and the corresponding taxonomy of duties underline the 
importance of effective autonomy and the need for some form of distributive justice, 
Kant himself does not provide elaboration beyond the fact that an individual’s basic 
needs must be met. Kant’s pronouncement that he must “postpone the elaboration and 
discussion of this principle until another occasion,”54 best expresses the reason why 
Kant’s theory of distributive justice is not well developed. Nevertheless, it is from 
understanding Kant’s concern with the external freedom of autonomy and how basic 
human needs must be met to allow for the effective use of ones autonomy, that we 
understand why Kantian justice demands a substantial form of distributive justice. The 
remainder of this chapter will examine the relationship between effective autonomy and 
capability theory. It is through the following discussion that a comparison between 
effective autonomy with Martha Nussbaum’s capability theory is given. From this 
discussion I argue that her outline of human capabilities best expresses the primary 
normative principles necessary to create an environment of increased aspect capacity and 
effective autonomy (external freedom).
III. Effective Autonomy and Capabilities for Freedom
The last two sections attempted to examine and outline the normative concern for 
Kantian distributive justice, namely, the effectiveness of external freedom in the kingdom 
o f ends. It has been my suggestion that in order to provide an environment conducive to 
Kantian freedom, the civil constitution would have to implement distributive principles 
that could act as normative considerations for the promotion of effective autonomy and 
external freedom. In this section, I compare effective autonomy with Martha Nussbaum’s 
capability theory55 and suggest that a capabilities focus best provides the additional 
normative principles necessary for Kantian distributive justice and for the promotion of 
effective autonomy (external freedom).
54 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” ]oc. cit.
55 Nussbaum has written many articles regarding the capabilities approach. However, I will be making my 
comparison from her latest effort, as found in Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The 
Capabilities Approach. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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Nussbaum states, “the aim of the project [capability theory] as a whole is to 
provide the philosophical underpinning for an account of basic constitutional principles 
that should be implemented by the governments of all nations, as a bare minimum of 
what respect for human dignity requires.” With this in mind, Nussbaum suggests that this 
basic social minimum would be best served by focusing on human capabilities, or as 
Nussbaum proclaims, “what people are actually able to do and to be - in a way informed 
by the intuitive idea of a life that is worthy of the dignity of the human being.” By this, 
Nussbaum suggests that her list of capabilities acts as the normative principles in 
determining a threshold level o f capability, under which “human functioning is not 
available to citizens.” The normative social goal is to provide an environment that brings 
individuals above the threshold.56
Before I continue to outline what these capabilities are and why they might act as 
Kantian constitutional normative principles, I wish to examine Nussbaum's stated aim in 
relation to the Kantian project I have been sketching. Although I am justifying human 
dignity through a Kantian argument (external freedom and autonomy) whereas Nussbaum 
is not,57 it would seem that both Nussbaum and I share an interest in providing normative 
elements to secure constitutional principles of distributive justice and human freedom. In 
this sense, Nussbaum’s capabilities act within the area I have been calling aspect 
capacity, with her threshold level being an indicator of where autonomy is no longer 
considered effective. It should also be noted that Nussbaum's capabilities are 
complementary to Kantian justice, for her capabilities “should be pursued for each and
co
every person, treating each as an end and none as a mere tool for the ends of others.” In 
order to facilitate this idea, she states them as the principle o f each person's capability, 
based on a principle o f each person as end. Nussbaum grounds these principles in 
Kantian fashion, albeit not directly, by suggesting that both concepts are justified by the 
possibility of an overlapping consensus, where individual conceptions of the good can be
56 Ibid., pg. 5.
57 Nussbaum justifies her argument for human dignity through Aristotle’s conception of human flourishing 
and the idea of being “truly human.” Although there are many interesting comparisons between Nussbaum 
and Kant’s Artistotelian heritage, I cannot expend the effort here and note that they are different approaches 
only for clarity.
58 Ibid.
171
reconciled under a normative conception of universal justice.59 In this regard, Nussbaum 
sounds rather Kantian in that her system of justice requires “the sum total of those 
conditions within the will of one person can be reconciled with the will of another in 
accordance with a universal law of freedom.”60
The universal human capabilities, which, according to Nussbaum should 
underwrite a distributive scheme of social cooperation, can be paraphrased as follows:
1. Life. The ability to live to the natural end of ones life, and not to live at 
a reduced state where life is not worth living.
2. Bodily health. The ability to live in good health; including nourishment 
and adequate housing.
3. Bodily integrity. Freedom of movement and protection from bodily 
harm.
4. Senses, imagination and thought. The ability to use one’s reason in a 
truly human way, including access to adequate education in all subjects, 
freedom of expression and having the ability to enjoy pleasurable 
experiences. “Being able to search for the ultimate meaning of life in 
one’s own way.”
5. Emotions. The ability to form emotional attachments, not having “one’s 
emotional development blighted by overwhelming fear and anxiety.”
6. Practical Reason. “Being able to form a conception of the good and to 
engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life.”
7. Affiliation. The ability to live with other’s, to form conceptions of 
justice and friendship. “Having the social bases of respect and non­
humiliation,” being treated as an end.
8. Other beings. The ability to live with the world of nature and to have 
concern for future generations.
9. Play. The ability to enjoy “recreational activities.”
10. Control of one’s environment in both political and material terms.
“Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s 
life; having the right to political participation.” The ability to hold goods 
and property for the advancement of real opportunities.61
59 Onora O’Neill has also suggested that Nussbaum’s capability theory could be consistent with Kantian 
justice and that considering justice in terms of capabilities, might best express Kant’s ideal of justice. 
However, O’Neill takes issue with proscribing these capabilities as rights, whereas Nussbaum is still open 
to the possibility. For more details see Onora O’Neill, “Justice, Capabilities, and Vulnerabilities,” in M. 
Nussbaum & J. Glover (eds.), Women. Culture and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities. 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995).
60 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 24.
61 Paraphrased from Nussbaum, op. rit., pg. 78-80. Quotations represent her direct phrasing. It should be 
noted that Nussbaum's capabilities include considerable extrapolation of what are included in each, 
however, for my purposes a general understanding is sufficient.
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Nussbaum’s argument is that the attainment of these capabilities is possible for 
everyone and that it is generally an individual's political; social and economic 
environment that determines whether these capabilities are developed. Furthermore, 
Nussbaum claims that these are not separate components, for the development of one 
capability usually relies on the functioning of the other. Therefore, in order to provide an 
environment that develops these capabilities, it should be done with all of them equally in 
mind and with universal application. As Nussbaum suggests, “human beings are creatures 
such that, provided with the right educational and material support, they can become fully 
capable of all these human functions.”
The Kantian concepts of internal and external freedom can be directly related to 
Nussbaum’s argument for human capabilities. For Kant, the ability to be autonomous has 
internal aspects, namely the freedom from “alien causes,” and external aspects, or the 
combined (internal and external) ability that allows for autonomous translation in the 
kingdom of ends. Based on the assumption of internal freedom, Kant’s conception of 
justice is concerned with the ability to be a autonomous member in a scheme of social 
cooperation. In order to provide for the effective autonomy of individuals, the social 
order must not only “promote the appropriate development of their internal powers, but 
also prepare the environment so that it is favorable for the exercise of practical reason 
and the other major functions.”63
The capabilities enumerated above add specific considerations for principles of 
distributive justice. However, these principles in and of themselves do not constitute a 
complete theory of justice. In this regard, capabilities act as normative considerations 
within the formation of a cooperative order and its corresponding constitutional 
framework. The capabilities focus attention on human functioning and the elements of 
development that are necessary in order for individuals to formulate autonomous beliefs 
and to transfer them to co-legislation. Nevertheless, Nussbaum’s list of capabilities 
should not be considered as complete, for many of her required capabilities might not fit 
the Kantian mold, or will need to be expanded to accommodate other Kantian 
constitutional requirements. What the list provides is some normative substance to
62 Ibid., pg- 83.
63 Idid.. pg.. 85.
173
Kantian justice and how Kantian cosmopolitans might consider human autonomy in 
relation to global distributive justice.
Where capability theory still needs improvement is in the area of determining 
where the threshold level can be reasonably placed and what role questions of equality 
will play once individuals move beyond the threshold standard. I would suggest that both 
of these are critical concerns that should be advanced by those advocating the capability 
approach. However, the most relevant critique of capability theory is that it does not 
provide any further assistance as to where to place the threshold level. Thomas Pogge, for 
example, claims that the capability approach cannot deliver a more “plausible public 
criterion of social justice” than resource based theories.64 Furthermore, the capability 
approach does not seem to provide a minimum standard where capability development 
can be reasonably expected across cultural boundaries. Where capability theory has 
difficulty setting a threshold minimum, it also has difficulty providing a reasonable 
explanation why various cultures would accept any minimal standard based on 
Nussbaum’s liberal notion of selfhood.65
One answer to the concern of threshold placement can be made by suggesting that 
the more institutional considerations, can and will, take place only within the process of 
cooperation and cannot be determined without participating insight. In addition, the 
question of threshold can at our present stage of world development be largely factored 
intuitively. By this I mean, that we can usually determine when the development of an 
individual’s capabilities are hampered by their political, social and economic 
environment. For example, it is not difficult to determine that someone does not have 
significant capability development when they are beaten daily, or sleep outside a 
storefront in a state of starvation. Furthermore, since the current world environment (not 
to mention a vast majority of states) hardly provides for the development of human 
capabilities, we can, with less reservation, understand Nussbaum’s suggestion to defer 
questions of social minimums until some reasonable level of developmental improvement 
is upon us.
64 Thomas Pogge, “Can the Capability Approach be Justified?”, posted on The Equality Exchange as a 
manuscript, (aran,uiv,pau.fr, 2003).
65 Cecil Fabre and David Miller, “Justice and Culture: Rawls, Sen, Nussbaum and O’Neill” in Political 
Studies Review. (2003), Vol. 1, pg. 1-17.
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Nevertheless, Nussbaum’s list of capabilities does invite criticisms as to whether 
it can be applied cross-culturally. Although Nussbaum denies having metaphysical 
assumptions, the major critique against cross-cultural application is based on the fact that 
her list of capabilities rest on a conception of autonomy and moral selfhood. Even though 
Nussbaum argues that the capability list only reflects inherent human qualities, her 
overall argument is nonetheless “based on the philosophical conviction that all people 
could flourish better as free and responsible moral agents.”66
A Kantian version of capability theory, although guilty of some cross-cultural 
difficulty, must be based on the metaphysical assumption of human agency and therefore 
derive its normative principles from this understanding of selfhood. The Kantian 
conception of external freedom is based on the assumption of free will and therefore must 
ground a conception of justice from this notion of autonomy in order to remain 
consistent. These universal principles of autonomy are exactly the intended ideals for 
Kantian cosmopolitanism. The result of Kant’s demand is that normative shifts will have 
to occur within certain cultures in order to realize this metaphysical ideal. Nevertheless, 
the goal for a universal order based on autonomy is not meant to restrict the freedom of 
choosing one’s end, but to allow for one’s chosen end to have social meaning. The basis 
for any ideal of universal freedom, even strict cultural relativism, has to have a normative 
grounding for what it considers as being “free.” The Kantian outline that I have tried to 
make does not deny this metaphysical assumption, but attempts to facilitate the creation 
of a kingdom o f ends where “the will of one person can be reconciled with the will of 
another in accordance with a universal law of freedom.”67 In guaranteeing that central 
human capabilities are accessible to all citizens, capability theory leaves room for 
individuals to decide for themselves how useful the capabilities are to further their ends. 
“In aiming to promote people’s capabilities to different valuable human functioning what 
it ultimately strives at is to promote them as free and responsible moral agents who 
recognize themselves and others as capable human beings.”
66 John Alexander, “Capability Egalitarianism and Moral Selfhood,” paper presented for Promoting 
Women's Capabilities: Examining Nussbaum’s Approach, (University of Cambridge, 10 September 2002).
67 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 24.
68 Alexander, pp. tit., pg. 23.
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Although the capability approach leaves considerable questions for a theory of 
justice unanswered, it does provide some useful normative guidelines for the universal 
promotion of human development. It is in terms of providing metaphysical constitutional 
requirements, namely, what effective autonomy might need in way of distributive 
principles, that the theory can be useful for a Kantian strive toward a kingdom o f ends. 
Metaphysics for Kant, is the elaboration of a priori propositions approximated by 
constructed laws of reason. Kant accepts that a complete account of justice is impossible 
and therefore maintains that his principles are only meant to provide the foundations for 
future discussions regarding practical application. In the next section, I will briefly 
discuss why Kant’s belief in autonomy extends to an overall concern for constitutional 
cosmopolitanism and global justice.
IV. Effective Autonomy and Cosmopolitan Concerns for Distributive Justice
Kant outlines his argument for a cosmopolitan order in two ways. On the one 
hand, he makes his appeal on an empirical level, outlining the practical need for order 
through historical examination and through the examination of international tensions that 
plagued his time. On the other hand, he sets up normative a priori principles of 
jurisprudence, where practical reason dictates a cosmopolitan right to external freedom. 
Kant defines cosmopolitanism as “the matrix within which all the original capacities of 
the human race may develop... [by] attaining a civil society which can administer justice 
universally.”69 In a fusion of empirical experience with normative principles, Kant 
maintains that humans cannot avoid physical contact with one another and therefore must 
enter into a global constitution that secures mutual right and spheres of external freedom 
for everyone.70 Nevertheless, Kant does not tell us exactly how this international order 
will ultimately look, or provide details as to how global institutions and economic 
structures will function to protect mutual cosmopolitan right.
69 Kant, “Idea of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” in Reiss, op. cit., pg. 45-51.
70 As was discussed previously, Kant’s term external freedom is largely synonymous with the concept of 
negative freedom; meaning, the realm of protection and autonomous negative space from external 
determents and coercion. However, external freedom also has an important relationship with positive 
rights, for it is concerned with how the autonomous will is translated to the co-legislated general will. For a
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A. The Kantian Concern for Global Justice
In regards to questions concerning international distributive justice, or what some
71contemporary cosmopolitan theorists call global economic justice, Kant offers as little 
commentary as he does with regards to domestic justice. In the works of Kant, only direct 
appeals for the creation of cosmopolitan law to overcome the global state of nature are 
made. Like Kant’s domestic view, the perceived Hobbesian international state of nature 
not only continually threatens international order, but also weakens the possibility of 
sustainable domestic order. In relation to international economic stability, Kant believed 
that “civil freedom can no longer be so easily infringed without disadvantage to all trades 
and industries, and especially to commerce, in the event of which the state’s power in its 
external relations will also decline.”72 What is explicit in Kant’s quote, is an 
understanding that economic prosperity has direct effect on both domestic and 
international order. Kant alludes that by weakening the global economy through self- 
motivation, states in fact weaken their own domestic political concerns by disadvantaging 
the polity’s access to commerce. This implies that laws to maintain international order are 
in the state’s best interest, because failure to adjudicate economic and political concerns,
7“^eventually end in empirically evidenced conflict and international economic decline. 
Kant believed that to protect both civil and economic, order, an international order must 
guarantee a normative cosmopolitan right to universal hospitality. This hospitality is seen 
as a respect by all states of an individuals external freedom and cosmopolitan right to 
associate, trade, communicate and exchange ideas without conflict or mistreatment. As 
Kant suggests, “since the earth is a globe, [humans] cannot disperse over an infinite area,
similar conclusion regarding the interdependence o f negative rights and positive duties see Henry Shue, 
Basic Rights. (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1996).
71 Some cosmopolitan theorists, such as Thomas Pogge, have used the terminology global economic justice 
and international distributive justice interchangeably. It seems to me that both terms mean and function in 
the same way. If I am wrong, then it is due to a lack of expressed significance by the author in relation to 
the use of either. For interchange of these terms, see Thomas Pogge, “Moral Universalism and Global 
Economic Justice,” in World Poverty and Human Rights. (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2002), and Thomas 
Pogge, “An Institutional Approach to Humanitarian Intervention,” Public Affairs Quarterly 6, 1, 1992, 89- 
103.
72Kant, “Idea For a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” in H. Reiss, op. rit., pg. 50.
73 I discuss this topic in relation to globalization in the next chapter.
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but must necessarily tolerate one another’s company.”74 Since the surface of the globe is 
finite, “the peoples of the world have entered in various degrees into a universal 
community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the 
world is felt everywhere.”
Although Kant maintains that cosmopolitan right is necessary for an individual’s 
autonomy to flourish in regards to his need to engage in economic trade, he never 
broadens the argument by adequately discussing what distributive elements are necessary 
for the effective use of one’s autonomy on a global level. In addition, Kant never expands 
his discussions on social welfare and the implications of distributive justice to his 
cosmopolitan thought. The lack of discussion is simply due to the fact that Kant did not 
foresee the demand for complex international distribution systems that exist today. For 
Kant, the moral requirements of distributive justice are placed on political states. It is the 
duty of domestic institutions to promote a conception of justice mandated by the concept 
of a general united will and the principle o f publicity. Kant was more concerned with the 
pressing matter of how the state could be one that represented the will of the people. 
Additionally, Kant assumed that if domestic states were republican and represented the 
will of the people, then the international economic order would also come to reflect an 
accepted conception of distributive justice. Kant failed to elaborate because he believed 
that just states would be the product of enlightened cooperation and therefore promote a 
system of distributive justice that would protect and promote the external freedom of 
individuals and to meet their needs and desires.
The best that Kantian cosmopolitanism can provide is a normative blueprint. The 
cosmopolitan implications of Kant’s philosophy are best encapsulated in a single 
appendix from the first critique. As was discussed in Chapter One, the following quote 
not only represents Kant’s first transition point from his critical philosophy to his 
political theory, but also provides a glimpse of his cosmopolitan enthusiasm. As Kant 
states:
“A constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in
accordance with laws which ensure that the freedom o f each can coexist
74Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 107.
75Ibid..pg. 108.
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with the freedom o f all the others (not one designed to provide the greatest 
possible happiness, as this will in any case follow automatically), is at all 
events a necessary idea which must be made the basis not only of the first 
outline of a political constitution but of all laws as well. It requires that we 
should abstract at the outset from present hindrances, which perhaps do 
not arise inevitable out of human nature, but are rather occasioned by 
neglect of genuine ideas in the process of legislation... Even if the later 
should never come about, the idea which sets up this maximum as an 
archetype, in order to bring the legal constitution of mankind nearer and 
nearer to its greatest possible perfection, still remains correct. For no one 
can or ought to decide what the highest degree may be at which mankind 
may have to stop progressing, and hence how wide a gap may still of 
necessity remain between the idea and its execution. For this will depend 
on freedom, which can transcend any limit we care to impose.”76
B. Cosmopolitanism and International Distributive Justice.
A brief summary regarding the generalities of contemporary cosmopolitanism and 
distributive justice could be useful for a comparison with Kant. In general, albeit with 
variations in detail, cosmopolitan theories share three major elements with the Kantian 
position. First, cosmopolitanism maintains that the principle units of moral concern are 
individual human beings. Second, cosmopolitan theories share the element that this moral 
concern should be universally applied, meaning that “the status of ultimate concern 
attaches to every living human equally.”77 Third, cosmopolitanism requires generality in 
its application, proclaiming that humans are the ultimate moral concern for everyone, 
regardless of race, nationality, social status and religious belief. In regards to distributive 
justice, contemporary cosmopolitans have focused on global inequality and where the 
current global order drastically violates these three cosmopolitan elements. One of the 
major arguments of contemporary cosmopolitanism is that if we hold the dignity of 
humans as the ultimate human value, then the current global system of unequal economic 
distribution is morally corrupt. The cosmopolitan suggests that what is necessary to 
correct this injustice, is a coherent theory of international distributive justice, where 
human plight has moral priority in the distribution of wealth, primary goods, welfare,
76 Kant, Appendix, “Transcendental Logic II, Dialectic, I, Ideas in General,” in The Critique of Pure 
Reason, op. cit.
77 Thomas Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” Ethics. 103, (1992), pg., 49-50.
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resources, capabilities, moral obligations, happiness, or some combination of these 
factors.
Similar to criticisms of capability theory, a specific critique of cosmopolitanism is 
that it puts liberal egalitarian agendas for economic distributive justice above their more 
relevant consideration regarding the plurality of values that exist in constructing schemes 
of justice in a global original position. Theorists such as David Miller have pointed out 
that “in a culturally plural world there is no reason to expect that different national 
communities would all decide to distribute matters in the same way, or even in similar
"JO
ways.” Consequently, cosmopolitanism faces an attack on its underlined universalistic 
belief in equal autonomy, because it fails to consider the various ways in which societies 
conceive of justice and economic distribution. For a global actuality remains, that 
individuals do live in communities that they largely identify with and choose to obligate 
themselves, and that those societies can have radically divergent conceptions of what 
social justice requires.
However, there is a critical distinction between practical application and 
normative principles of justice within contemporary cosmopolitan theory, a distinction 
that Kant also noted between theory and practice. The distinction is made between what 
Charles Beitz has defined as moral cosmopolitanism and institutional cosmopolitanism. 
What the distinction suggests, is that moral cosmopolitanism “applies to the whole world 
the maxim that answers the questions about what we should do, or what institutions we 
should establish, based on an impartial consideration of the claims of each person who
7Qwould be affected by our choices.” As Brian Barry has pointed out, “moral 
cosmopolitanism leaves open the final questions of the ideal constitution of international
o n
society.” Therefore, this distinction is related to, but separate from institutional 
cosmopolitanism, which is focused on how to implement the normative considerations of 
its moral counterpart in some form of global governance. Although both are closely 
related and it is difficult to imagine institutional strategies without some normative
78 David Miller, Citizenship and National Identity. (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000), pg. 162.
79 Charles Beitz, “Cosmopolitan Liberalism and the State System,” in C, Brown (ed.), Political 
Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives. (London, Routledge, 1994), pg. 124.
;80 Brian Barry, “International Society From a Cosmopolitan Perspective,” in D. Mapel & T. Nardin (eds.) 
International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives. (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1998), pg.
144.
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grounding, it is an important distinction to be made, for it is critical to understand that 
“there is no automatic move from the ethical premises to any particular conclusion about
o  1
the ideal world constitution.” In other words, moral cosmopolitanism is concerned with 
what should be done, while an institutional component is concerned with how the moral 
principles are to be structured in practice. There exists an overlap between them, but the 
moral theory is prior to implementation and acts as only an ethical grounding for possible 
institutional schemes.
Nevertheless, in light of pluralist and communitarian criticisms among others, 
some self-proclaimed Kantian based theorists have abandoned their earlier concerns for 
domestic justice, for a more communitarian approach. For example, in the application of 
justice as fairness to the international level, John Rawls did not reach the same 
conclusion as many contemporary cosmopolitans. According to Rawls, “to some degree, 
the more general liberal ideas lack the three egalitarian features [globally applied] of the 
fair value of the political liberties, of fair equality of opportunity, and of the difference 
principle. These features are not needed for the construction of a reasonable law of 
peoples and by not assuming them our account has greater generality.”83 In so many 
words, Rawls believes that the more egalitarian principles of justice conflict with various 
cultural perspectives and therefore would violate other liberal conceptions such as 
tolerance. Since various decent cultures have identifiable methods of justice, the liberal 
conception of tolerance forbids that we alter the richness of cultural pluralism by 
applying liberal egalitarian principles. In addition, Rawls believed that the efficiency of 
the difference principle, in the face of states that could not responsibly control themselves 
in relation to population and political stability, was greatly compromised and therefore 
should not apply globally.
It is difficult to relate Rawls abandonment of the difference principle in The Law 
o f Peoples to Kant’s cosmopolitan theory. As I outlined earlier, Kant offers little 
discussion of international economics and certainly does not outline any significant
81 Ibid.. pg. 145.
82 Rawls claims that his “description of justice is an attempt to interpret Kant’s conception of moral 
legislation.” See John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures 1980,” 
Journal of Philosophy. 77, (1980), pg. 517.
83 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples. (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1999), pg. 51.
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model of international distributive justice. However, where I believe Rawls fails his self- 
proclaimed Kantian formulation of moral legislation is in relation to effective autonomy 
and the existence of global inequalities. It is clear that Kant believed the principle o f 
publicity was designed to alter unjust policies in schemes [global and domestic] of social 
cooperation. As Kant claims, cosmopolitan morality demands “a duty to reform existing 
injustices so that they gradually approach the a priori ideal of justice.”84 This scheme of 
justice, as I outlined earlier, contains political rights for negative freedom and positive 
duties of hospitality to assure the effective use of one’s autonomy. The effective use of 
autonomy is critical to Kantian enlightenment and the rational process of co-legislation in 
a hypothetical kingdom o f ends. If we are to envision the international realm as another 
form of social cooperation, then these moral principles have validity on the cosmopolitan 
level.85 Rawls fails Kant, in that Rawls removes the necessary element of justice and 
basic principles of mutual right on an international level, elements that are clearly not 
respected internationally.
It is in regards to effective autonomy that contemporary cosmopolitanism better 
mirrors Kant’s cosmopolitan concern. Since the international economic environment 
supports a system of radical inequality and systematic poverty, this system in turn 
supports the eradication of external freedom and forces individuals to suffer without 
means to pursue ends, political voice or attractive life choices. On the global level, 
Kant’s moral requirement is that systematic economic inequalities are to be pulled toward 
the three cosmopolitan normative principles. Furthermore, since Kantian autonomy 
demands that each individual must provide rational deliberation for the accepted 
justification of social ends, the cosmopolitan concern for a more equal economic and 
political scheme to assure co-legislation is morally defensible from a Kantian 
constitutional standpoint. Therefore, in the international realm as much as in the 
domestic, effective autonomy demands that schemes of distributive justice, based on the
84 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, pg. cit., pg. 97.
85 It is useful to restate Kant’s definition of cosmopolitanism, because it not only supports my Kantian 
comparison with capability theory, but also shows that Kant’s definition of justice is to be globally applied. 
Kant defines cosmopolitanism as, “the matrix within which all the original capacities of the human race 
may develop... [by] attaining a civil society which can administer justice universally.” Kant, “Idea of a 
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” in H. Reiss, pg. cit., pg. 51.
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idea of human capabilities, be incorporated within the normative principles of any 
cosmopolitan constitution.
V. Conclusion
The primary concern in this chapter has been in regards to effective autonomy and 
the related distributive demands of Kantian justice. I have argued that the effective use of 
one’s autonomy requires that human capabilities are to be constitutionally enhanced and 
that the capacity for effective autonomy is a critical moral concern for Kantian co­
legislation within a global kingdom o f ends. In addition, I have suggested that it is not 
incoherent to assume that Kantian domestic principles of justice are related to his 
cosmopolitan theory, since both versions are rooted on Kant’s metaphysical belief that 
individuals are the ultimate unit of moral concern and that this concern is attached to 
everyone equally, under “a universal law of freedom.”
One major critique of Kantian cosmopolitanism pertains to the difficulties 
attendant on applying normative principles in practice. Contemporary cosmopolitans
R7have suggested that there is “a great deal of room for disputes about global institutions” 
and how moral principles should be applied. With this in mind, contemporary 
cosmopolitans have been particularly careful to separate moral positions from 
prescriptions for the institutional makeup of a cosmopolitan order. Kant also made certain 
to not pretend to understand the complexities of any practical cosmopolitan order. As 
Kant suggests, cosmopolitan justice will be the result of international norm building and 
of recognized a priori juridical principles, that “will gradually build further and
oo # #
further.” In this light, cosmopolitanism has no particular predictive institutional 
complexion and will be a result of a slowly applied cosmopolitan enthusiasm. As has 
been suggested, Kantian theory only provides the metaphysical principles and it will be 
our experience and rational reflection that will eventually tell us how to enhance, apply, 
enforce and realize them. However, this will not be a simple process, or have a clearly
86 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit.. pg. 24.
87 Brian Barry, "Statism and Nationalism, a Cosmopolitan Critique,” I. Shapiro & L. Brilmayer (eds.), 
Global Justice. (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1998), pg. 36.
88 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in Reiss, op. cit., pg. 104.
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defined application theory for every situation. Similarly, it would seem that extensive 
world poverty and the substantial destruction caused by tyrannical politics since Kant’s 
time, has not been enough to provide for Hume’s “heroic medicine” and the idea that
89people eventually learn from their mistakes.
Although the awareness of global inequality has grown and the attempt for global 
cooperation has continued to progress slowly, the results are still unacceptable, and it 
would be difficult to find a reasonable individual who could not share that conclusion in 
one form or another. Therefore, the immediate goal of Kantian cosmopolitanism is to 
reduce inequalities toward the a priori ideal of external freedom and justice. Where the 
capabilities of every human being have global stature as an ultimate unit of moral 
concern. To what extent cosmopolitan enthusiasm will evolve into application is 
uncertain; for it will be the result of millions of variables, for which no explanation could 
account. Nevertheless, there is considerable difference in stating that normative principles 
are impossible to apply and saying that their application is difficult. The fact that Kantian 
normative principles are difficult to apply does not imply that those principles cannot be 
applied in practice. Furthermore, the fact that a theory is particularly complicated in 
application does not mean that it is therefore not what we ought to do. The distinction is 
important and suggests the force behind the cosmopolitan enthusiasm discussed in the 
next chapter. As has been suggested by Georg Cavallar, cosmopolitan enthusiasm is not 
based on what human beings do now. It is based on what they rationally ought to do. In 
this regard, the enthusiasm is not rooted entirely in the empirical past, but directed toward 
the changeable future.90
89 Kant, “The Contest of Faculties,” in Reiss, op. cit., pg. 190.
90 George Cavallar, Kant and the Theory and Practice of International Right (Cardiff, University of South 
Wales Press, 1999), pg. 150.
Chapter Six; Conclusion
Applied Theory and a Continued Cosmopolitan Enthusiasm
“However uncertain I may be and may remain as to whether we can hope for anything 
better for mankind, this uncertainty cannot detract from the maxim I have adopted, or 
from the necessity of assuming for practical purposes that human progress is possible.”
— Immanuel Kant
Immanuel Kant was well aware of the difficulties involved in establishing a 
cosmopolitan order. In response to the idea of a world federation, he knew that “such 
proposals have always been ridiculed by great statesmen, and even more by heads of 
states, as pedantic, childish and academic ideas.”1 Kant also realized that any condition of 
universal justice “is the most difficult to establish, and even more so to preserve, so that 
many maintain that it would only be possible within a [world] of angles, since men, with 
their self-seeking inclinations, would be incapable of adhering to a constitution of so 
sublime a nature.”2 Despite the difficulties of implementing his theory, Kant never lost 
faith in humankind’s capacity to employ practical moral reason and to therefore 
eventually create a cosmopolitan order based on a mutually consistent understanding of 
justice and public right.3 As the quote above illustrates, Kant believed that the maxim of 
universal public right is true a priori, despite the obstacles of empirical circumstance. For 
it is only within a condition of public right and justice that humans can enjoy an 
environment of secured external freedom. As Kant argues, “such is the requirement of 
pure reason, which legislates a priori, regardless of all empirical ends.”4 It is for that 
reason that we should assume for all practical purposes that a cosmopolitan condition is 
possible.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that Kant’s cosmopolitanism is necessarily a 
utopian abstraction beyond the realm of human experience. As has been illustrated 
throughout this thesis, Kantian cosmopolitanism is premised on the empirical fact that
1 Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying: This Might be True in Theory, but it Does not Apply in 
Practice,” in H. Reiss (ed.), Kant’s Political Writings. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970), pg. 
92.
2 Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” in H. Reiss, Ibid.. pg. 112.
31 borrow the phase cosmopolitan enthusiasm from Georg Cavallar, Kant and the Theory and Practice of 
International Rieht. (Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1999).
4 Kant, “On the Common Saying: This Might be True in Theory, but it Does not Apply in Practice,” in H. 
Reiss, op. cit., pg. 73.
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humans are bounded together within a spherical globe and therefore are interlocked in 
already existing and potentially existing communities o f overlapping fate,5 which 
suggests that in one way or another human beings “must necessarily tolerate one another” 
if any external form of freedom is to be possible.6 It is because of our bounded 
interconnectedness that “the earth has thus entered in varying degrees into a universal 
community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of right in one part of the 
world is felt everywhere.”7 Since human contact is unavoidable and various 
circumstances potentially threaten the existence of any form of public right and external 
freedom, practical reason dictates the establishment of a cosmopolitan legal condition of 
mutually consistent public right, where “the freedom of each can coexist with the 
freedom of all the others.”8
The purpose of this thesis has been to examine and develop the normative 
principles necessary for a Kantian cosmopolitan constitution and for the creation of a 
condition of cosmopolitan law. In outlining the normative requirements consistent with, 
and necessary to, a Kantian based cosmopolitan constitution, this thesis has at times 
applied faithful exegesis while also making alterations to Kant’s more problematic or 
ambiguous concepts. This methodology has been adopted in an attempt to provide a more 
robust and coherent outline of a Kantian cosmopolitan position. Although many will 
believe this methodology to be a beneficial and profitable tool in developing an 
alternative vision of Kantian cosmopolitanism, many others, most notably some Kantian 
scholars, will undoubtedly look unfavorably on my treatment of Kant. For some, this 
thesis will have gone too far with an interpretation of Kant that is in drastic opposition to 
their own exegetical reading of Kantian philosophy. However, as was mentioned at the 
outset, this project was concerned with developing a tenable form of Kantian 
cosmopolitanism that not only was coherently consistent, but was also able to effectively 
respond to contemporary arguments against cosmopolitan law by relativists, pluralists,
5 1 borrow this phase from David Held, “From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism,” in Mathias 
Koenig-Archibugi & David Held (eds.), Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance. (Cambridge,
Polity Press, 2003): 160-186. For Kant’s quote see The Metaphysics of Morals. Mary Gregor (trans.), 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), pg. 137.
6 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” o d . dt., pg. 106.
7 Ibid.. pg. 107-108.
8 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit, pg. 41.
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realists and communitarians. In this regard, there is an underlying theme throughout this 
thesis concerning the useful difference between examining Kant’s cosmopolitanism in the 
strict contextual and textual sense, and with examining a variation of Kantian 
cosmopolitanism that is based on various aspects of his overall philosophy.
In some ways the method of reconstruction employed throughout this thesis is 
more Kantian than critics of this approach would like to accept. This is because Kant 
firmly believed in a process of human progress that not only built upon the knowledge of 
the past, but was also a process of abstracting beyond current understanding, pressing the 
envelope of possible human development. As Kant suggests, progress requires an 
“incalculable series of generations, each passing on its enlightenment to the next,” and it 
“requires that we should abstract at the outset from present hindrances, which do not arise 
inevitably out of human nature, but are rather occasioned by the neglect of genuine 
ideas.”9 Consequently, reexamining and expanding on existing ideas are crucial 
components for human development. In this light, this thesis should be understood as 
being engaged in a normative dialogue with Kant’s cosmopolitanism, building from his 
baseline positions, while also allowing the flexibility to reinterpret, rethink and 
reformulate Kant’s constitutional cosmopolitanism. This was not done in an attempt to 
assert the final word on Kant’s cosmopolitanism, but merely to examine an alternative 
way that Kantian cosmopolitanism might be understood in relation to a modem world 
that is in desperate need of continued philosophical examination.
In providing a tenable account of Kantian cosmopolitanism this thesis has 
examined the history of cosmopolitan thought and the way in which Kant moved away 
from both the Stoic and natural law paradigm, instigating his own argument for a 
condition of cosmopolitan law. From that background, this project outlined and explored 
Kantian cosmopolitanism; examining the principle of cosmopolitan law, cosmopolitan 
right, the laws of hospitality, the normative principles behind the pacific federation, a 
cosmopolitan epistemology of culture and a possible normative basis for a Kantian form 
of global distributive justice. In doing so, the project interpreted Kantian cosmopolitan 
theory as a less demanding vision of ethical order than has been suggested by some
9 Kant, “The Idea of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 43 and 
“Appendix: Transcendental Logic II, Dialectics, I, Ideas in General,” The Critique of Pure Reason. J.M.D. 
Meiklejohn (trans.), (New York, Colonial Press, 1900).
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contemporary cosmopolitan theorists. Contrary to many conceptions of cosmopolitanism, 
the project interprets Kantian cosmopolitan thought as a form of global constitutional 
jurisprudence that requires minimal ethical / legal demands versus the more rigorous 
demand of establishing a world state or a utopian moral order. By viewing Kantian 
cosmopolitan theory as a form of cosmopolitan jurisprudence, it has better promise to 
satisfy communitarian, realist and pluralist concerns without surrendering cosmopolitan 
principles of human worth and global ethical order. Contrary to the views of some 
contemporary cosmopolitan theorists, this project suggests that cosmopolitan theory is 
difficult to take seriously when it uncompromisingly demands the removal of state 
interest and communal ties required by an extreme form of cosmopolitanism.10 In contrast 
to an extreme approach, this thesis has attempted to provide an alternative Kantian 
version of cosmopolitan law that allows for various ethical perspectives on a culturally 
local and state level, while providing a minimal global ethical umbrella for international 
cooperation and universal law.
One question that could be asked of the Kantian model outlined in this thesis 
pertains to the degree to which it is actually cosmopolitan in scope. Thus, some might be 
tempted to object that the cosmopolitan position outlined is exclusively limited to 
members of the pacific federation and is not sufficiently global enough. It could be 
charged that if the federation only included a specific number of states, then it is unclear 
how a Kantian cosmopolitan constitution really creates a sense of world citizenship and 
mutual public right beyond the federation’s own borders. Although the thesis provides a 
response to this question, it is useful to draw out some of the implications that a Kantian 
model has in relation to four contemporary issues of global justice. In order to supply 
some link between theory and practice, the discussion below will examine four 
contemporary issues in cosmopolitan theory; namely the debate surrounding the global 
economy and inequality, the furtherance of a global forum for transnational debate, a 
distinction between humanitarian assistance and distributive justice, and the idea of
101 refer here to Scheffler’s distinction regarding moderate and extreme cosmopolitanism, namely that a 
extreme cosmopolitan position requires that all moral commitments, even localized sentiments for the 
family, must be justified in relation to a particular cosmopolitan ideal or principle without exception. 
Alternatively, a moderate form of cosmopolitanism allows for the acceptance that some special obligations 
can be held independently and in mutual compatibility with cosmopolitanism. For his more detailed
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universal human rights as a foundation for cosmopolitan right. The point of this exercise 
is to illustrate how a Kantian cosmopolitan position could respond to these issues and 
how it might in theory and practice further a cosmopolitan condition.
I. Implications of Kantian Cosmopolitanism:
Globalization, Global Markets and Inequality
As has been touched upon in prior chapters, the term globalization generally 
refers to a condition of growing interdependence and connectedness between various 
global communities. Although the word globalization itself takes on various meanings 
depending on its source, most scholars generally understand that globalization is actually 
occurring, and that it has created both positive opportunities for continued human 
progress and negative effects that have hampered the life prospects of various 
communities. In some circles globalization is seen as having expanded new markets for 
cultural and economic goods as well as allowing for the cross-pollination of ideas and 
transnational communication. For others, globalization has become a threatening force to 
the idea of a cosmopolitan condition, creating institutionalized systems of global 
inequality, resource depletion and the overall effect of human exploitation.11
One significant area within contemporary debates about globalization revolves 
around the concept of the global economy, the effects of global capitalism, multinational 
corporations and particular practices of exploitation that are either directly promoted or 
implicitly sanctioned by various states, corporations and trade organizations. The concern 
is that current global economic policies promote institutionalized systems of global 
inequality, injustices and human right violations. Another significant concern involves 
the fear that globalization has in effect threatened opportunities for expanded democratic 
governance by limiting the choice and power of individuals to be decision-makers, thus 
reducing large segments of the global population to be merely the decision takers of the. 
politically powerful and rich. One only has to look at poverty indexes and mortality 
statistics of the UNDP and the World Bank to see the massive disparities in terms of
delineation, see Samuel Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), 
pgs. 115-119.
1 For a broad overview of the various positions on globalization see, David Held & Anthony McGrew, 
Globalization / Anti-Globalization. (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2002).
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• nannual income, life expectancy and living standards between the rich and poor. As Kok- 
Chor Tan has aptly pointed out, “differences in detail notwithstanding, the general 
agreement is that the current global economic structure, and the norms and principles that 
drive and regulate economic practices, precipitate and perpetuate gross inequality and 
poverty.”13
As was alluded to in Chapter Two, Kantian cosmopolitan laws of hospitality have 
several implications for globalization and the fair regulation of global markets. For 
example, the fifth law of hospitality explicitly forbids federated members from exploiting 
non-federated communities through extorted or misrepresented contracts. In other words, 
federated members can only engage in commerce by way of fairly negotiated contract 
and not through trade relations which have been established through undue economic, 
military or political pressure. This is because federated members obligate themselves to 
conduct international commerce in such a way that the possibility of future peaceful 
relations can be maintained. According to Kant, the only way to guarantee continued 
relations and a mutual condition of cosmopolitan public right is by having federated 
members maintain a consistent normative position between the treatment of federated and 
non-federated communities. This means that in issues of trade, federated states must 
negotiate in good faith and in such a way that resulting conditions are seen as mutually 
beneficial. This in itself suggests that federated members must act in accordance to 
mutually consistent principles of global justice, thus operating within the parameters of 
cosmopolitan law. Although these restrictions do not provide a particularly detailed 
analysis of how federal trade laws would in practice operate, they do establish a 
normative framework from which a mutually consistent system of global trade should be 
institutionally organized. Therefore, if formalized through practice, these normative 
restrictions would go a long way to establish a system of trade regulations that would 
alleviate many of the concerns about the exploitive nature of global markets and help to 
correct existing inequalities between various trading communities.
12 An excellent overview of these statistics can be found in Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human 
Rights. (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2002).
13 Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Boarders: Cosmopolitanism. Nationalism and Patriotism. (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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To be sure, it would be disingenuous to suggest that by instituting these principles 
into economic practice the federation would single handedly eradicate the problems of 
global inequality. For it is possible that states outside the scope of federal jurisdiction 
would continue to engage in unfair trade practices without regard for global 
consequences. In addition, it is also simply a fact of circumstance that some communities 
have been blessed with greater natural resources -  a good basis for wealth creation -  then 
others. Certain communities are at a natural advantage in regards to resource capital and 
strategic trading location. Nevertheless, the practice of equal trade relations by federated 
members would be a vital step toward a more balanced and equal condition of 
globalization. For what cosmopolitan law establishes is the normative belief by federated 
states that global economic institutions and practices should be aligned with principles of 
hospitable public right and that violations of these normative principles are not only 
unethical, but also violate the possible establishment of a condition of global justice.
II. The Protection of Cosmopolitan Right and the Global Forum
As in the case with global markets, the cosmopolitan federation obligates itself to 
the hospitable treatment of all human beings regardless of state, ethnic or communal 
origin. As was discussed in Chapters Two and Three, a Kantian cosmopolitan federation 
is committed to the principle of cosmopolitan law. This specifically disallows the 
inhospitable treatment of individuals living both internally and externally to the 
federation. In addition, federated members are Obligated to refrain from assisting and / or 
conducting business with states that are despotic or who pose a direct threat to the safety 
of the pacific alliance. In the context of contemporary global politics, a federated state 
could not hold an inconsistent position between domestic public right, while 
systematically engaging in violations of right outside its border. One obvious example is 
that it would not be legitimate for a federated member to secretly prop up foreign 
dictators in order to suit their own political interest and / or to have unfettered access to 
economic resources.
Furthermore, federated members would have an obligation not to give economic 
assistance to any regime seeking to expand its military capacity. As was outlined in
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Chapter Two, federated members can only assist other states in good faith with an 
obligation to refrain from exploiting vulnerable communities. The implications that stem 
from this global commitment are considerable and would go a long way to reduce 
diffidence as well as feelings of inequality and exploitation that exist in the world today. 
Federated members could not amass large armies and would be prohibited from assisting 
others in creating large military forces. As was discussed in Chapter Two and Three, the 
preliminary articles of the cosmopolitan constitution were designed specifically to 
maintain an overall sense of assured security from future military aggression. This sense 
of security was not only designed for federated members in their relations with one 
another, but were also meant to foster a global environment of perpetual peace with non- 
federated states.
In addition, by practicing laws of hospitality the federation helps to develop and 
safeguard a public forum for global dialogue and deliberation. This is because the laws of 
hospitality limit excessive abuses of power (both economical and military) while also 
protecting a cosmopolitan right for transnational communication. As was mentioned in 
the last section, a significant concern with globalization is the fear that systemic 
inequalities threaten the opportunity for expanded democratic governance by limiting the 
choice and power of individuals to be decision-makers. Since large segments of the 
global population are merely decision-takers of the politically rich and powerful, many 
critics of globalization argue that greater protective procedures are necessary in order to 
secure a global sense of democratic decision making. Accordingly, most debates within 
transnational democratic theory revolve around how to provide people who are affected 
by global decisions with an opportunity to influence those decisions. The focus for 
transnational democratic theory, particularly with those involved in what is called the 
deliberative turn, is that individuals have an “effective opportunity to participate in 
processes of collective judgement.”14
Nevertheless, a central critique of deliberative democracy, along with many other 
transnational democratic theories, is that they rely on preexisting models of liberalism
14 Mark Warren, “Deliberative Democracy” in A. Carter & G. Stokes (eds.) Democratic Theory Today. 
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 2002), pg. 174. Italics are mine.
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and corresponding protections already granted within liberal democracies.15 Many critics 
suggest that expanding deliberative models beyond state boarders is impossible because 
without a universal state to arbitrate against possible breakdowns in the deliberative 
process, then deliberation could easily be stalled into incommunicative quagmire. 
Deliberative democrats themselves often admit that deliberative democracy is only 
possible when coupled with some system of liberal rights and /or constitutional 
mechanisms which allow for communicative power within a secured public sphere.16 
According to theorists like Mark Warren, these liberal protections are necessary to 
guarantee a robust public sphere, the existence of a counter-balancing civil society and to
17adjudicate impasses in the deliberative process.
However, other theorists such as John Dryzek and Anthony McGrew have argued, 
on the contrary, that cosmopolitanism and deliberative democratic models are not only 
compatible, but that “deliberative democracy should be more at home in the international
1 ftsystem.” According to Dryzek, “we should think of democracy not in terms of voting or 
the representation of persons interests, but rather in terms of deliberation and 
communication.”19 In addition, they argue that discourse already occurs on the 
international level and from the expansion of an active global civil society. Therefore, the 
inclusion or exclusion of any particular group in a political state is becoming less relevant 
since various associations find expression by communicating at the transnational level. 
As Dryzek suggests, “deliberation and communication... can cope with fluid boundaries, 
and the production of outcomes across boundaries. For we can look for democracy in the 
character of political interaction that generates public opinion, without worrying about
90whether or not it is confined to particular territorial entities.”
However, transnational models of deliberative democracy as defended by Dryzek 
seem to side step the criticism that certain values, mechanisms, or preexisting
15 Deborah Cook, “The Talking Cure in Habermas’s Republic,” in New Left Review. 12, (Nov. 2001), pgs. 
135-151.
16 Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996). Also see Warren, op. cjt.
17 Warren, op. cit.
18 John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000). Anthony 
McGrew, “Transnational Democracy,” in A. Carter & G. Stokes (eds.) Democratic Theory Today. 
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 2002). Quote from Dryzek, pg. 115.
19 Dryzek, op. cit., pg. 129.
20 Ibid.
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commitments are necessary before a deliberative process is feasible. For skeptics of 
deliberative democracy are not arguing that communication and dialogue does not take 
place on a global level, but that this communication does not represent a distinct model of 
democracy. In other words, what deliberation seems to produce are mutually agreed 
resolutions at times, but it does not necessarily produce a framework for the procedures 
of deliberation itself in all cases. What is needed prior to any form of genuine 
transnational deliberative democracy is an understanding in the value of deliberation and 
the legitimacy of mutually negotiated resolution. According to many, including several 
deliberative democrats, this presupposes some conception of justice and the belief that 
democratic legitimacy is delivered by mutual communication and deliberation.
There are two supportive features to deliberative theory produced by the 
cosmopolitan model developed in this thesis. First, the pacific federation protects the 
possibility for transnational association and communication for everyone, at least within 
its sphere of influence. Second, the federation engages in external relations so that future
negotiations and mutual relations could “eventually bring the human race nearer and
21nearer to a cosmopolitan constitution.” This commitment presupposes the idea that 
transnational dialogue and deliberative communication are critical components in the 
development of transnational governance and a cosmopolitan constitution, something that 
Kant firmly recognizes throughout his political writings.22 However, unlike Dryzek’s 
deliberative model, the Kantian model provides constitutional legal mechanisms to create 
an open public sphere within the federation and for the possibility of deliberative action 
across federated and non-federated boarders, effectively bolstering a differentiated global 
civil society. In this regard, the cosmopolitan model defended in this thesis contains 
many aspects of deliberative theory while also providing the legal and constitutional 
framework from which deliberative procedures could rest upon.
21 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 106.
22 Ibid.. pgs. 102-115. Arguments of this sort are scattered throughout Kant’s political writings. The most 
significant and compelling are located in “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” 
especially pgs. 50-53; “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?,” pgs. 54-60; “The Contest of 
Faculties,” especially pgs. 180-181 & 186-190; “On the Common Saying: This Maybe True in Theory, 
but it Does not Apply in Practice,” especially pgs. 84-92. These essays are all found in H. Reiss, Kant’s 
Political Writings, op. cit. Similar arguments can also be found throughout Kant’s The Metaphysics of 
Morals, op. cit., especially Part II.
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As was argued in Chapter Three, Kantian cosmopolitan law does not require, or in 
fact advocates, a liberal world state as the mechanism for generating a cosmopolitan 
condition. In this regard, the model of federation and the room it provides for multilateral 
cooperation / deliberation within the pacific federation fits well with contemporary 
international relation theorists who do not see the international environment as 
necessarily having to be either a world state or perpetually anarchic. Theorists such as 
James Rosenau and Oran Young have argued that there is a “growing realization that the 
achievement of governance does not invariably require the creation of material entities of 
formal organizations of the sort we normally associate with the concept of 
government."23 Nevertheless, both Young and Rosenau have suggested that effective 
systems of global governance would require certain rules and / or generally agreed 
principles of deliberation in order to “facilitate cooperation” and to “alleviate collective 
action problems in a world of independent actors.”24 It is in relation to this need for the 
establishment of common principles of public right that Kantian cosmopolitanism seeks 
to institute in a system of cosmopolitan law. By creating a cosmopolitan constitution 
based on a mutually consistent concept of public right, the federation secures the 
possibility for an effective global forum and strives to alleviate international tensions that 
undermine global cooperation and / or violate freedoms granted by cosmopolitan law.
III. Humanitarian Assistance and Global Justice
Another contentious issue in contemporary global theory relates to whether global 
inequalities and human suffering are best addressed through humanitarian assistance or 
resolved through some mechanism of resource and wealth distribution. Simply presented 
for the purposes of comparison, there are two established positions within the western 
tradition of international relations theory. The first position argues that states have a
23 Oran Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society. (Ithaca,
Cornell University Press, 1994), pg. 14. For a similar conclusion see, James Rosenau, “Governance, Order 
and Change in World Politics,” in J. Rosenau & E. Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government:
Order and Change in World Politics. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-29.
24 Young. Ibid.. pg. 15.
25 There are certainly more than two traditions in international relations theory. These positions can range 
from a more Malthusian position to more extreme forms of cosmopolitanism. Nevertheless, for my 
purposes here I am concerned only with the two arguments outlined above. This is because both share
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duty to provide humanitarian assistance in order to alleviate human suffering which has 
been caused by unforeseen circumstances outside the control of those affected. This 
includes suffering caused by misfortune, natural disaster, repressive governments, 
unavoidable war, drought, governmental collapse and / or the spread of disease. The 
second position upholds one of global distributive justice as outlined in the last chapter. 
This cosmopolitan position argues that humanitarian assistance alone only alleviates 
immediate problems associated with inequality and human suffering and therefore fails to 
address the institutional factors that perpetuate conditions of human suffering and global 
inequality. In sum, there are those who favor a system of humanitarian assistance based 
on the particular circumstances involved in cases of human suffering and those who favor 
a more egalitarian system of distributive global justice, which seeks to rebalance global 
inequalities toward some cosmopolitan conception of universal justice.
A persuasive humanitarian assistance position has been presented by the 
international theory of John Rawls’ as it is outlined in The Laws o f Peoples. According to 
Rawls, there exists an important distinction between humanitarian assistance and 
conceptions of global distributive justice. As Rawls suggests, a theory of global justice is 
redundant at the international level since according to his non-ideal theory liberal states 
already have a duty to aid nations through humanitarian assistance. As Rawls puts it, 
“well-ordered people have a duty to assist burdened societies. It does not follow, 
however, that the only way, or the best way, to carry out this duty of assistance is by 
following a principle of distributive justice to regulate economic and social inequalities 
among societies.”26 In addition, Rawls believes that unlike schemes of global distributive 
justice, which demand the fulfillment of egalitarian principles regardless of localized 
circumstances, humanitarian assistance allows for critical distinctions to be made 
regarding domestic self-responsibility and the prudence from which societies handle 
themselves. As Rawls suggests, it is unreasonable to ask well ordered societies to transfer 
resources to societies regardless of the fact that they have been negligent or unwilling to
similar values concerning the alleviation of human suffering and an additional normative concern for the 
basic needs of individuals. These positions share a similarity with the philosophy of Kant and therefore are 
the positions from which a comparison will be most lucrative.
26 John Rawls, The Laws of Peoples. (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1999), pg. 106.
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7 7implement policies necessary to improve their situation. Lastly, Rawls argues that a 
system of global distributive justice is insensitive to various cultures and “would fail to
7Rexpress due tolerance for other acceptable ways or ordering society.” In light of the 
apparent contradiction with Rawls past work, much has been written regarding the 
abandonment of his more egalitarian concerns as found in A Theory o f Justice. Critics of 
Rawls argue that he is mistaken to abandon the difference principle when applying his 
theory of justice to the international level since the global level represents nothing more 
than another possible scheme of social cooperation and hence requires a corresponding
7Qsystem of distributive justice. My concern here is not to go over the well-rehearsed 
material on this subject, but to relate how the Kantian model outlined in this thesis might 
respond to questions regarding the desirability of distributive justice over a system that is 
based solely on humanitarian assistance.
As was discussed in the last section, federated members obligate themselves to 
practice the laws of hospitality and to maintain a system of cosmopolitan law. It was also 
argued that these actions would go a long way to limit global exploitation and to help 
guide the regulation of fair and equal trade relations between federated and non-federated 
communities. Nevertheless, as was outlined in the last chapter, a system of distributive 
justice beyond the protection of basic external freedoms would also be necessary to 
approximate a cosmopolitan condition and fulfil Kant’s own concern for human 
development as suggested by a hypothetical kingdom o f ends. As was argued in the last 
chapter, there is interpretive room within Kant’s discussion of social welfare and his 
principle o f publicity to suggest a consistent system of distributive justice, which at the 
very minimum favors the establishment of institutional structures to guarantee the basic 
needs of individuals. Furthermore, it was argued that this system of distributive justice 
might be best expressed through a globally applied capability approach.
27 Ibid.. pg. 117-119.
28 Ibid., pg. 59.
29 Although I tend to agree with most o f these criticisms I simply cannot dedicate significant space to this 
subject. The tip of the iceberg includes, Thomas Pogge, “Rawls and Global Justice,” Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy. 18, (2), (1988): pp. 227-256. Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders. (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2005), especially chp. 4. Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders. (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), especially chp. 3 & 4. Patrick Hayden, John Rawls Towards a Just 
World Order. (Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2002). Allan Buchanan, “Rawls’s Law of Peoples,” 
Ethics. 110 (2000): pp. 697-721.
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With respect to the question of whether a Kantian model would favor
humanitarian assistance or a more robust system of global distributive justice, the
response is that it utilizes aspects of both, but favors one more than the other. Where Kant
and Rawls significantly differ is in the fact that a system of global justice is for Kant the
ultimate goal, something for which the federation obligates itself to promote internally
and externally. However, Kant’s and Rawls’ positions are similar in one respect, namely
that Kant is willing to allow for pragmatism similar to Rawls’ use of non-ideal theory.
For example, within the Kantian model outlined, there would exist a duty for the
furtherance of global justice between federated members and non-federated members.
Nevertheless, humanitarian assistance could be one method to help bring about this
cosmopolitan condition. Prima facie, Kant’s cosmopolitan enthusiasm is similar to
Rawls’ own concern, in that Rawls clearly states that the long-term goal of assistance is
to “bring burdened societies, like outlaw states, into the society of well ordered
peoples.”30 However, whereas Rawls allows non-ideal conditions to inform the long term
arrangement of international institutions; Kantian cosmopolitanism firmly holds global
justice to be an ideal on the basis of which the federation is committed to alter existing
institutional schemes. This is because for Kant, cosmopolitan justice demands a duty to
11
reform injustices so that they gradually approach the a priori ideal of justice. In this 
regard, humanitarian assistance is only an immediate and pragmatic method for 
influencing non-federated members to move toward eventual membership and toward 
more robust cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice. Therefore, the Kantian 
position as argued within this thesis leans towards an ultimate system of global 
distributive justice through some preliminary systems of humanitarian assistance.
It is also important to understand that the federation as it has been developed 
throughout this thesis aims to maintain a system of distributive justice between its 
members and therefore does not consider intra-federated distribution as a form of 
humanitarian assistance. The use of humanitarian assistance is only one of many initial 
tools used by federated members in order to provide aid to non-federated members. In 
this regard, many of Rawls’s concerns regarding delivery systems, suitability of programs
30 Ibid.
31 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. cit., pg. 97.
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on the ground, to whom funding is given within a burdened society (anti-corruption 
measure), and its interchangeability with local systems of justice could be managed on a 
case by case basis by the federation. Nevertheless, it is important to once again stress that 
any humanitarian assistance by federated members would be ultimately geared towards 
securing the eventual possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan condition between 
communities which will ultimately “have influence on each other.” As stated above, the 
distinction between assistance and justice is only a pragmatic move from theory to 
practice in the short term. In the case of Kantian cosmopolitanism, pragmatism cannot 
inform the system of justice, as it seems to do for Rawls, but can only be one 
consideration in a move towards its ideal counterpart. In other words, humanitarian 
assistance is used in conjunction with the laws of hospitality and public right to create an 
overall condition of justice. A condition from which non-federated states could become 
participants in a larger scheme of distributive justice and therefore also be required to 
uphold the cosmopolitan commitments that such membership enjoins.
IV. The Idea of Universal Human Rights as a Basis for Cosmopolitan Right
Many cosmopolitan and human right theorists have attempted to make a 
connection between Kantian cosmopolitan right and the universal human rights as 
understood in the United Nations Charter on Human Rights (UNCHR). Sharon 
Anderson-Gold for example has argued that there is a direct connection between Kant’s 
discussion of justice and the normative principles that underwrite the UNCHR. 
Although she is correct to suggest that many of the negative rights listed in the UNCHR 
would create conditions upon which individuals could enjoy external freedom; it is not 
necessarily the case that a Kantian theory of public right accommodates the entire list of 
social rights as well. As has been discussed in the previous chapter, Kant did not fully 
develop a robust system of social and economic justice. In this regard, any extrapolation 
of social rights from Kant’s political theory is exactly that, an extrapolation. This is not to 
say that the attempt to tie universal human rights to Kant is misguided, for there are
32 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., pg. 56.
33 Sharon Anderson-Gold, Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights. (Cardiff, University of Wales Press,
2001).
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significant areas of overlap between contemporary arguments for universal human rights 
and the political philosophy of Kant. However, it would be deceptive to directly link 
Kantian cosmopolitanism with all the provisions in the UNCHR without making some 
critical distinctions between them.
Critics of a human rights approach have maintained that we should be somewhat 
skeptical of those who attach the language of human rights to Kantian cosmopolitanism. 
Especially if these theorists insinuate that Kant conceived of universal human rights 
exactly as we do today. According to the duty-based approach offered by Onora O’Neill, 
a strict focus on assigning rights overlooks the fact that these rights must have prior 
duties and / or obligations by others in order to fulfil the nature of such a right.34 In this 
sense, the assigning of rights comes with corresponding duties to perform the obligation 
presupposed by that human right. In addition, right-based theories often assume that there 
is a clear delineation between the right bearer and those who would have corresponding 
duties to fulfil the obligation. Since this is often not the case internationally, O’Neill 
argues that rights without such corresponding duties are “manifesto rights” since they can 
only produce imperfect duties toward others. As O’Neill writes, “imperfect obligations 
can be enforced only when they are institutionalized in ways that specify for whom the 
obligation is to be performed.”35 What is necessary, according to O’Neill, is a renewed 
Kantian cosmopolitan focus on the specificity of these rights in relation to corresponding 
duties and an institutionalization of these obligations into a global system of human 
responsibility.36
There has been much written on the relationship between universal human rights, 
duties to humanity and cosmopolitanism. In addition, exhaustive arguments have been 
made illustrating that alternative forms of cosmopolitanism, namely utilitarian and duty 
based approaches, ultimately reduce into relying on some underlying normative principle 
of human right.37 As Tan, Jones and Thomas Pogge have pointed out, for O’Neill the 
motivation for having duties to our fellow humans rests “on a Kantian duty to protect and
34 Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reason: Exploration of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. (New York, St. 
Martin’s Press, 1989).
35 Ibid.. pg. 191.
36 Ibid., pg. 199.
37 Charles Jones, Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999), 
chp. 4. Also see Tan, pg. cut., chp. 3.
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promote individual moral agency.”38 However, as Tan and Jones further suggest, 
“O’Neill’s duty based approach has to rely on an account of individual moral primacy 
that is rather consistent with the doctrine of individual rights.” In other words, although 
O’Neill has skillfully highlighted the point that rights make the most sense when 
individuals have corresponding duties to respect those rights, she does not produce a 
“different conceptual grounding for cosmopolitan justice.”40
Furthermore, the rights based approach seems to provide the most viable 
cosmopolitan option for any future theorizing on the creation of a cosmopolitan 
condition. Therefore the relevant question here is not whether Kant himself would have 
confirmed contemporary human rights arguments as being representative of his theory of 
public right and moral agency, but whether universal human rights are compatible and 
consistent with the Kantian position of cosmopolitan law as argued in this thesis.
As was argued in Chapter Two, the laws of hospitality assign both rights and 
duties while clearly delineating who is to have these rights and who would have an 
obligation as a duty-bearer to respect them. In the realm of cosmopolitan law, all 
individuals have a duty to uphold the laws of hospitality, while federated states have a 
further obligation to enforce the protection of cosmopolitan right. Federated states are 
duty-bearers in the sense that the cosmopolitan constitution forbids a violation of 
cosmopolitan right and that this duty is confirmed by any state that contractually joins the 
pacific federation. In this case, O’Neill’s concern about the identification of duty-bearers 
is resolved since the cosmopolitan constitution would clearly delineate who has 
international and cosmopolitan rights, what those rights entail, and who has duties to 
uphold those rights.
Furthermore, there is no theoretical reason as to why a rights-based approach is 
incompatible with Kantian cosmopolitanism. As has been argued throughout this thesis, 
Kant’s entire cosmopolitan project is premised on the protection of individual moral 
agency and the establishment of a mutually consistent condition of global public right. 
Given the language of current global politics, the human rights approach seems to
38 Tan, op. cit;, pg. 52. For similar arguments see Jones, op. cit., and Thomas Pogge, “O’Neill on Rights 
and Duties,” Grazer Philosophische Studien. 43 (1992): pgs. 233-247.
39 Tan, Ibid. Jones, op. cit., pg. 107.
40 Tan, op. dt., pg. 53.
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provide the best philosophical invention that allows for the respect of an individuals 
moral agency based exclusively on the fact that the person is a human being regardless of 
geographical location or citizenship. In this regard, a rights-based approach fits 
comfortably with the inherent individualist, egalitarian and universalized demands of 
Kant’s cosmopolitanism. In relation to Kant’s pragmatism and a transition from theory to 
practice, it would seem that “rights are on their way to becoming the accepted 
international currency of moral, and especially political debate.”41 Therefore, the 
argument that the language of human rights is an non-identifiable concept to many 
cultures is simply no longer the case, since almost every culture now at least understands 
the concept of universal human rights, regardless of the fact that they might ultimately 
reject them.42
However, some communitarians and relativists have argued that the very rejection 
of human rights by some communities illustrates that it is a western concept that cannot 
account for nonwestem values. The argument has generally been raised that the practice 
of exporting a language of universal human rights is tantamount to an act of liberal 
imperialism. In this regard, the language of universal human rights has an attached 
normative agenda to replace communal values with a non-identifiable universal 
conception of human entitlement. Many modem day politicians, such a Lee Kuan Yew, 
feel that the language of human rights destabilizes communal obligations and cultural 
self-determination, suggesting that there is a theoretical conflict between universal human 
rights and local communities. As Yew put it, “Asians have little doubt that a society with 
communitarian values, where interests of society take precedence over that of the 
individual, suits them better than a society of individuals.”43 From this communitarian 
perspective, critics maintain that the concept of universal human rights should be seen as 
meta-ethically opposed to various cultural beliefs and that some communities are better 
suited without the cosmopolitan principles which underpin universal human rights.
41 L. Sumner, The Moral Foundations of Rights. (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1987), pg. vii.
42 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. (Cornell, Cornell University Press, 
1989).
43 Taken from Nathan Gardels, “Interview with Lee Kuan Yew,” New Perspectives Quarterly. (9), I, 
(Winter, 1992).
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The question of cultural difference and its relationship to cosmopolitan law has 
already been addressed in Chapter Four. Nevertheless, it behooves a cosmopolitan 
position that is concerned about a transition between theory and practice to highlight the 
faulty logic of the two aforementioned arguments. First, it should be pointed out that the 
argument presented by critics like Yew are guilty of a reductionist sociology o f culture as 
outlined in Chapter Four.44 In this regard, Yew’s argument is premised on the fact that 
cultures are clearly definable, that a clear description of that culture is possible and that 
subgroup variants pose no problem in describing its cultural identity. Not only is there the 
immediate problem that Yew alone cannot represent the entire ‘Asian’ population, but 
there is little credibility in claiming that an entire anthropological group shares the exact 
communitarian position. This argument not only presumes that every Asian shares a 
similar communitarian commitment, but that human rights are necessarily incompatible 
with those communal aspirations. As has been argued by numerous theorists, the 
presumed incompatibility between cultural commitments and universal human rights is 
overstated and does not necessarily represent the fact that an acceptance of human rights 
is impossible.45 As John Charvet points out, many inequalities in human rights are a 
matter of political authority versus a fundamental article of religious or cultural faith, and 
therefore can be modified without abandoning an overall vision of community.46
The second fallacy committed by Yew’s argument is that he assumes that cultures 
cannot undergo internal normative shifts and that they are unable to fuse external ideas 
with their own cultural views. As was argued in Chapter Four, there is no theoretical 
reason to suggest that cultures are impregnable fortresses that are impervious to a cross- 
cultural pollination of ideas and values. An argument of this kind is unrepresentative of 
human history and immediately strikes us contrary to the cultural evidence that suggests 
otherwise. It would seem that cultures are relating with other communities and that they
44 A reductionist sociology o f culture and the three corresponding features are attributed to Seyla Benhabib, 
The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era. (Princeton, Princeton University Press,
2002).
45 For a small cross sample, which includes communitarian writers who hold a similar view, see John 
Charvet, “The Possibility o f a Cosmopolitan Order Based on the Idea of Universal Human Rights,” 
Millennium. (3), Vol. 27, (1998): pp. 523-541, Bhiku Parekh, “Non-Ethnocentric Universalism, in T. Dunn 
& N. Wheeler (eds.), Human Rights in Global Politics. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
Charles Taylor, “Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights,” in J. Bauer & D. Bell (eds.),
The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999).
46 Charvet, op. cit., pg. 536.
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often borrow, steal and interfuse various external cultural values with their own. In this 
regard, the difficult and important element in the formulation of a cosmopolitan order 
based on human rights is the fact that cultural communities will have to acknowledge 
some indispensable amount of human agency and external freedom. Although difficult to 
imagine as happening in tyrannical communities, this immediate difficulty does not 
necessarily mean that the people within those communities are themselves unwilling or 
psychologically unable to accept human rights if they were presented with the choice. 
Given the possibility for multifarious cultural identities and cultural normative shifts, it is 
not impossible to imagine various levels of subjective obligation and identification, one 
of which could be universal human rights under a unified system of cosmopolitan law.
V. Conclusion
In many ways it could be argued that the world is moving toward a cosmopolitan 
condition and that there is much to be enthusiastic about. The current world order 
sustains unprecedented levels of cooperation between states, communities and 
individuals. Peoples of the world currently find themselves embroiled in international 
organizations, systems of global trade, global communication, economic 
interdependence, cross-media infusion, complex international treaties, and other effects 
of globalization that brings the remoteness of communities together. Furthermore, the rise 
of democracy on the global level since the 1980’s and the need for communities to solve 
global problems such and global warming and SARS has created greater opportunities, 
partnerships, mutual commitments, international norm building and a growing possibility 
for continued cosmopolitan enthusiasm.47 In addition, there has been a steady increase in 
what has been labeled as a global civil society. According to many theorists, a robust 
global civil society has acted as an insurgent element, which challenges the current global 
order and forces grass-root global concerns to be addressed by international institutions 48 
Lastly, as was insinuated in the prior section, the language of universal human rights is
47 David Held, “Democracy and the New International Order,” in D. Archibugi and D. Held (eds.), 
Cosmopolitan Democracy. (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995).
48 Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War. (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2003).
204
beginning to find a global audience and more states than not have embraced the language 
of human rights by signing onto human right covenants.
Nevertheless, despite this continued globalization of interests and a durable 
dialogue on human rights, our global order still produces extraordinary poverty, senseless 
death, human right violations and dismal inequality. What is perhaps the most striking 
feature of these global issues is the fact that many of these problems could be eliminated 
if a political will to do so existed.49 Furthermore, although the world has suffered two 
devastating world wars and the threat of nuclear annihilation, it would seem that 
humanity refuses to learn from history and that the world is largely unwilling to embrace 
anything closely resembling a System of mutual public right and global justice. It would 
seems that Kant’s reliance on David Hume’s heroic medicine has had more difficulty 
producing the enlightened progress he had hoped, since states are still “bludgeoning each 
other” like “two drunken wretches in a china-shop” without ever realizing that they will 
“have to pay for all the damages they have caused.”50 Focusing on the apparent realism of 
the global system, many theorists argue that the current level of cooperation is as good as 
it gets, that communal self-interest, cultural boundaries, political brinkmanship, economic 
models, and the nature of the international system itself are all inherently anti­
cosmopolitan. The best that can be hoped for, according to this anti-cosmopolitan stance, 
is that states will control themselves through the self-interested pursuance of a balance of 
power and that enough well minded states will organize themselves in such a manner as 
to secure a power balance for the foreseeable future.
So given the fact that the world does not resemble a cosmopolitan ideal what 
possibility is there for the existence of a cosmopolitan condition of public right? As 
Michel De Montaigne poignantly remarked, “one cannot change anything without 
judging whatever one abandons to be bad, and whatever one adopts to be good.”51 In 
many regards, any change towards a cosmopolitan condition will only result from a 
conscious decision to Change current international relations and the way states and
49 For a more detailed argument outlining the manageable cost o f eliminating poverty and its feasibility, see 
Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, op. cit.
50 Kant, “The Contest of Faculties,” in H. Reiss, pg. ch., pg. 190.
51 Michel De Montaigne, “On Common; and Never Easily Changing a Traditional Law,” in M.A. Screech 
(trans.), Montaigne: The Complete Essays. (New York, Penguin Books, 1987), pg. 136.
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individuals beyond state boarders behave. In order for this to be possible, we as human 
beings will have to abstract from current hindrances toward more universal and 
encompassing visions of global cohabitation. In some respects we will have to start 
thinking in terms of the categorical imperative and whether our current behavior could be 
or should be universalizable.
Regardless of current hindrances, there still remain certain indisputable facts 
about the world that scholars of contemporary political theory must continue to try and 
resolve. It is indisputable that humanity is enclosed within the bounded sphere of the 
earth and that our actions toward one another greatly affect our mutual ability to live 
well. Furthermore, it is indisputable that any concept of communal right is incoherent 
unless it is couched within a system of global rights and obligations. For it is absurd to 
suggest that any state, community or individual can enjoy self-determined freedom when 
they are under a constant threat from external forces. Furthermore, as they stand, global 
institutions are organized in such a way that they perpetuate massive injustices and 
inequalities between various peoples of the earth. If we take these injustices and 
inequalities as an affront to the valuation of human beings as having ends in themselves, 
then it is important to seek out recognizable principles that not only facilitate greater 
cooperation, but that also protect the human concerns of various people impacted by 
global cohabitation. In Kantian terms, what is needed is “a constitution allowing the 
greatest human freedom in accordance with the laws which ensure that the freedom of 
each can coexist with the freedom of all the others.”52 This condition of justice “is at all 
events a necessary idea which must be made the basis not only of the first outline of a 
political constitution but of all laws as well.”53 In this regard, “all politics must bend a 
knee before right... [If we are to] arrive, however slowly, at a stage of lasting 
brilliance.”54
To this end, the purpose of this thesis has been to provide a Kantian alternative to 
the global order and to outline what a tenable form of Kantian constitutional 
cosmopolitanism would resemble. In doing so, this thesis has focused on the normative
52 Kant, “Appendix: Transcendental Logic II, Dialectics, I, Ideas in General,” in Critique of Pure Reason. 
op. cit.
Ibid.
54 Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in H. Reiss, op. tit., pg. 125.
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principles that would underwrite a cosmopolitan condition of public right and the 
formation of a Kantian cosmopolitan constitution. Undoubtedly, some will argue that this 
project is nothing more than a theoretical exercise and that it has abstracted too far from 
real world circumstances that limit the prospect of a cosmopolitan condition. To this I can 
only side with Kant and “put trust in the theory of what the relationships between men 
and states ought to be according to the principle of right.”55 In this regard, this thesis is a 
continuation of Kant’s cosmopolitan enthusiasm, for “it recommends to us earthly gods 
the maxim that we should proceed in our disputes in such a way that a universal 
federation may be inaugurated, so that we should therefore assume that it is possible”56 
This underlining enthusiasm stems from the premise that just because a theory has a 
degree of difficulty, it does not mean that it cannot be achieved, but simply that there will 
be complications involved in the effort to realize it. Furthermore, and most importantly, 
just because a theory has a degree of difficulty does not also mean that it is not something 
we should strive to do. In this regard, “it thus remains true to say that whatever reason 
shows to be valid in theory, is also valid in practice.”57
55 Kant, “Theory and Practice,” in H. Reiss, op. dt., pg. 92.
56 Ibid.
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